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Seven basic elements differentiate British from American trial procedures:
confining attorneys to their tables; dealing with objections outside the presence of the
jury; resolving disagreements between attorneys prior to objections being made;
presenting the defense opening statement at the close of the prosecution case; the judge
directly questions witnesses and has a wider latitude in controlling the evidence; and the
judge gives a summation of all the evidence presented to the jury (Fulero & Turner,
1997). The present experiment examined the influence of these different courtroom
procedures, judges’ non-verbal behavior, and evidence strength on juror decision-making.
Using models of persuasion to understand how the varying elements may effect juror
decision-making, it was predicted that trials following American courtroom procedures
would be more distracting for jurors and as such, they would be more likely to rely on the
peripheral cue of the judge’s expectations for trial outcome as expressed in his nonverbal
behavior. In trials following British procedures jurors should be less distracted and better
able to scrutinize the strength of the evidence that in turn should minimize the influence

v

of the judge’s nonverbal behavior. Two hundred forty-five participants viewed a mock
civil trial in which courtroom procedure, judge’s nonverbal behavior, and evidence
strength were varied. Analyses suggest that courtroom procedure and evidence strength
influenced the direction of participants’ verdicts, but that judge’s nonverbal behavior did
not have a direct impact on verdict preference. Judge’s nonverbal behavior appeared to
influence other measures related to verdict. Participants were more confident in their
verdicts when they agreed with judge’s nonverbal behavior and when they viewed British
courtroom procedures. Participants were more likely to return estimates of the
defendant’s liability that reflected judge’s nonverbal behavior and a congruency with
evidence strength. Participants also recalled more facts in the British conditions than in
the American conditions. These findings are interpreted as indicating the importance of
the impact of trial procedures and of nonverbal influence.
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Chapter One.* Introduction and Literature Review
Trial by jury is a unique system of justice that has origins dating back to the
Norman invasion of Britain in 1066 AD (Hans & Vidmar, 1986; Kempin, 1990). No
other nations, besides the United States and Britain, rely so heavily on ordinary citizens
to make its most important decisions (Adler, 1994).
1

American and British courts have been said to exemplify adversarial models of
procedural justice (Lind, Erickson, Friedland, & Dickenberger, 1978). Yet, as Fulero and
Turner (1997) noted, “[American] attorneys, judges, and legal scholars have become
increasingly critical of the handling of cases in American courts” (pp. 439). Many of the
recent and more eminent cases, such as the notorious O.J. Simpson case, have displayed
the excessively combative nature of American trials. Those who have observed trials in
both Britain and the United States note that British trials contain a more civil and
cooperative atmosphere within the courtroom. (Enoch, 1994).
This more civil and cooperative atmosphere is not merely due to the barristers’
wigs and robes seen in British courts. Rather, British trial procedures seem much more
somber in contrast to their American counterparts (Collett, 1995). British barristers
remain behind their one long table and simply stand up behind that table when they are
questioning a witness, addressing the judge, or addressing opposing council. They also
rarely, if ever, object to a line of questioning. Most often in British courts it will be the
judge who will object to or redirect a line of questioning. A British judge also gives a
summation to the jury of all the evidence presented in the case. The judge presents this
summary before instructing the jury on how to apply the relevant laws in the case.
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Confining lawyers to their table, and limiting objections, sidebar conferences and other
distractions common to American courts might enhance an individual juror’s ability to
process information systematically. Jurors would not be distracted by these other events
and they could then concentrate on the vast amounts of evidence brought forth during a
trial.
In American courts, there have been numerous court cases that were overturned
because judges’ biased nonverbal communication unduly influenced the jury and thus
breached the defendants’ right to a fair and impartial trial (Qffutt v. US. 1954; US v.
Beaty, 1983; US v. Frazier. 1978; US v. Nazzaro, 1973; Walker v. Lockhart, 1984). If,
within American courts, judge’s nonverbal behavior is so egregious as to impede a
defendant’s right to a fair trial, one can only presume that there are similar occurrences
within British courts due to the basic similarities of the adversarial system. As discussed
previously, there are several possible advantages to British trial procedures, but given the
potential prejudicial effects of judge’s nonverbal behavior, the imposing role of the
British trial judge serves as a possible drawback to wholly using British trial procedures.
In British trials, the judge plays a more imperious role than in American trials. This
provides jurors with more exposure to the judge; therefore, the potential for the judge to
influence the jury is greater. The major objectives of the current study include: (1) an
exploration of the effects, if any, of British and American trial procedures; (2) an
investigation of the effect of judicial behavior on the decision-making of jurors; (3)
examining the extent to which trial procedures (British vs. American) interact with the
apparent bent of judge’s nonverbal behavior to influence juror decision-making; and (4)

1 It is im portant to note that the British trials described in this research only include jury trials conducted in England and Wales.
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trying to understand the conditions under which jurors may use judge’s nonverbal
behavior in making verdict decisions. Do British trials provide jurors with more
exposure to the judge which in turn unduly influences their decision-making or is it not
merely exposure to the judge, but rather other elements which inhibit the ability of the
individual juror to attend and process to trial evidence?
Procedural Differences Between British and American Trial Procedures
Fulero and Turner (1997) noted that British trials are said to be more civil than
American trials. They identified several procedural differences between British and
American courts. Some of these procedural differences between British and American
courts are: (1) confining attorneys to their tables rather than allowing them walk about the
courtroom; (2) dealing with objections outside the presence of the jury; (3) resolving
disagreements between opposing attorneys before objections are made; and (4) presenting
the defense opening statement at the close of the prosecution case rather than at the
beginning of the trial. In addition, judges have a more active role in controlling evidence
in British than in American trials; they directly question witnesses and provide
summaries of the evidence to the jury after the closing arguments and before instructions
(Fulero & Turner, 1997; Baldwin & McConville, 1979; Darbyshire, 1992).
Fulero and Turner (1997) manipulated these seven procedural differences
between British and American trials and measured their effect on the final verdict and
perceptions of the trial. They examined whether the use of these British courtroom style
procedures led to a trial that was perceived as more civil than the American courtroom
style without affecting verdict. Participants viewed one of three versions of a videotaped

Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate legal jurisdictions and trials within those countries are conducted in an entirely different
fashion
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trial: (1) a British version conducted by British legal professionals; (2) an American
version (which lacked the British trial elements) conducted by American legal
professionals; and (3) a British version conducted by American legal professionals.
Results of their study indicated that participants perceived the British trial
procedures, conducted by either British or American legal professionals, as more civil
and viewed the judge in the British trial more positively than the judge in the American
version (Fulero & Turner, 1997). In terms of verdict, there was no significant affect
between the trial conditions. Even though participants perceived the British trial as more
civil and the British judge was viewed more positively than the American judge,
participants preferred the American trial version.
The present research poses the question: Does the more civil atmosphere of the
British courtroom, which is created by the seven elements noted previously, create an
arena in which jurors are better able to process trial evidence systematically? The results
of Fulero and Turner’s research have indicated that civility may not be correlated with
preferences for style of adjudication. Mock jurors may prefer the more churlish
American version of the trial, but this extreme antagonism may create distractions for
jurors that impede their scrutiny of the evidence.
Fulero and Turner’s results of procedural preference substantiate results from
research conducted by Walker, LaTour, Lind and Thibaut (1974) and Lind, Erickson,
Friedland, and Dickenberger (1978) on procedural justice. Walker, et al., (1974) and
Lind, et al., (1978) delineate two distinct procedural models in civil cases used
throughout the world. Trial courts that derive their legal system from English common
law follow what is known as an adversarial model (i.e., British, Canadian, and US courts

4

are examples of adversarial models.) In adversarial models there are two disputing
parties represented by attorneys who are skilled in argument and persuasion. The choice
of what evidence is presented to either an impartial jury or a judge is left to the discretion
of the disputing parties. In essence, control over adjudication is left in the hands of the
disputing parties. Legal systems that are based off of the Code-Napoleon, the
inquisitorial model, are essentially the opposite of the previously described adversarial
systems based off of Anglo-American law (French and German courts are among the
many examples of the inquisitorial model.) In the inquisitorial model, an impartial
representative of the court conducts an investigation of the dispute. In most cases the
presiding judge or a panel of judges questions witnesses. In the inquisitorial model, the
control of the trial rests in the hands of the judge or panel of judges (i.e., the inquisitor).
In research conducted by Walker, LaTour, Lind, and Thibaut (1974) participants
served as defendants in a trial as the result of some controversy stemming from the initial
experimental activity, which was a business simulation. Other participants served as
observers of the trial. Observers had no prior knowledge of the defendant’s guilt or
innocence. The study evaluated participants’ perception of the adjudication when they
varied adversarial versus non-adversarial procedures, prior belief about guilt, and the
favorableness of the final judgment. Results indicated that the defendant-participants
viewed the adversarial procedure as most fair and were most satisfied with judgments
resulting from this procedure. These results were all independent of pretrial belief or
favorableness of verdict. There was also a preference on the part of defendantparticipants for innocent verdicts, again, regardless of their pretrial belief. Observers
rated the adversary procedure as most fair and preferred innocent over guilty verdicts.
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As Walker, et al., pointed out the results of this study indicate that the adversarial
model induces greater trust and satisfaction in participants. Observers see the adversarial
model as more fair than the inquisitorial. The findings of their study suggest that if
elements of the inquisitorial model were presented in the United States, parties to
litigation and the observing public would find these procedures unfair and litigants would
not have faith in verdicts that were derived from these procedures.
Walker, et al.’s study was conducted in the United States with participants that
were most likely familiar with the American adversarial model of adjudication. A later
study conducted by Lind, Erickson, Friedland, and Dickenberger (1978), looked at
reactions to different models of adjudication from a cross-national perspective.
Participants from the United States, Britain, France and West Germany2 were randomly
assigned to the roles of plaintiff or defendant. Participants then read descriptions of four
different models of adjudication. The researchers chose the four different models
because they appeared to represent different distinct points on a “conceptual continuum
of systemic adversariness,” (cited in Lind, et al., 1978, p. 320). The American and
British trial procedures represented the adversarial model, which is at one end of the
continuum and the French and West German trial procedures represented the inquisitorial
model of adjudication, the other extreme of this continuum. Thibaut and Walker (1975)
suggested that it is the perceived distribution control between the decision-maker (i.e., the
judge) and the disputants which will determine the amount of satisfaction and preference
with the adjudication procedure. The “continuum of systemic adversariness” could also
be conceptualized as a continuum of distributed control, with the more adversarial

2T his study was conducted prior to the reunification of W est and East Germany in 1989.
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models (American and British) at the end where over control litigation is in the hands of
the disputing parties, and the inquisitorial models (French and West German) at the other
end of the continuum with control mostly in the hands of the decision-maker.
Lind, et al., (1978) found that even in countries with legal systems based on the
inquisitorial model, there was a general preference for the adversarial model. Defendant
participants had a somewhat greater preference for the adversarial model than plaintiff
participants did. Also, participants tended to indicate that they perceived greater control
in their roles as disputing parties in the adversarial model than in the inquisitorial model.
Some interesting findings regarding British participants was that they gave nearly
equivalent ratings to the adversary model and the model that contained two investigators
who were aligned with the decision-maker (they also had the same results with French
participants). Also, with the model in which there was only one investigator aligned with
the decision-maker, British participants, more so than others, perceived as leaving little
control in the hands of disputing parties and the decision-maker: all the control was
perceived to be in the hands of the investigator. One interpretation of these findings with
British participants was that the double investigator model may be more analogous to
their own legal system. The courtroom procedures used in the British legal system appear
to engender a more cooperative environment between the attorneys for the disputing
parties and the decision-maker, especially in comparison to their American counterparts.
The results obtained by Lind, et ah, from British participants may be due to the fact they
do not perceive and change in control between the adversarial model and the double
investigator model, based on their familiarity with their own legal system..
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The focus of the current study is not on preference or satisfaction with a particular
adjudicative model, rather the current study examines what influence the elements that
differ between British and American trial procedures can have on verdict decisions by
jurors. Fewer distractions (i.e., objections, outbursts, and sidebar conferences), the
judge’s summation of trial evidence, and the judges’ greater control of the courtroom
proceedings can conceivably create an atmosphere in which jurors can effectively attend,
process, and scrutinize trial evidence. In essence, the same elements that Fulero and
Turner noted as creating an atmosphere of civility within British courts may be the same
elements that also create an atmosphere in which jurors are better able to reach the
considered verdicts that the law requires.
Some of the elements that may influence jurors’ decision-making are the
procedural differences that can be distracting. Potentially distracting elements of a trial
are the constant objections made by either of the disputing parties, side-bar conferences,
and outbursts. These distracting elements are more common in American courts.
The British judge’s greater control of the courtroom, which includes asking
questions of witnesses directly and summation of the evidence, may also influence juror
decision-making. British judges tend to exhibit a greater degree of control over
courtroom proceedings. They manage proceedings in such a way that there is a more
continual flow of information, because there are fewer objections and judges take it upon
themselves to either redirect questioning or object to a line of questioning (Darbyshire,
1992). In contrast, American judges adopt a more reserved role during the course of the
trial. They allow the attorneys more control over the trial proceedings and normally
contribute when they must rale on an objection. These dynamics may elicit the elements
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that produce an environment that is ultimately distracting to jurors, (e.g., frequent
objections) and drawing jurors’ attention away from their main task of scrutinizing trial
evidence.
There is no research to suggest that the other elements confining attorneys to their
tables, which is unique to British trials, influence juror decision-making. Yet, there is
research demonstrating that presenting the defense opening statement at the close of the
prosecution’s case rather than at the beginning of the trial may have an effect on the way
jurors go about processing the trial evidence. Research on the positioning of opening
statements has shown that whichever party is allowed to present their opening statement
first is the party that is most likely to set thematic framework for the trial (Pyszczynski,
Greenberg, Mack, & Wrightsman, 1981; Pyszczynski & Wrightsman, 1981; Wells,
Miene, & Wrightsman, 1985). As such, jurors will use that particular framework to guide
their processing and interpretation of evidence (Wrightsman, Nietzel, & Fortune, 1994).
Given these results, it seems that the defense statement would only affect the processing
of trial evidence by jurors if it came before the prosecution or plaintiffs opening
statement. Given that the aim of this research is to examine the differences between
actual British and American trial procedures, it will not matter where the defense’s
opening statement is located; it will not have a large impact because it follows the
prosecution’s opening statement in both procedures. The procedural differences of
confining attorneys to their tables and the variation between the locations of the defense
opening statement are considered to be non-detrimental to juror decision-making in the
present research. They were retained for the purpose of maintaining authenticity between
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the two trial procedures and for achieving the overarching goals of this research, which is
to analyze the impact of the two trial systems on juror decision-making.
Fewer distractions during the course of the trial, along with the greater control of
the judge over the trial proceedings could potentially assist jurors by creating an
atmosphere in which there are few disruptions in thought. In this environment, jurors can
better process and retain information presented to them and later evaluate that
information. This increased ability to process is especially important in more complex
trials (i.e., those containing scientific evidence or otherwise complicated evidence) that
require a greater amount of attention and more cognitive resources to process the
information. If many distractions occur, such as objections and side-bar conferences,
jurors may not be able to focus, accumulate, or evaluate this information. This inability
to evaluate evidence effectively may cause jurors to be particularly susceptible to the
influence of judges’ nonverbal indications of bias for or against a particular litigant.
Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior
Judges have access to a large amount of background information in a trial,
including inadmissible evidence that will never appear before the jury. It is likely that
this information will influence the opinions that judges form about the merits of a
particular case. Resnik (1982) notes that judges may form opinions of litigants based on
inadmissible evidence or pretrial testimony similar to any other person given this kind of
information. Judges may communicate their beliefs about these key individuals through
their nonverbal behavior. “Laughter, nods, expressions of anger, and the like can
intentionally or unintentionally communicate what the judge thinks” (Levine, 1992,
p.72). This nonverbal behavior may be an influential piece of information that jurors
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bring with them to the jury room, especially in the face of a diminished ability to
systematically process the evidence presented at the trial.
In re Murchinson (1955) the Supreme Court of the United states determined that
due process of law requires that a trial judge conduct a fair, orderly, and impartial trial
In Offutt v. United States (1954) judges were required to “satisfy the appearance of
justice.” The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (1987) actually delineate permissible
limits of judicial behavior. The courts recognize that not only is overt behavior on the
part of the judge impermissible, but more subtle verbal and nonverbal behavior is
unacceptable judicial behavior, as well, and can potentially violate a defendant’s right to
a fair trial (State v. Lamont, 1976). Currently, appellate courts recognize that there are
more subtle forms of judicial influence but only the most egregious cases of undue
judicial influence are reversed on these grounds alone.
As noted previously, there have been numerous court cases that have been
overturned because a judges’ biased nonverbal communication unduly influenced the jury
(Offutt v. US, 1954; US v. Beaty. 1983; US v. Frazier. 1978; US v. Nazzaro, 1973;
Walker v. Lockhart, 1984). Ekman and Friesen (1969) noted that it is easier for people to
exert conscious control over verbal communication than over their nonverbal
communication. Because it is difficult to control, people may inadvertently communicate
their attitudes and biases through nonverbal behaviors. Ekman and Friesen called this
process leakage.
Blanck, Rosenthal, and Cordell (1985) conducted an extensive examination of
judges’ beliefs about defendants, judges’ behavior, and jurors’ judgments of guilt in
actual trials. They found that defendants’ background characteristics, such as prior
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criminal history, were related to the judges’ expectations of guilt (Blanck et a l, 1985).
They also noted that judges’ nonverbal communication while instructing juries differed
depending on their belief about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Evaluators perceived
the judges’ delivery of the instructions as less warm, less competent, less wise, and raters
also viewed the judges as more anxious when they had an expectation of guilt. Juries
were more likely to bring back guilty verdicts when judges were perceived as less
professional, less dogmatic, and not as wise.
There findings, however, indicated that when comparing jury verdicts and judges’
perceptions of what the verdict should be the researchers found a negative relationship
between the two. It seemed that even though the judge’s behavior varied when their
perceptions of the defendant’s guilt or innocence differed, it did not appear to bias jurors’
verdicts in the similar direction of the judge’s verdict perception. In these situations
jurors returned verdict that were contrary to the judge’s perceptions of what the trial
outcome should be. Possible explanations for this negative relationship could be that
juror’s perceptions of what the judge’s nonverbal behavior indicated was divergent to the
judge’s expectations or they simply were not influenced by the judge’s behavior.
Blanck et al.’s (1985) study was an observational study and not a study that
systematically manipulated the courtroom setting. Blanck et al.’s study did not allow for
causal inferences about the effect of judges’ nonverbal communication on jurors and jury
verdicts. Researchers have manipulated jurors’ exposure to judges’ expectations in a few
studies (Halverson, Hallahan, Hart, & Rosenthal, 1997; Hart, 1991, 1995). One study
specifically examined the effects of judges’ expectation of defendants’ guilt on jury
verdicts (Hart, 1995). Jury eligible adults listened to audiotaped testimony and then
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watched a videotape of actual trials in which one of three judges read jury instructions.
Individual differences among judges were controlled by having each of the three judges
read instructions for a case in which they thought the defendant was guilty and for a case
in which they thought the defendant was not guilty. In one condition, participants
watched a videotape in which the judge believed the defendant was guilty, and in the
other condition participants viewed a judge who felt the defendant was not guilty. In each
condition, subjects heard the same testimony and the judges’ instructions were equal in
terms of content across conditions, as well. Even when jurors were advised to disregard
the judge’s behavior and form their own opinions, participants tended to return verdicts
concordant with the judges’ view of the case. In another study, independent raters viewed
the delivery of the jury instructions from the previously described study and evaluated the
extent to which the judge’s believed the defendant was guilty (Hart, 1991). Raters’
assessments of the judge’s nonverbal behavior were highly predictive of the judges’
expectations in the case.
Most recently, researchers examined if simplified jury instructions would reduce
the biasing effects of judges’ nonverbal behavior (Halverson, Hallahan, Hart, &
Rosenthal, 1997). In the study, participants were randomly assigned to conditions in
which they were given either standard or simplified jury instructions. All the participants
then heard the same audiotape of testimony from an actual trial and then proceeded to
view a videotape of one of two judges: one judge who believed the defendant was guilty
or another who believed the defendant was innocent. Participants who heard the standard
jury instructions were more likely to return a verdict that was in concordance with the
judges’ expectations than were participants who heard the simplified instructions. Thus,
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higher complexity instructions increased the influence of judges’ nonverbal
communication on participant verdicts.
As noted earlier, these series of experiments serve as the only empirical analysis
that manipulated jurors’ exposure to judges’ expectations. These experiments focused
primarily on judges’ nonverbal behavior only during the delivery of jury instructions. The
nature and extent of judicial influence may be a naturally occurring expectation effect
that happens throughout the trial. Factors such as reduced ability to process information
and an increased interaction with the judge may increase the likelihood that jurors use the
judges’ nonverbal behavior as a peripheral cue in decision-making.
Elaboration Likelihood Model and Heuristic Systematic Model
Research on persuasion may enable us to predict how the different trial
procedures interact with judges’ nonverbal behavior to influence juror verdicts. The
“heuristic-systematic model” (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) and the
“elaboration likelihood model” (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) describe two major
processes that lead to persuasion. The central route, or systematic processing (Petty &
Cacioppo, 1989; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989), is conceived as a comprehensive,
analytic orientation in which people scrutinize and analyze all the information that is
relevant and important to the judgment task at hand. Persuasion is then a function of the
quality of the arguments that are presented in the message; greater argument quality leads
to greater persuasion (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981).
Research has shown that people do not always engage in systematic processing of
information. Rather, in situations where they lack motivation or domain-specific
knowledge or are confronted by situations that impair the ability to process when the
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ability is present (e.g. distraction, time-pressures, etc.) they may turn to a peripheral or
heuristic processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). The
peripheral route, or heuristic processing, demands less cognitive effort and capacity than
the central route. People use heuristic decision rules (i.e., declarative and procedural
knowledge structures) and peripheral cues (i.e., simple cues that affect attitudes in the
absence of central processing) that do not involve attention to message quality as
shortcuts for evaluating a persuasive message. Source credibility, source likeability,
mood, mere number of arguments, and stereotypes have been shown to be the sole
determinants of attitude change (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Cacioppo & Petty,
1979b; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Cooper, Bennett & Sukel, 1996; Macrae,
Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Schumann, Richman, &
Strathman, 1993).
When individuals have high motivation, ability, and opportunity to process
information, they engage in more effortful cognitive processing, called high elaboration,
or systematic processing. In these situations, central cues such as existing beliefs,
argument quality, and initial impression are important in determining persuasion effects
(i.e., enduring positive attitude change or resistance to attitude change). In contrast, when
motivation, ability, or opportunity is low, individuals are either not willing or unable to
engage in a high level of processing. In this low elaboration situation, peripheral
persuasion cues or heuristic rales of thumb such as communicator attractiveness,
credibility or expertise, similarity, power, repetition of a simple message which increases
the liking of a message, clarity, ordering and rewards within the message are all factors
that determine persuasion effects. Persuasion effects range from a temporary attitude
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shift to retaining the initial attitude. Individual difference variables, such as, a need to
scrutinize all information (i.e. need-for-cognition), a need to monitor behavior in order to
convey an appropriate image at all times (i.e. self-monitoring), or varying levels of
personal involvement on different issues, are examples of variables that can affect
motivation to process information systematically. Variables that can affect ability to
process information centrally or systematically are such things as the complexity level of
a message, comprehensibility, rate or speed of message delivery, and distraction.
According to these dual process models, the distractions caused by American
courtroom proceedings should increase jurors’ use of heuristic decision rales and
peripheral cues. The constant objections, sidebar conferences, and open derisions made
by opposing attorneys during an American trial may be highly distracting to jurors and as
such may reduce systematic processing of trial evidence.
Empirical research supports the view that distraction inhibits systematic
processing by disrupting the thoughts that would normally be elicited by the persuasive
message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Petty, Wells, and Brock (1976) found that distraction
was especially consequential as a thought disrupter when motivation and/or ability to
process a message was high. In their experiment, they systematically manipulated
argument quality (high vs. low quality arguments) and distraction when motivation to
process was high. Two discrepant messages concerning a 20% tuition increase at the
participant's university were prepared for the experiment. Participants listened through
headphones to a pre-recorded message that was either easy to counterargue and elicited
more negative thoughts due to the negative content or one that was more difficult to
counterargue, yet elicited more positive thoughts due to the content. The distraction task
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required subjects to record on paper the quadrant in which each “X ” flashed on a
projector screen. The “X ’s” were flashed at varying intervals during the message.
Results indicated that increased distraction was associated with a decrease in the number
of counterarguments generated. There was also a significant message quality and
distraction interaction. Participants who were not highly distracted were able to
counterargue the low quality arguments more easily than participants in the highly
distracted conditions were. There were also significantly more favorable thoughts were
generated for the difficult to counterargue message when distraction was low than in any
other condition. Distraction serves as a disruption to thoughts that would normally be
elicited by a message and would be most disruptive when people are highly motivated
and able to process information (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
As noted previously, many distractions exist within American courts and include
constant objections, lawyers approaching the bench, and extensions during the trial that
create a sort of “stop-start” atmosphere to the trial. These courtroom distractions can be
likened to the task of counting the flashing “X ’s” used in Petty et al. (1976; they serve as
a thought disruption and reduce a persons’ ability to process information). Given the
results of Petty et al., disruptions in the court could potentially lead to either a reliance on
heuristic decision rales or peripheral cues because jurors are unable to fully process and
cogitate over the information presented. Since jurors may feel they need to make a
decision, in distracting situations they may turn to other cues or heuristic shortcuts to aid
in their decision process,
Cacioppo and Petty (1979b) predicted that if a person were already motivated to
think about a more complex message, repeating the message would give individuals a
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greater opportunity to cogitate over the arguments presented. For example, if an
argument contained slightly complex and compelling ideas, people would be likely to
generate additional pro-attitudinal thoughts concerning the argument with each repetition
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1979b). As noted previously, message repetition can also serve as a
peripheral cue. The difference in the utility of message repetition as either a peripheral or
central cue to processing lies in the complexity of the message. When a message is more
complex, repetition provides the audience with another opportunity to ruminate over the
information. When a message is simple, repetition breeds familiarity and it is then this
familiarity that becomes a peripheral cue to processing. Commercials and ads, depicting
simple phrases or messages are good examples of how message repetition breeds
familiarity. A good example of this would be in terms of buying soda. When you think
of soda, you think of Pepsi®, or Coke®, and not necessarily Fanta®; this is because
Fanta® does not barrage the television viewing audience with commercials (which use
other persuasion factors as well.)
Cacioppo and Petty (1979b) conducted an experiment in which participants, who
were university students, were exposed to eight cogent arguments for increasing
university expenditures. Half the participants were led to believe that the money would
come from a tuition increase (this was considered a counter-attitudinal message) and the
other half were led to believe the money would come from a tax on visitor services (a
pro-attitudinal message). Participants were randomly exposed to one, three, or five
repetitions of either of the previously described messages. Results of this experiment
indicated that repeating the message three times led to more agreement with the advocacy
of the message than a single presentation. Participants generated more favorable
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thoughts and fewer unfavorable thoughts concerning the message when it was repeated
three times. When the message was repeated five times, agreement with the message
advocated declined. Cacioppo and Petty (1979b) suggest that this result was due to
boredom which then led to the decrease m favorable thoughts »
The judge’s summation can be viewed as repeated presentation of the trial
evidence. As Cacioppo and Petty demonstrated, repeated exposure allows individuals to
revisit and elaborate further on the information presented. Jurors are given another
opportunity to revisit trial evidence via this summation. Many times, information
presented at a trial, especially a civil trial can be very complex. The added opportunity to
ruminate over evidence should enhance a juror’s ability to elaborate further on the
arguments presented during the trial. Because of this opportunity for further elaboration
of the trial evidence, jurors would be less likely to demonstrate a reliance on peripheral
cues or heuristics in order to make a decision (i.e., returning a verdict that is congruent
with the judge’s perception of the trial outcome.)
The ELM/HSM models have been used successfully in other research on juror
decision-making. Cooper, Bennett, and Sukel (1996) examined the way in which mock
jurors make decisions about complex scientific testimony. They predicted that testimony
of scientists and engineers may become so complex as to render processing of the
information difficult. In these situations, jurors may turn to shortcuts or heuristic rules as
a way of informing their ultimate decision (Cooper et al., 1996). They hypothesized that
highly complex testimony produces a situation in which jurors’ ability to process the
information systematically is diminished and as such they must turn to the peripheral or
heuristic route and use peripheral cues or heuristic shortcuts. Research has shown that
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limiting participants’ ability to process induces perceivers to use peripheral cues and
heuristic shortcuts (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). In
their trial simulation, they systematically manipulated the strength of the expert’s
credentials and the complexity of the testimony given by the expert. As they predicted,
when the testimony was complex, jurors were more persuaded by a highly credible expert
witness than by a less credible expert witness. Witness credentials had little impact on
the persuasiveness of the evidence when it was less complex, and thus more
comprehensible to the perceiver. This study does not provide a complete test of the
HSM/ELM models of persuasion because the authors did not manipulate evidence
strength, so there is no indication as to whether jurors engaged in systematic processing
(i.e., attended to argument quality) when the evidence was less complex. Without this
manipulation, it is difficult to know for certain whether jurors, who are provided with the
opportunity to elaborate on trial evidence, will disregard peripheral cues and base their
decisions on the evidence.
How might jurors evaluate conflicting complex scientific evidence when it is
presented using American versus British trial procedures? Might the constant objections
from and meandering by attorneys in the American system prove distracting and prevent
jurors from recognizing whether the trial evidence is weak or strong? If jurors are
distracted from the quality of the evidence, might they be more likely to rely on judges’
nonverbal behavior when deciding whether the plaintiff or the defendant has won their
case? Will the judge’s summation function as an added opportunity for jurors to revisit
and elaborate upon trial evidence? Will trial components of the American system help or
hinder a juror’s ability to process trial evidence? Will trial components of the British

20

system help or hinder a juror’s ability to process trial evidence? The present study was
designed to address these questions.
Overview
The present study evaluates the impact of British or American trial procedures on
juror decision-making. As noted earlier, such elements as allowing the attorneys to roam
about the courtroom, objections, side-bar conferences and outbursts that occur in
courtrooms in the United States, as well as the lack of a judge’s summation may reduce
an individual jurors’ ability or likelihood systematically process information. In the
alternate courtroom condition, the increased exposure jurors have to the British judge
may increase the prejudicial effects of their nonverbal behavior. In addition to
evaluating the consortium of varying elements between the two trial conditions, I was
able to evaluate mock jurors’ perceptions of the attorneys’ civility, fairness, advocacy,
and antagonism as well as the effectiveness of the judge. I hypothesized that participants
viewing British courtroom procedures would: recall more facts in the case; exhibit a
higher scrutiny of the evidence and, thus, be more likely return a verdict congruent with
evidence strength than would participants who viewed American procedures. Moreover,
participants who viewed British procedures would perceive the trial as more civil and fair
than participants who viewed American procedures would.
Dual process models of persuasion suggest that when an individual is either not
able or motivated to process information he or she will look to peripheral cues or
heuristics as cues or shortcuts to processing. Halverson et al. demonstrated that a likely
peripheral cue would be judges’ nonverbal behavior. I predicted that judge’s beliefs about
defendant guilt would not be as influential in the British as in the American conditions.
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Participants who viewed American courtroom procedures would have less ability and
opportunity to systematically process information and would be more likely to utilize the
judge’s nonverbal behavior as a peripheral cue to processing rather than scrutinizing
evidence strength.
Along with varying courtroom procedures between British and American trials
and manipulating judge’s nonverbal behavior, I manipulated evidence strength in order to
fully evaluate the impact of these procedural differences on juror decision-making. I
predicted that evidence strength, judges’ nonverbal behavior, and trial procedures would
interact to influence jurors’ decisions. Using persuasion models to try and understand
how the varying elements could influence jurors, I speculated that American trials created
conditions in which mock jurors had a diminished ability and/ or opportunity to elaborate
process information (i.e., they contained distracting elements and lacked the judge’s
summation). On the other hand, British trials would enhance a mock jurors ability and/
or opportunity to elaborate on trial evidence because they lack the distracting elements
and contain the judge’s summation. Given this main differentiation between the two trial
systems, I predicted that when jurors viewed American trial procedures, their subsequent
verdicts would be similar to the judges’ perception of what the trial outcome should be,
regardless of evidence strength. The ratings of individual trial players and the cases
presented by participants who viewed American trial procedures will be rated in a
manner consistent with the preference of the judge (as indicated by their nonverbal
behavior.) In American trial conditions, the frequent distractions may cause multiple
thought disruptions, which may hinder the individual juror’s ability to focus attention on
the evidence and also may limit their ability to form overall impressions of the case or
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trial players without utilizing judge’s nonverbal behavior as a peripheral cue.
Participants in American trial conditions should recall less information than participants
in British trial conditions because there were more distractions and there was no
opportunity to revisit trial information (i.e., there was no judge’s summation in American
conditions.) Overall, participants in American trials should not exhibit a reliance on
evidence strength in making their verdict decisions, rather they will return verdicts that
are congruent with the judge’s perception of trial outcome.
In British trials, evidence strength should prevail as the dominant influence on
verdict preference by jurors (i.e., there should be an evidence strength x courtroom
procedure interaction). As noted previously, this may be due to the fact that jurors are
better able and have more opportunity to elaborate on trial evidence in British trials.
Judges’ perception of what the verdict should be would not influence decision-making in
these conditions because jurors will be able to process information and will not rely on
peripheral cues in order to make a decision. Also, participants’ ratings of the trial players
and the cases presented should not demonstrate an influence of judge’s nonverbal
behavior because they should have the opportunity in these conditions to form
impressions of these aspects of the trial.
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Chapter Two: Methodology
Participants
Two hundred forty-five participants (approximately 30 per cell) were drawn from
different psychology classes taught at Florida International University. Participants’
average age was 21 years (SD = 5; range = 1 8 - 5 6 years). A majority of the sample was
female (71%). The racial and ethnic background of the sample varied with the largest
portion of the sample being Hispanic white (60%). The remainder of the sample consisted
of non-Hispanic white (14%), non-Hispanic black (14%), Asian (5%), Hispanic black
(3%), and those who marked “other” (4%). Most of the sample (92%) had had some
college experience but had not yet received their degree; the remaining had received their
college degree and/or had post-graduate experience or degrees (8%). The sample
consisted mostly of full-time students (77%). The remainder of the sample indicated that
their current occupation fell under such categories as: professional or technical (5%),
sales (5%), managerial (3%), clerical or secretarial (8%), and craftsperson or laborer

(2 %).
Participants received either extra credit in their psychology classes or they
fulfilled a research experience requirement in return for their involvement in this study.
Participants were tested in groups of one to five people.
Materials
Stimulus Trial. Participants viewed one of eight versions of a civil trial, adapted
from the trial used in Cooper et al. (1996). This was a fictitious trial concerning exposure
to toxic substances based on several product liability cases. The plaintiff in this case
alleged that he had contracted colon cancer as a result of workplace exposure to
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polychlorinated biphenyls or “PCB’s.” Before the trial the defense conceded that the
plaintiff had been exposed to PCB’s, the issue under contention was whether PCB’s were
a proximal cause of the plaintiff’s cancer. The expert for the plaintiff was a biochemist
who claimed that his experimental research demonstrated that PCB’s cause cancer in
animals. The expert for the defense was an epidemiologist, and he claimed that his
observational research demonstrated that PCB’s have adverse affects, but that colon
cancer is not one of them (see Appendices A and B for representational samples of the
trial transcripts). The experts were the only people to give testimony in the trial. People
with acting or public speaking experience played the roles of the judge, expert witnesses,
and attorneys.
The trial included: an opening statement of the facts of the case, the trial judge’s
initial instructions to the jury, opening statements by counsel, the examination of expert
witnesses for the plaintiff and defense, closing statements by counsel, and the judge’s
final instructions to the jury. Participants in the British versions also viewed a summation
of the facts of the case given by the judge before hearing instructions. Within the trial, I
manipulated the use of British or American courtroom proceedings, the judges’ nonverbal
behavior, and the strength of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.
The complex version of the Cooper et al. stimulus trial was used so that the trial
would be complex enough that participants would have to put forth effort to evaluate the
testimony systematically. The complexity level of the testimony was previously pilot
tested by Cooper et ah and the results of a between subjects design indicated that
participants viewed the high complexity testimony as significantly more complex than
the simple testimony. Participants also rated the complex testimony as more difficult to
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understand than the simpler testimony. The mean trial time of the eight versions was
1:07:12 (SD = 0:01:12). The mean trial time for the British trials was 1:06:39 (SD =
0:01:29) and the mean time for American trials was 1:07:46 (SD = 0:00:33). For the
strength manipulation, the mean time for the strong trials was 1:07:56 (SD = 0:01:16) and
the mean time for the weak trials was 1:06:28 (SD = 0:00:33). The shortest trial was
1:04:39 (British procedures- strong evidence) and the longest trial was 1:08:23
(American procedures- weak evidence).
Courtroom Proceedings. Following Fulero and Turner’s (1997) description of
seven procedural differences between British and American trials, I built five courtroom
variations into the stimulus trial (please see Table 1 for the specific variations). Not all
the variations were used because not all would be apparent in the videotaped trial. The
omitted procedural differences that are evident in British courts were having the
differences between opposing attorneys dealt with outside and having the judge play a
more active role in controlling evidence. The variations center on three main areas: the
behavior of the attorneys; the behavior of the judge as dictated by the different courtroom
cultures; and the order of events during the trial. In the American trial attorneys objected
to questions posed by the opposing attorney, but in the British trial no such objections
were made by opposing attorneys. The judge summarized the evidence in the British trial
but did not in the American trial. The attorneys roamed all over the courtroom in the
American trial but did not in the British trial, where they simply stood behind a single
table when they asked questions of the witnesses. In the British trial, the defense opening
statement was at the close of the plaintiff’s case. In contrast, in the American trial both
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the plaintiff and defense opening statements were at the beginning of the trial and the
closing statements were at the end of the trial prior to instructing the jury.
Evidence Strength. I varied the strength of the evidence in the context of the expert
witnesses’ testimony. In the strong evidence condition, the plaintiff expert noted that his
research demonstrates that PCB’s cause cancer in rats and that PCB exposure is the only
plausible cause of the plaintiffs cancer. The defense expert in this condition argued that
one couldn’t extrapolate findings from research conducted on rats to humans and that his
epidemiological research indicates that there is no link between PCB exposure and the
later development of cancer. In the weak evidence condition, the plaintiffs expert
witness was unable to deny the existence of other plausible causes for the plaintiff’s
cancer. The other plausible causes for the plaintiffs colon cancer presented during the
weak evidence conditions were: (a) that the plaintiff’s family had fam ilial adenomatous
polyposis (FAP), a colorectal cancer syndrome that runs in families; (b) the plaintiff had
adenomatous polyps, which have been associated with an increased risk of colon cancer;
(c) the plaintiff had evidence of ulcers in his colon, which is associated with chronic
inflammatory bowel disease which in turn is associated with an increase risk of colon
cancer; (d) the plaintiff smoked, but quit three years prior to the trial; (e) and the plaintiff
had a diet which was high in fat and low in fiber, which also has been associated with an
increase risk of colon cancer (http://www.cancer.org/cancerinfo/, 2000). The defense
expert restated all of these alternative causes for the plaintiffs colon cancer in his
testimony.
The effectiveness of this manipulation of evidence strength was pilot tested in a
two-group, between subjects design. Forty participants, recruited from various
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psychology classes at Florida International University, viewed two versions of the
stimulus trial that controlled for courtroom procedure and judge’s beliefs about the
defendant’s negligence and legal responsibility for the plaintiffs colon cancer. The only
variation between the two conditions was the strength of the evidence presented by both
the plaintiff and defense. When the plaintiff’s case was strong, the defense case was
weakened because they simply stated that their research did not find a connection
between PCB’s and colon cancer. When the plaintiffs case was weakened the plaintiffs
expert noted other possible alternatives for the plaintiff’s cancer and the defense then
reiterated these alternatives. Results of the pilot testing indicated that participants in the
strong evidence conditions were more likely to find in favor of the plaintiff (P = .64) than
in the weak evidence conditions (P = .27), %2(1,N = 40) = 5.23, p < .05. On a scale of 0
to 100%, participants in the strong evidence condition were more likely to indicate PCB’s
were most probably the cause of the plaintiffs colon cancer (M = 71.20, SD = 21.19)
than were participants in the weak evidence condition. M = 44.95, SD =22.37, t (38)=
3.809, SE = 6.89, p < .01. Also, participants in the strong evidence condition were more
likely to indicate that the plaintiffs colon cancer was the legal responsibility of the
defendant (M = 74.00, SD = 23.78) than were participants who were in the weak
evidence condition, M = 40.85, SD = 24.35, t(38) = 4.356, SE = 7.61, p < .01.
Participants’ ratings of the experts, the judge, and the attorneys did not differ across
conditions.
Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior. I manipulated thejudge’s nonverbal behavior across
conditions by varying both negative and positive non-verbal behaviors of the judge in
each of the conditions. In the pro-plaintiff conditions, the judge displayed more positive
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non-verbal behaviors toward the plaintiff’s attorney and expert witness during the
presentation of the plaintiffs case. For example, the judge was attentive and leaned
toward the witness (for a listing of pro-plaintiff and pro-defense nonverbal behaviors
exhibited by the judge please see Appendix C and D). In this same condition, the judge
displayed negative non-verbal behaviors during the presentation of the defendant’s case,
such as leaning away from the expert and not paying attention to the evidence as it was
presented. In the alternate condition in which the judge is pro-defense, the judge showed
negative nonverbal behaviors during the presentation of the plaintiff’s case and positive
nonverbal behaviors during the presentation of the defendant’s case.
Measures
After viewing the videotape, participants answered a number of questions
concerning the trial, the testimony, and the major players in the trial (see Appendix. F).
First, participants rendered a verdict either in favor of the plaintiff or in favor of the
defense. Participants also rated their confidence in their verdict decision on a 7-point
Likert scale, with 1 = not at all confident and 7 = very confident. The crucial issue in the
case was whether PCBs were the proximal cause of the plaintiff’s cancer. Participants
indicated, by writing in a number between 0% and 100%, the probability that PCBs were
the proximal cause of the plaintiffs cancer and the probability that the plaintiffs cancer
was the legal responsibility of the defendant. This is arguably a more sensitive measure
than verdict for perceived liability in this case (Cooper et a l, 1996). I created a new
variable (defendant liability) by averaging participant ratings for two separate items:
participants’ probability estimates for whether PCB’s were the proximal cause of the
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plaintiffs colon cancer and whether the plaintiffs colon cancer was the legal
responsibility of the defendant (Cronbach’s a = .92).
If participants rendered a verdict for the plaintiff they were asked how much
money (if any) they would award him for compensatory damages. Similar to Cooper et
al., participants were told to assume that he has been adequately compensated for medical
bills, lost income, and legal costs, but that he is requesting an additional $500,000
compensation for pain and suffering.
The next series of questions assessed participants’ reactions to the evidence, the
experts, the attorneys, the judge, and the overall trial and procedure in separate sections.
In the first section, participants evaluated the evidence presented during the trial
(evidence perception). On the 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree), participants rated their agreement with the following statements: the
plaintiffs colon cancer was caused by his exposure to PCB’s, the plaintiffs expert
evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that PCB’s cause colon cancer, other risk factors
were the cause of the plaintiff’s colon cancer, the defense expert sufficiently
demonstrated that PCB exposure does not cause colon cancer, and it was improper to
claim that a substance that causes cancer in animals would cause cancer in humans. I
recoded the data so that higher numbers indicated a more favorable evaluation of the
plaintiff’s case. A principal component factor analysis of the data indicated that the scale
was unidimensional and the solution yielded one interpretable factor, defendant
responsibility for the plaintiffs injury, which accounted for 58.63% of the item variance
(See Table 2 for defendant responsibility items and factor loadings). I constructed a
defendant responsibility scale by averaging all the items in the evidence perception
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section of the questionnaire (Cronbach’s a = ,81). Reliability was increased if the scale
concerning the level of impropriety when claiming that a substance that causes cancer in
animals would cause cancer in humans was removed (Cronbach’s a = .85). Thus, the
defendant responsibility scale was created by averaging the items: the plaintiff’s colon
cancer was caused by his exposure to PCB’s, the plaintiffs expert evidence was
sufficient to demonstrate that PCB’s cause colon cancer, other risk factors were the cause
of the plaintiffs colon cancer, and the defense expert sufficiently demonstrated that PCB
exposure does not cause colon cancer.
Participants also rated their agreement with statements about their perceptions of
the plaintiffs and defense expert witnesses on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). These items included the extent to which he
was: persuasive, his arguments were weak, likeable, convincing, knowledgeable,
credible, incompetent, qualified, and understandable. Results from a principal
component factor analysis of this data yielded one factor, plaintiff expert credibility,
which accounted for 43% of the item variance (see Table 3 for plaintiff expert credibility
items and factor loadings). A scale was constructed by averaging all the scores of these
items based on this factor analysis (Cronbach’s a = .83). The factor analysis of
participant ratings of the defense expert also yielded one factor, defense expert
credibility, which accounted 50% of the item variance (see Table 4 for defense expert
credibility items and factor loadings).
In the third section, participants rated their agreement with items concerning the
opposing attorneys, using the same 7-point scales described above. Within the
questionnaire, the statements were counterbalanced such, that participants viewed an
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equal number of positively and negatively worded statements. Participants viewed the
following statements (all positively worded): her opening argument was compelling, she
questioned her witness effectively, she had a compelling closing argument, she was an
effective trial advocate, she was persuasive, she was likeable, she was knowledgeable,
she used objections effectively, she was antagonistic. I conducted separate principal
component analyses with varimax rotation for each of the attorneys. In each factor
analysis, the rotated solution yielded two interpretable factors, perceptions of the
attorneys’ performance during trial and antagonism of attorneys (a single item). The
plaintiff attorney performance factor accounted for 47% of the item variance and
plaintiff’s attorney antagonism factor accounted for 14% of the item variance (see Table
5 for perceptions of plaintiffs attorney performance and factor loadings). Defense
attorney performance accounted for 38.0% of the item variance and defense attorney
antagonism accounted for 18.8% of the item variance (see Table 6 for perceptions of
defense attorney and factor loadings). I created scales of the perceptions of the plaintiff
attorney’s performance by averaging across scores obtained from each of the individual
items. The scale had adequate reliability (Cronbach’s a = .83) as did the similar scale I
created for perceptions of the defense attorney’s performance (Cronbach’s a = .87).
Participants then evaluated the judge in the same fashion as the other major
players in the case. Participants indicated the extent of their agreement with the
following statements: the judge treated the lawyers and jurors with respect and concern,
was authoritative, favored the plaintiff, favored the defense, was knowledgeable, was
interested in the plaintiffs case, was interested in the defendant’s case, was competent,
was domineering, was effective, exhibited any prejudicial nonverbal behavior during the
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trial, and exhibited prejudicial nonverbal behavior during the jury instructions. For the
twelve items addressing participants’ evaluations of the judge, a factor analysis with
varimax rotation yielded four interpretable factors. The first factor was judge
competency and included items such as fairness, authoritativeness, effectiveness,
competency, and the extent of his knowledge. Judge competency accounted for 29% of
the item variance. The second interpretable factor was judge bias, which included items
such as: the extent to which the judge was in favor of the plaintiff, the extent to which the
judge was in favor of the defense, the degree to which the judge seemed interested in the
plaintiffs case, and the degree to which he was interested in the defense case. Judge bias
accounted for 20% of the item variance. The third interpretable factor was judge
nonverbal behavior and this included the scale items of the extent of the judge’s
nonverbal behavior during the trial and the extent of the judge’s nonverbal behavior
during the jury instruction phase. Judge’s nonverbal behavior accounted for 14% of the
item variance. The final factor was the single scale item, that evaluated participants’
perceptions of the judge’s domineering behavior during the trial. This item accounted for
9% of the item variance. Based on the factor analyses of jurors’ ratings of the judge, three
separate scales of judge competency, judge bias, and judge’s nonverbal behavior were
created by averaging the items that loaded onto each of these factors (Cronbach’s a = .78,
.78, and .83, respectively: see Tables 7 for scale items and factor loadings).
Participants also evaluated their overall impressions of the trial. They rated their
agreement with the following statements: the trial was fair, the trial had too many
interruptions and objections, the plaintiffs case was strong, the defense’s case was weak,
the trial was civil, the plaintiffs case was clear, the defense’s case was understandable,
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and the plaintiffs expert witnesses’ testimony was complex, and the defense expert’s
testimony was not complex. A principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation
yielded three interpretable factors. The first factor was impressions of the defense case
and this included items such as: strength of the defense case, complexity of the defense
expert’s testimony, and the extent to which participants were able to understand his
testimony. Impressions of the defense case accounted for 23% of the item variance. The
second interpretable factor was perceptions of the trial procedure and plaintiffs case,
which included items such as: the civility of the trial, fairness of the trial, strength of the
plaintiff’s case, and the extent to which participants were able to understand the
plaintiffs expert’s testimony. Perceptions of the trial procedure and plaintiffs case
accounted for 22% of the item variance. A third interpretable factor included the items of
whether the plaintiff’s case was clear and whether the trial had too many interruptions
and objections. This third factor accounted for 12% of the variance. Reliability analyses
of these factors revealed that the only highly reliable scale created from, the factor
analyses was impressions of the defense case when the item evaluating participants’
perceptions of the strength of the defense case was removed (Cronbach’s a = .77).
Perceptions of the trial procedure and plaintiff’s case and whether the plaintiff’s case was
clear and whether the trial had too many interruptions and objections were not highly
reliable (Cronbach’s a = .59 and .07 respectively: see Table 8 for factor loadings of this
section).
The next section of the questionnaire measured participants’ overall
comprehension and retention of trial evidence. Participants took a timed recall test like
the one used in Petty, Wells, and Brock (1981). Participants had five minutes to recall all
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the facts in the case that they could remember. A fact is any piece of information that
conveys one factual idea, (i.e., “the plaintiff is 28 years old”) as conveyed by the experts
during the trial. Repetitions of the same fact and opinions were not counted as new
pieces of information. Two judges independently scored this section of each
questionnaire and inter-rater reliability was extremely high (W = .947, p < .01). The
number of correct facts scored for this section was then averaged across raters to create
the dependent variable of recall. Comprehension of the testimony was determined by
asking participants twenty true/false questions (Cooper et al, 1996). Comprehension was
coded by calculating the proportion of correct answers to these true/false questions.
The remaining items that were not part of any of the newly created scales were
analyzed separately. These items included: (1) whether it is improper to say that a
substance that causes cancer in animals would do so in humans, (2) plaintiff and (3)
defense attorney antagonism, (4) whether the judge was domineering, (5) civility, (6)
fairness, and (7) distracting quality of the trial, (8) whether the plaintiffs expert witness
was complex, (9) and whether the defense’s case was strong.
Procedure
There were eight experimental conditions formed by the crossing of courtroom
proceedings (British vs. American), with the strength of evidence (strong vs. weak), and
with the verdict perception by the judge (plaintiff vs. defense). Participants were
randomly assigned to conditions in groups ranging in size from 1 to 5 people. These
groups then viewed one of the eight versions of the videotaped mock trial At the
conclusion of the videotaped mock trial, participants filled out a questionnaire that asked
for basic demographic information, along with the questions described previously.
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Questionnaires were filled out individually. Participants did not discuss or deliberate the
trial while filling out the questionnaire. Once participants were completed with the
questionnaire they were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
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Chapter Three: Results
Manipulation Checks
Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior. A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal
behavior) X 2 (evidence strength) ANOVA was conducted on the scale of judge’s
nonverbal behavior. There was only a main effect of courtroom procedure, F (1, 237) =
8.12, g < .01, rj = .03. Participants who viewed British courtroom procedures were more
likely to notice the judge’s nonverbal behaviors (M= 4.85) than were participants who
viewed American courtroom procedures (M= 4.12: see Table 22 for means and standard
deviations).
Evidence strength. A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X
2 (evidence strength) ANOVA was conducted on participants’ overall evaluation of the
strength of the plaintiff’s case. As would be expected, participants in the strong evidence
conditions found the plaintiffs case much stronger (M= 5.28) than did participants in the
weak: evidence condition (M= 4.57), F (1, 237) = 13.93, p < .01, r\2 = .06. There was also
a significant main effect for judge’s nonverbal behavior, F (1, 237) = 3.97, p < .05, r\ =
.02. Participants in the judge pro-plaintiff conditions judged the plaintiffs case to be
stronger (M=5.11) than did participants in the judge pro-defense condition (M= 4.73).
Verdict
For the purpose of these analyses, participant verdicts were coded 0 if they found
for the defense and 1 if they found for the plaintiff. I conducted a 2 (courtroom
procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence strength) ANOVA on
participants’ verdicts (see Table 9 for means). Both courtroom procedure and evidence
strength main effects were significant, F (1, 237) = 7.26, p < .01, rj2 = -03 for courtroom.
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procedure and F (1, 237) = 75.78, p < .01, r|2= .24 for evidence strength. Participants in
the American courtroom procedure were more likely to vote for the plaintiff than were
participants in the British courtroom procedure (.Ms = .73 and .60, respectively). In
addition, participants who saw the strong plaintiff’s evidence were more likely to vote for
the plaintiff than participants who saw the weak evidence were (Ms = .89 and .43,
respectively). There was no significant main effect for judge’s nonverbal behavior or any
significant interactions for verdict as the dependent variable, all Fs <2.75.
Following this ANOVA, I conducted a 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s bent)
X 2 (evidence strength) logistic regression using SPSS© LOGISTIC REGRESSION. I
used the simple variable coding scheme for all the variables. Initially, I entered all of the
main effects and interactions into the model I then used a backward stepwise selection
procedure to determine which of the terms to include in the model. The final model
included the three main variables and all interactions of those variables (i.e., courtroom
procedure X judge’s nonverbal behavior, courtroom procedure X evidence strength,
evidence strength X judge’s nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength X courtroom
procedure X judge’s nonverbal behavior, %2 (7, N = 245) = 73.38, j> < .001. These
analyses revealed that the main effect of courtroom procedure was significant, such that
participants in the American procedure were almost three times (i.e., 2.69) as likely as
participants in the British conditions to find for the plaintiff than for the defendant. The
analysis also revealed a significant main effect of evidence strength, such that
participants in the strong plaintiffs evidence condition were almost 14 times (i.e., 13.87)
more likely to find for the plaintiff than for the defendant than participants who viewed
the weak evidence conditions. There were no other significant findings, %2 < -.015.
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Confidence
A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA was conducted with confidence as the dependent variable. This
analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction of courtroom procedure X judge’s
nonverbal behavior X evidence strength, F (1, 237) = 6.69, g < .01, rj2 = .04 (see Table
10 for means). Simple effects analyses revealed a significant cross-over interaction
within the British courtroom procedure condition for judge’s nonverbal behavior and
evidence strength F (1, 120) = 21.67, g < .001, but there was no significant interaction
within the American version. Participants in the British conditions with the judge
displaying a pro-plaintiff bias were more confident in their verdicts when the plaintiffs
case was strong than when the plaintiffs case was weak, F (1, 120) = 10.91, g = 001.
Conversely, participants in the British conditions with a judge displaying a pro-defendant
bias were more confident in their verdicts when the evidence was weak, F (1, 120) =
10.76, g = 001.
The ANOVA also revealed a significant two-way interaction of judge’s nonverbal
behavior and evidence strength, F (1, 237) = 14.64, g < .001, r\2= .06. Simple effect
analyses revealed a significant effect of judges’ nonverbal behavior in the strong
evidence condition, F (1, 241) = 8.72, g = .003. Participants in the strong evidence
condition were more confident in their verdicts when the judge was pro-plaintiff than
when the judge was pro-defense. Conversely, when the evidence was weak, participants
were more confident in their verdicts when the judge’s behavior was pro-defense than
when the judge’s behavior was pro-plaintiff, F (1, 241) = 6.02, g = .015. There were no
other significant interactions or main effects, all Fs < .13.
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Defendant Liability
I conducted a 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2
(evidence strength) ANOVA on the continuous variable representing defendant liability.
There were no significant interactions (all Fs < 1.81), but there were significant main
effects for each of the independent variables (see Table 11 for means). Participants rated
the defendant to be more liable when American courtroom procedures were used (M =
64.37) than when British courtroom procedures were used (M = 56.22), F (1, 237) = 4.49,
JL< .05, T) = .02. Participants also rated the defendant to be more liable when the judge
was pro-plaintiff (M = 64.22) than when the judge was pro-defense (M= 56.37), F (1,
237) = 4.17, g < .05, rj = .02. As would be predicted, strong evidence strength
conditions elicited significantly higher ratings of defendant liability (M= 78.01) than did
weak evidence conditions (M= 42.58), F (1, 237) = 84.98, p < .01, rj2= .26.
Damage Awards
To normalize the distribution of damage awards, I took the natural log of each
participant’s response. I analyzed responses only from participants who had found for the
plaintiff (as per the instructions to participants). I conducted a 2 (courtroom procedure) X
2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence strength) ANOVA with the natural log of
each award response as the dependent variable. There were no significant interactions
and no significant main effects, all Fs < 1.48 (see Table 12 for means).
Defendant Responsibility for the Plaintiffs Injury
The defendant responsibility scale was subjected to a 2 (courtroom procedure) X
2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence strength ANOVA (see Table 13 for means).
The main effect of courtroom procedure was significant, F (1, 237) = 8.39, p < .01, K]2 =
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.03. Participants in the American condition rated the defendant to be more responsible
(M = 4.54) than did participants in the British condition (M= 4.10). The main effect of
judge’s nonverbal behavior was also significant, F (1, 237) = 5.05, g < .05, rj2 = .02.
Participants in the pro-plaintiff condition found the defendant to be more responsible for
the plaintiffs injury (M= 4.51) than did participants in the pro-defense condition (M=
4.11). The last main effect of evidence strength was also significant, F (1, 237) = 110.88,
g = .000, r| = .32. Participants in the strong evidence condition judged the defendant to
be more responsible for the plaintiff’s injury (M= 5.19) than did participants in the weak
evidence condition (M= 3.42). This analysis revealed no significant interactions, all Fs <
.92.
Plaintiff Expert’s Credibility
A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA of participant ratings of the plaintiff expert’s credibility revealed no
significant interactions among the three independent variables, all Fs < .94 (see Table 14
for means). There was a significant main effect of courtroom procedure, F (1, 237) =
4.53, g < .05, r\2 = .02. Participants viewing the American courtroom procedure were
more likely to rate the plaintiff’s expert to be more credible (M= 5.57) than were
participants in the British condition (M= 5.33). There was also a significant main effect
for evidence strength, F (1, 237) = 26.82, g = .000, il2 = .10. Participants in the strong
evidence condition were more likely to view the plaintiffs expert more positively (M=
5.73) than were participants in the weak evidence condition (M= 5.16). There was no
significant main effect of judge’s nonverbal behavior on the ratings of the plaintiff
expert’s credibility, F (1, 237) = 2.34, g = .13.
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Defense Expert Credibility
A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA of participants’ ratings of the defense expert’s credibility revealed no
significant interactions on participants’ perceptions of the defense expert, all Fs < 2.91
(see Table 15 for means). Just as with the plaintiffs expert, there was a significant main
effect of courtroom procedure, F (1, 237) = 16.11, p = .000, r|2 = .06. Participants in the
British condition found the defense expert to be more credible (M= 5.17) than did
participants in the American condition (M= 4.63). Again, similar to the ratings of the
plaintiffs expert, there was a significant main effect of evidence strength, F (1, 237) =
12.73, p = .000, T| = .05. Participants in the weak evidence conditions were more likely
to rate the defense expert more positively (M= 5.14) than were participants in the strong
evidence condition (M= 4.66). There was no significant main effect of judge’s nonverbal
behavior on the ratings of the plaintiff expert’s credibility, F (1, 237) = 1.35, p = .25.
Plaintiffs Attorney Performance
A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA with plaintiffs attorney performance as the dependent measure
indicated that there were no significant interactions among the independent variables, all
Fs < .98 (see Table 16 for means). There was a significant main effect of courtroom
procedure, F (1, 237) = 14.55, p = .000, r|2 = .06. The plaintiffs attorney received more
positive evaluations from participants in the American condition (M= 5.19) than from
participants in the British condition (M= 4.71). There was also a significant main effect
of evidence strength, F (1, 237) = 4.56, p < .05, rj2 = .02. Participants rated the
plaintiff’s attorney more favorably when the evidence for the plaintiff was strong (M=
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5.08) than when the evidence was weak (M= 4.82). There was no significant main effect
of judge’s nonverbal behavior on the ratings of the plaintiff attorney’s performance, F (1,
237) = .94, p = .33.
Defense Attorney Performance
I conducted a 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2
(evidence strength) ANOVA with defense attorney performance as the dependent
variable (see Table 17 for means). Similar to ratings of the plaintiff’s attorney, there was
a significant main effect of evidence strength on ratings of defense attorney performance,
F (1, 237) = 16.28, p = .000, rj = .06. Participants rated the defense attorney more
positively when the evidence presented by the plaintiff was weak (M= 4.32) than when
the evidence presented by the plaintiff was strong (M= 3.78). Unlike ratings of the
plaintiff’s attorney, there was a significant main effect for judge’s nonverbal behavior, F
(1, 237) = 9.84, p < .01, r|2 = .04. Ratings of the defense attorney’s performance were
higher when the judge was pro-defense (M= 4.26) than when the judge was pro-plaintiff
(M= 3.83). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction of courtroom
procedure and judge’s nonverbal behavior, F (1, 237) = 4.91, p < .05, r\2 = .02. In the
judge pro-defense condition, ratings of the defense attorney were higher when the trial
was conducted using British courtroom procedures (M= 4.48) than when the trial was
conducted using American courtroom procedures (M= 4.03), F (1, 241) = 5.15, p = .02.
Within the judge pro-plaintiff condition, ratings for the defense attorney did not differ
across courtroom procedures, F (1, 241) = .56, p = .45. There were no other significant
interactions, all Fs < 3.04.
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Extent of Antagonism Exhibited by the Attorneys
For both the plaintiff and defense attorneys, there was a main effect of courtroom
procedure on participants’ ratings of attorney antagonism, F (1, 237) = 10.64, p < .01, rj2
= .04 for the plaintiffs attorney; F (1, 237) = 5.11, p < .05, r\2 = .02 for the defense
attorney. Participants judged the plaintiffs attorney to be significantly more antagonistic
in the American conditions (M= 3.74) than in the British conditions (M= 3.13). Similarly,
participants viewed the defense attorney to be significantly more antagonistic in the
American condition (M= 4.01) than in the British conditions (M= 3.60). There were no
other main effects or interactions for the level of antagonism exhibited by the attorneys,
all other Fs < 3.29 (see Tables 18 and 19 for means).
Judge Competency
A factorial ANOVA was conducted using the three independent variables of
courtroom procedure, judge’s nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength and the judge
competency scale as the dependent variable (see Table 20 for means). The only
significant effect for this scale was a main effect of judge’s nonverbal behavior, F (1,
237) = 4.66, p < .05, r\2 = .02. Participants in the judge pro-plaintiff condition rated the
judge to be more competent (M= 4.94) than did participants in the judge pro-defense
condition (M= 4.60). There were no other significant main effects or interaction effects
forjudge competency, all Fs < 1.22.
Judge Bias
A 2 (courtroom procedures) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA was used to analyze the dependent variable of judge bias. As would
be expected, there was a significant main effect for judge’s nonverbal behavior, F (1,
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237) = 133.43,p = -000, î]2 = .36 (see Table 21 for means). Participants in the judge pro
plaintiff rated the judge as more biased toward the plaintiff (M= 5.03) than did
participants in the judge pro-defense condition (M= 3.14). This main effect was qualified
by a significant interaction of courtroom procedures and judge’s nonverbal behavior, F
(1, 237) = 11.47,2 < .01, rj2 = -05. Participants who watched the pro-plaintiff judge rated
the judge as more biased toward the plaintiff in the British conditions (M= 5.32) than in
the American conditions (M= 4.73), F (1, 241) = 6.44, p = -012. Yet, the reverse occurred
for participants who in the judge pro-defense condition. Participants rated the judge as
more biased toward the plaintiff in the American conditions (M= 3.40) than in the British
conditions (M= 2.88), F (1, 241) = 4.81, p = .029. There was also a significant main
effect for evidence strength, F (1, 237) = 12.24, p < .01, rj2 = .05. Participants in the
strong evidence condition rated the judge to be more biased towards the plaintiff (M=
5.26) than did participants in the weak evidence condition (M= 3.14). There were no
other significant interactions or main effects, all Fs < 1.76.
The Extent of Judge’s Domineering Behavior
This single item rating of the judge’s domineering behavior was subjected to the same
factorial ANOVA as those mentioned previously (see Table 23 for means). The only
significant effect this factorial ANOVA revealed was an interaction between courtroom
procedure, judge’s nonverbal behavior, and evidence strength, F (1, 237) = 7.72, p < .01,
rj2 = .03; all other Fs < .73. Within the judge pro-plaintiff conditions, there was a
significant interaction of courtroom, procedure and evidence strength, F (1, 119) = 6.08, p
= .02. When the evidence was strong, participants found the judge to be more
domineering in the American condition (M= 3.87) than in the British condition (M=
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2.94), F (1, 119) = 5.25, j3 = .02. Courtroom procedure did not affect participants’
perceptions of how domineering the judge was when the evidence was weak. Within the
judge pro-defense condition, participants’ perceptions of how domineering the judge
appeared did not differ significantly as a function of the interaction of courtroom
procedure and evidence strength.
Complexity of the Defense Case
A factorial ANOVA was conducted with complexity of the defense case scale as
the dependent variable (see Table 24 for means). This analysis revealed no significant
interactions and only one significant main effect of courtroom procedure, F (1, 237) =
11.60, p < .01, rj2 = .05, all other Fs < 2.20. Participants who viewed the trial that used
British courtroom procedures were more likely to rate the defense’s case as
understandable and less complex (M= 4.40) than participants who viewed the trial using
American courtroom procedures (M= 3.74).
Complexity and Understandabilitv of the Plaintiffs Case
Participants did not see the plaintiffs case as differing significantly in terms of the
items concerning the complexity and the understandability of the plaintiffs case across
the different conditions and levels of the independent variables when a factorial ANOVA
was conducted on this item, all Fs < 3.08 (see Tables 25 and 26 for means).
Trial Fairness
A 2 (courtroom procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA was conducted with participants’ evaluations of the overall fairness of
the trial as the dependent variable. The only significant effect was that participants who
viewed the trial with strong evidence were significantly more likely to agree that the trial
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was fair (M= 5.05) than were participants in the weak evidence conditions (M= 4.60), F
(1, 237) = 4.73), p < .05, r\2 = .02 (see Table 27). There were no significant interactions
across variables for this dependent measure, all Fs < 1.70.
Trial Civility
As predicted, participant’s who viewed British courtroom procedures were more
likely to rate the trial as being civil (M= 5.79) than participants who viewed American
courtroom procedures (M= 5.22), F (1, 237) = 11.44, p < .01, r|2= .05 (see Table 28 for
means). There were no other significant main effects or interactions for this variable, all
Fs < 1.24.
Perceived Amount of Distraction
Also, as predicted participant’s rated the trials that used American courtroom
procedures (M= 4.86) as significantly more distracting than trials that used British
courtroom procedures (M= 2.36), F (1, 237) = .179.61, p < .01, r\2= .43. There were no
other main effects or significant interactions for this dependent variable, all other Fs <
2.33 (see Table 29 for means).
Memory of Trial Evidence
A 2 (courtroom, procedure) X 2 (judge’s nonverbal behavior) X 2 (evidence
strength) ANOVA was conducted with the total number of correctly recalled facts from
each participant as the dependent variable (see Table 30 for means). As hypothesized,
participants in the British conditions (M = 6.75) recalled significantly more facts than
participants in the American conditions (M = 4.77), F (1, 237) = 18.36, p < .01, rj2 = .07.
There were no other significant main effects or interactions for amount recalled, all Fs <
3.57.
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The same ANOVA was conducted with total number of items correct on the truefalse memory test as the dependent variable. Results were similar to the free-recall
section, in that the only effect of the factorial ANOVA was the main effect of courtroom
procedure, F (1, 237) = 4.69, p < .05, r\2 = .2 (see Table 31 for means). Participants in
the British conditions provided more accurate responses to the true-false questions (M=
15.88) than did participants in the American condition (M= 15.15). There were no other
significant main effects or interactions for amount recalled, all Fs < 1.29.
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C h ap ter Four; Discussion
British Versus American Courtroom Procedures
The present study examined the effects of British and American trial procedures
and judges’ nonverbal behavior on juror decision-making. British courtroom procedures
lack distracting elements such as objections, side-bar conferences, outbursts, and recesses
and contain other elements such as the judge’s summation and direct questioning of
witnesses that most likely enhance a jurors ability to systematically process evidence. It
was hypothesized that the presence of the distracting elements and the absence of such
elements as the judge’s summation in American courtroom procedures would hinder
participants’ ability to process evidence systematically. As a result, participants should
rely more heavily on judge’s nonverbal behavior as a cue or heuristic to processing.
Conversely, it was also hypothesized that in British courtroom conditions, which lacked
these distracting elements and contained the judge’s summation, participants would be
more likely to scrutinize evidence and be influenced by variations in evidence strength.
The results of the current study indicated that participants who viewed British
courtroom procedures were more likely than their American viewing counterparts to find
the trial to be: more civil, less distracting, the judge to be less domineering, the attorneys
to be less antagonistic, and the defense evidence to be less complex. Participants in the
British conditions also recalled more trial evidence and scored higher on a test for their
memory of the trial evidence presented. These results supported and extended the results
of Fulero and Turner’s (1997) study. The only significant difference Fulero and Turner
found between British and American trials were perceived civility and the perceived
performance of the judge. Their results indicated that participants found the British style
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trial to be more civil. In addition, participants rated the British style judge higher than the
American judge on the dimensions of fairness, authoritativeness, knowledgeability,
likeability, and overall effectiveness. They also found that participants viewing American
trials perceived that there were more interruptions and objections than participants
viewing trials using the British style.
One of the most significant extensions of Fulero and Turner’s (1997) study was
that participants viewing the trial using British courtroom procedures had a higher
number of total recalled facts and a higher number of correct answers to the memory test
than did those who viewed the American trial procedures. No such assessment of this
dimension was conducted in Fulero and Turner’s study.
The results obtained between courtroom procedures on participants’ perceptions
of the lawyers and their cases stand in contrast to those obtained by Fulero and Turner. In
the current study within the American conditions, participants were more likely to find
for the plaintiff, assign higher probabilities of defendant liability, find the plaintiffs case
stronger than the defense’s, and give the plaintiff’s attorney and expert higher ratings
than did participants in the British conditions. It seemed the reverse results were obtained
in the current study for the case presented by the defense. Within the British condition,
participants rated the case presented by the defense as less complex and more
understandable and rated the defense attorney and expert more positively than did
participants in the American conditions. When Fulero and Turner compared American
style trials and British style trials (using American judges and lawyers for both versions),
they found that the conviction rate for both trials was similar and perceptions of the
prosecution and defense attorneys were equal across conditions (though used a criminal
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case rather than the civil case used for this study).
Another extension of Fulero and Turner’s original study on British versus
American trial procedures was to look at the effect of judge’s nonverbal behavior
between both courtroom styles. An interesting result of the current study between
courtroom conditions was that participants demonstrated a better ability to notice the
judge’s bias and nonverbal behavior when viewing the trial using British courtroom
procedures.
Influence of Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior
There was no direct influence of judge’s nonverbal behavior on verdict. However,
there were interesting and important effects of judge’s nonverbal behavior on
participants’ confidence in their verdicts and in their ratings of defendant liability.
Participants were more confident in their verdicts when the judge’s bent, as indicated by
his nonverbal behavior, corresponded with evidence strength (i.e., when evidence was
strong the judge was pro-plaintiff, and when evidence was weak the judge was pro
defense). Although participants’ verdicts appeared to be chosen on the basis of the
evidence, participants may have had some nagging doubt about their verdicts when the
judge did not seem favorable to the side that presented the strongest case. Hart (1991) had
the same results for judge’s nonverbal behavior on confidence, although in his research,
judge’s nonverbal behavior did influence verdict.
Judge’s nonverbal behavior also influenced participant ratings of defendant
liability. Participants believed that the defendant was more likely to be liable when the
judge was pro-plaintiff than when the judge was pro-defense. It also appeared that when
the judge’s bent, as indicated by their nonverbal behavior, corresponded with evidence
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strength this not only inflated participant’s confidence in their verdict choice but also
their probability estimates of defendant liability.
Other researchers have found an effect of nonverbal behavior on the crucial
measure of verdict, but such was not the case in this current study. Across British and
American courtroom procedures, the strength of the evidence presented appeared to
verdict choice. Visher (1987) found that extra-legal factors affect juror decision-making
only when evidence is ambiguous. Even when participants felt distracted and exhibited
an effect of that distraction in American conditions (i.e., lower recall and memory
scores), the strength of the evidence was the biggest predictor of verdict decision.
Impact of Courtroom Procedure and Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior
One important area in which the interaction of courtroom procedure and judge’s
nonverbal behavior did have a significant impact was on participants’ confidence in their
verdicts. Participants in the British conditions were more confident in their verdicts when
judge’s nonverbal behavior and evidence strength were congruent than in American
conditions when judge’s bent and evidence strength were congruent. It could be that
participants viewed the judge’s nonverbal behavior as a form of evidence. As noted in
the introduction, judges have access to much of the background information in a trial that
jurors may never hear, such as prior background or inadmissible evidence. Due to the
wide influence of the media such as television court dramas and news coverage of
notorious trials, it could be assumed that the participants knew that the judge might have
been exposed to information about the case that they would not be. When the judge’s
behavior was congruent with the evidence strength, his behavior served to bolster their
confidence in their verdict choices. When the judge’s behavior was not congruent with
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the evidence strength, it may have brought doubt to participants’ verdict choices because
the evidence strongly suggested that the defendant was legally responsible for the
plaintiffs colon cancer but the judge’s behavior did not. This congruency effect on
confidence was exaggerated in British conditions because participants were better able to
detect the nonverbal behavior in these conditions as indicated by their ratings on judge’s
nonverbal behavior. It should be noted that the judge is more salient in British conditions
and as such may have more potential for influence. Future studies need to look at
whether the judge’s behavior was used as further evidence for rendering a verdict
decision and whether it is the saliency of the judge in British conditions promotes the
influence of the judge’s behavior.
Interaction of Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent and Evidence Strength on Verdict
The hypothesis that there would be an interaction effect of courtroom procedure,
judge’s nonverbal behavior and evidence strength on verdict and other measures related
to verdict was not supported. It seems each of the independent variables by themselves
had an impact on verdict. The only measure related to verdict that did exhibit a threeway interaction for these variables was participant’s confidence in their verdicts.
Participants were the most confident in their verdicts in conditions where British
courtroom procedures were used, and the judge’s behavior and evidence strength were
congruent.

In looking at the rating scales pertaining to the judge, this result seems

logical. Participants found the judge to be more competent when he was pro-plaintiff
than when he was pro-defense. Also, they were better able to detect his nonverbal
behavior in the British conditions, which in turn may have affirmed their verdict choice
when his behavior was congruent and served as lingering doubt when his behavior was
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incongruent. Also, research on the ELM/ HSM has demonstrated that when participants
come to a decision after systematically processing the evidence, they are more resistant to
persuasion and more confident in their decisions (Tesser, Martin & Mendolia, 1995).
Though there was no courtroom procedure and evidence strength interaction, there are
indications that participants in British conditions may have had a greater opportunity to
systematically process information. Participants in the British conditions had higher
memory and recall scores than participants in the American conditions and they were
better able notice judge’s nonverbal behavior to the point that it bolstered their
confidence in their verdict choices when his behavior was congruent with the strength of
the evidence. In trials where evidence may be more ambiguous this difference in court
procedures could have a greater impact given these results.
Differences Between Current and Previous Studies on Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior
Halverson, et al (1997), Hart (1991), and Blanck, et al (1987) all used an
experimental paradigm in which participants listened to a brief audiotaped version of a
drunk driving trial and then viewed a videotape of a judge reading pattern jury
instructions. These researchers used real judges and predetermined their beliefs about
defendant guilt before showing the videotape to participants. This paradigm seems to
highlight the underlying hypothesis about the influence of the judge’s behavior (i.e.,
increase the demand characteristics of the experiment [Ome, 1961]). Because
participants listen to a very brief audiotaped version of an ambiguous case, they have
very little information. This increases the likelihood that they will use a peripheral cue or
heuristic. Within these studies, it appears that judges’ nonverbal behavior is made
obvious to jurors and in turn they use it to make decisions about the case. This could be
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an explanation as to why they found an effect of judge’s nonverbal behavior on verdict
and I did not. We know that jurors are motivated to make good decisions (Kalven &
Zeisel, 1966). So, in order to make good decisions jurors try and focus on the evidence
in the case. When this is absent, jurors would be most likely to turn to secondary and in
some cases, tertiary sources of information to make a decision, such as judge’s nonverbal
behavior.
Hart (1991) predicted that using actors to assess the influencing effects of judges’
nonverbal behavior would produce much larger effects on verdict than the videotaped
judges of his study would. This study did not support his prediction. Yet, there may be
other conditions where using an actor as a judge could produce larger effects on verdict,
i.e. trials with more ambiguous or circumstantial evidence. These other conditions
should be explored in further studies.
Conclusions
The current study served as an extension to Fulero and Turner’s (1997) study on
perceptions of British and American courtroom procedures. Rather than simply being a
study on perceptions of both procedures, the current study evaluated the impact these
differences may have on juror decision-making. The current study also served as an
extension to previous studies on judges’ nonverbal behavior (Hart, 1991; and Halverson,
et al, 1997). It provided a theoretical framework in which the biasing effects of judge’s
nonverbal behavior could be explored. Also, the current study used a mock trial and
evaluated the effect of judges’ behavior throughout the trial, rather than having
participants listen to an abridged audiotaped trial and then view a judge read instructions
to the jury.
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Overall, it seemed that a participant’s verdict was predicted by evidence strength.
But the question remains whether if conditions were changed (e.g., the trial was much
more ambiguous) would participants rely more on judge’s nonverbal behavior as they did
in the studies by Hart and Halverson, et al.? Or are participants only somewhat influenced
by judge’s nonverbal behavior, as indicated by the results of the current experiment.
These are questions to be answered with further research?
What constitutes “leakage” on the part of the judge? In the current study, the
judge was an actor who was instructed to be a bit more blatant with his nonverbal
behaviors. In contrast, the judges’ used by Blanck, Hart, and Halverson, et al. were real
judges who more than likely were trying to control their behavior and appear neutral. The
results of Hart’s study indicated that when judges expected guilty verdicts, they were
more somber and inserted more words into the text but their overall nonverbal behavior
was not entirely obvious. In the current study the judge’s behavior could be described as
indicating interested or preference depending on what case he was instructed to be for or
against. Though, the current study did not produce an effect of judge’s nonverbal
behavior on verdict using an actor, it nonetheless, produced an effect on other dependent
variables. In other conditions this particular actor’s behavior may produce an effect on
verdict, but given the results of the current study and previous studies it is difficult to say
what behavior specifically seems to influence jurors. It seems that not only do the small,
less noticeable behaviors of the real judges used in previous research influence
participants, the exaggerated behaviors of the current judge also influenced jurors, though
not on their ultimate verdict choices. Is it that the less noticeable behaviors influence
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verdict, while the exaggerated nonverbal behaviors do not? Further research should
explore this issue.
The present research was an initial attempt to examine the potential influence of
the aspects of courtroom procedures that vary between American and British trial systems
on juror decision-making. This was applied research so all the varying aspects of these
two procedures were included in this study. Further research should tease apart these
varying components and assess their individual affects on juror decision-making.
Given the current findings about American versus British courtroom, proceedings
and judges’ nonverbal behavior, it seems that there are advantages and disadvantages to
using either court procedure. American trials have elements that can distract jurors from
their primary task of processing evidence. British trial elements allow the juror to have
considerable exposure to the judge and his or her behavior during trial, which can unduly
influence a juror’s processing of trial evidence under certain conditions. The current
study demonstrates the potential biases of distraction and judges’ nonverbal behavior on
juror decision-making. The psycho-legal literature identifies a growing number of biases
in courtroom proceedings, but it also identifies ways to minimize those biases. The
results of the current study seem to suggest that taking on an American approach to the
judicial role can minimize the potentially biasing effects of judge’s nonverbal behavior.
Yet, in terms of enhancing a juror’s recall and memory for trial evidence, the British
courtroom procedures are a better choice than American courtroom procedures. The
most important finding of this study is that when jurors have the ability they will
ultimately use evidence to reach their verdict decisions.
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Table 1
Procedural variations between British and American trial conditions
British

American

1. Attorneys remained behind their tables
while questioning witnesses.

Attorneys roamed about the court during
questioning of witnesses.

2. There were no objections during the
course of testimony.

There were 26 objections during the
presentation of evidence for each side.

3. The presentation of the defense
opening statement was at the close of
the plaintiffs case.

Both the plaintiff and defense gave their
opening statements at the beginning of the
trial and their closing statements at the end
of both examinations.

4. The judge was seen asking questions
and interjecting himself when a
question was seemingly improper.

The judge did not ask questions nor
interjected himself during the course of
questioning by attorneys.

5. The judge gave a summation of the
trial evidence after the closing
arguments and prior to instructions.

The judge did not give a summation
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Table 2
Means for Defendant Responsibility Items and Factor Loadings from Principal
Component Analysis

Item ___________________________

M

Factor
Loading

The primary cause of Mark Stevens’ colon cancer
was his exposure to PCB’s.

4.50

.92

The plaintiff expert’s research sufficiently
demonstrated that PCBs cause colon cancer in
humans.

4.43

.86

It is more likely that other risk factors such as a
familial history of colon cancer, a diet high in fat
and low in fiber, as well as adenomatous polyps and
chronic inflammatory bowel disease were the
primary cause of Mark Stevens colon cancer.

The defense expert’s research sufficiently
demonstrated that PCB exposure might have
harmful effects on humans, but that colon cancer is
not one of them.

It is improper to say that a substance that causes
cancer in animals would cause cancer in humans.
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4.38

3.95

4.47

.78

.76

.42

Table 3
Means for Plaintiff Expert Credibility Items and Factor Loadings from Principal
Component Analysis
Factor
____________________
Item
M
Loading

Dr. Fallon’s testimony was persuasive

5.07

.77

His arguments were weak.

5.02

.77

He was likeable

4.54

.48

His arguments were not convincing

5.14

.83

He was knowledgeable.

5.91

.70

He was not credible

5.71

.68

He was incompetent

6.23

.44

He was qualified to be an expert witness in this case

5.78

.62

His testimony was understandable

5.65

.53
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Table 4
Means for Defendant Expert Credibility Items and Factor Loadings from Principal
Component Analysis

M

Factor
Loading

Dr. Campbell’s testimony was persuasive

4.62

.77

His arguments were weak.

4.74

.66

He was likeable

3.89

.51

His arguments were not convincing

4.47

.80

He was knowledgeable.

5.56

.72

He was not credible

5.12

.75

He was incompetent

5.61

.69

He was qualified to be an expert witness in this case

5.14

.76

His testimony was understandable

4.93

.69

__________

Item
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Table 5
Means for Plaintiff Attorney Competence Items and Factor Loadings from Principal
Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation
Factor
M
Loadings
Item
(1)
(2)
Jean Howard’s opening argument was compelling.

4.97

.77

.05

Her questioning of the expert witness was effective.

5.40

.75

.14

Her closing argument was not compelling.

4.64

.72

-.06

Overall, she was an effective trial advocate.

5.09

.89

-.05

Overall, she was not persuasive

4.97

.82

-.09

She was dislikable.

5.64

.61

-.48

She was knowledgeable.

5.00

.76

.17

Her use of objections during the trial was effective.

3.80

.51

.47

She was antagonistic.

3.43

-.10

.85
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Table 6
Means for Defense Attorney Competence Items and Factor Loadings from Principal
Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation

M

Factor
Loadings
(1)
(2)

3.78

.69

.17

4.30

.83

.08

4.02

.37

.62

4.19

.86

.19

4.18

.40

.58

4.34

.40

.59

4.27

.80

.17

3.23

.58

.14

3.81

.27

-.17

Item

Diane M oore’s opening argument was compelling.

Her questioning of the expert witness was effective.

Her closing argument was not compelling.

Overall, she was an effective trial advocate.

Overall, she was not persuasive

She was dislikable.

She was knowledgeable.

Her use of objections during the trial was effective.

She was antagonistic.
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Table 7
Means for Judge Perception Items and Factor Loadings from Principal Component
Analysis with Varimax Rotation

Items

M

Factor Loadings
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The judge treated the lawyers and jurors with
respect and concern.

4.70

.09

-.43

.34

.58

The judge was authoritative.

5.10

-.08

-.07

.17

.80

The judge was in favor of the plaintiff

3.34

.74

.43

-.10

-.02

The judge was knowledgeable.

4.80

.06

.01

.77

.25

The judge seemed interested in the plaintiffs
case.

4.01

.69

.27

.21

.26

The judge was competent.

4.87

-.04

-.10

.82

.09

The judge was not in favor of the defense

4.81

.82

-.29

.11

.15

The judge was domineering.

3.48

-.27

.41

-.43

.51

The judge did not seem interested in the
defense’s case.

4.20

.82

-.20

-.07

-.17

Overall, the judge was effective

4.39

.06

-.03

.51

.61

During the trial, the judge’s facial expressions,
gestures, tone of voice, etc., gave me an idea as
to which side the judge preferred.

4.68

-.06

.88

-.08

-.19

During jury instructions in particular, the judge’s
facial expressions, gestures, tone of voice, or any
type of behavior other than his actual words let
me know what he thought the verdict should be.

4.33

.02

.84

-.05

-.04
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Table 8
Means for Trial Procedure Items and Factor Loadings from Principal Component
Analysis with Varimax Rotation

Items

M

The trial was tried fairly.

4.83

Factor Loadings
(1)

(2)

(3)

.06

.06

-.03

The trial had too many interruptions and
objections.

3.59

-.43

-.48

.42

The case presented by the plaintiff was
strong.

4.83

-.42

.52

.05

The trial was civil in tone and atmosphere.

5.51

.10

.72

.16

The case presented by the plaintiff was easily
understandable.

5.44

-.17

.59

.51

The evidence presented by Dr. Fallon (the
plaintiffs expert) was complex.

4.03

.14

.11

.82

The case presented by the defense was weak.

3.62

-.61

.02

.19

The case presented by the defense was
difficult to understand.

4.36

.84

.08

.07

The evidence presented by Dr. Campbell (the
defense’s expert) was complex.

3.79

.73

-.02

.26
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Table 9
Mean Verdicts by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and Evidence Strength
Judge's Bent
Pro-plaintiff

Pro-defense

Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

1.09

0.29

33

1.26

0.44

31

Weak

1.63

0.49

30

1.67

0.48

30

Strong

1.03

0.18

30

1.07

0.25

30

Weak

1.43

0.50

30

1.55

0.51

31

American

66

Table 10
Mean Confidence by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and Evidence Strength
____________________
Pro-plaintiff
Courtroom Evidence
Procedure Strength
British

American

Judge’s Bent_______________
Pro-defense

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

Strong

1.09

0.29

33

1.26

0.44

31

Weak

1.63

0.49

30

1.67

0.48

30

Strong

1.03

0.18

30

1.07

0.25

30

Weak

1.43

0.50

30

1.55

0.51

31
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Table 11
Mean Probabilities Defendant Liability Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and
Evidence Strength
Judge's Bent________________
Pro-plaintiff__________

Pro-defense

Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

M

British

Strong

83.10

23.01

33

69.95

34.80

31

Weak

37.30

32.47

30

34.53

33.39

30

Strong

82.97

18.94

30

76.03

27.30

30

Weak

53.50

%/ JL • 1 Àmt
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30

44.97

35.09

31

American
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Table 12
Mean Damage Award by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and Evidence Strength
Pro-Plaintiff

Courtroom Evidence
Procedure Strength

Pro-Defense

M

British
Strong

$872,424

$1,851,993

33

$32,787,903

$17,9510,575

31

Weak

$348,333

$950,814

30

$105,000

$192,242

30

American
Strong

$726,667

$850,125

30

$471,167

$682,965

30

Weak

$230,000

$258,844

30

$284,347

$494,315

31
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Table 13
Mean Ratings for Defendant Responsibility Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent,
and Evidence Strength
Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff_______________ Pro-defense
Courtroom. Evidence
Procedure Strength
British

American

M

SD_____ N

M

SD

N

Strong

5.36

1.05

33

4.67

1.09

31

Weak

3.21

1.41

30

2.99

1.63

30

Strong

5.47

0.85

30

5.25

1.08

30

Weak

3.93

1.43

30

3.54

1.73

31
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Table 14
Mean Ratings for Plaintiff Expert Credibility Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
Judge's Bent ________________
Pro-plaintiff
______
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.77

0.59

33

5.49

0.84

31

Weak

5.05

0.97

30

5.02

0.98

30

Strong

5.97

0.76

30

5.70

0.86

30

Weak

5.34

0.97

30

5.24

0.87

31

American
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Table 15
Mean Ratings for Defense Expert Credibility Scale Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent,
and Evidence Strength
___________
Pro-plaintiff
Courtroom Evidence
Procedure Strength
British
Strong

Judge'sBent ___________ __
_______
Pro-defense

M________ SD______ N

M

SD

N

4.75

1.08

33

5.18

0.97

31

Weak

5.21

0.84

30

5.55

LOO

30

Strong

4.45

1.03

30

4.26

1.09

30

Weak

4.89

1.15

30

4.92

1.26

31

American
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Table 16
Mean Ratings for Plaintiff Attorney Competence Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff
Courtroom Evidence
Procedure Strength
British

American

________
Pro-defense

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

Strong

4.95

0.95

33

4.76

1.13

31

Weak

4.58

1.06

30

4.57

0.89

30

Strong

5.46

0.80

30

5.17

0.88

30

Weak

5.06

0.94

30

5.07

1.10

31
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Table 17
Mean Ratings for Defense Attorney Competence Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
________ Judge's Bent__________ ________
Pro-plaintiff
________ Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

3.50

1.02

33

4.42

1.12

31

Weak

4.05

0.97

30

4.55

1.21

30

Strong

3.67

0.99

30

3.54

1.05

30

Weak

4.15

1.08

30

4.52

0.85

31

American
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Table 18
Mean Ratings for Plaintiff Attorney Antagonism Item by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
_________
Judge’s Bent_________ _________
Pro-plaintiff
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

3.21

1.D
19jL
X

33

3.03

1.45

31

Weak

3.40

1.40

30

2.87

1.46

30

«y •

1 62
U

1.69

30

3.67

1.45

30

3.90

1.40

30

3.74

1.48

31

American

Strong
Weak
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Table 19
Mean Ratings for Defense Attorney Antagonism Item by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
________
Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff_______________ Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

M

British

Strong

3.94

1.00

33

3.81

1.64

31

Weak

3.31

1.17

29

3.33

1.75

30

Strong

3.93

1.26

30

4.20

1.52

30

Weak

4.17

1.58

30

3.74

1.37

31

American
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Table 20
Mean Ratings for Judge Competence Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and
Evidence Strength

Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff
________ Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.17

1.27

33

4.98

1.29

31

Weak

5.20

1.29

30

4.70

1.42

30

Strong

4.70

1.53

30

4.60

1.53

30

Weak

4.67

1.35

30

4.68

1.24

31

American
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Table 21
Mean Ratings for Judge Bias Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and Evidence
Strength

Judge’s Bent__________ ______
Pro-plaintiff ________
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.60

1.32

33

3.36

1.19

31

Weak

5.01

1.26

30

2.38

1.37

30

Strong

4.88

1.40

30

3.60

1.29

30

Weak

4.58

1.09

30

3.20

1.24

31

American
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Table 22
Mean Ratings for Judge’s Nonverbal Behavior Seale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
_______

Judge’s Bent
_____________ _
Pro-plaintiff___________
Pro-defense

Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.42

1.74

33

4.47

2.23

31

Weak

4.38

1.90

30

5.12

2.26

30

Strong

4.20

2.07

30

3.72

1.81

30

Weak

4.43

1.64

30

4.15

2.15

31

American
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Table 23
Mean Ratings for Judge Domineering Behavior Item by Courtroom. Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength.
Judge's Bent
______
Pro-plaintiff
______
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

2.94

1.58

33

3.71

1.70

31

Weak

3.67

1.69

30

3.43

1.87

30

Strong

3.87

1.33

30

3.30

1.60

30

Weak

3.17

1.78

30

3.90

1.37

31

American
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Table 24
Mean Ratings for Complexity of Defense Case Scale by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
________Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff ______
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

4.35

1.36

33

4.39

1.54

31

Weak

4.22

1.57

30

4.63

1.71

30

Strong

3.32

1.47

30

3.75

1.62

30

Weak

4.12

1.48

30

/■% «

1.23

31

American
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A

3.79

Table 25
Item Mean Rating for Plaintiff Case Clarity Item, by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent,
and Evidence Strength
_____________
Pro-plaintiff

Judge'sBent
_______ __
Pro-defense

Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.18

1.79

33

5.55

1.31

31

Weak

5.23

1.59

30

5.37

1.38

30

Strong

5.70

0.99

30

5.47

1.25

30

Weak

5.47

1.43

30

5.55

1.03

31

American
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Table 26
Mean Ratings for Plaintiff Case Complexity Item by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent,
and Evidence Strength

Judged Bent
Pro-plaintiff _________
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

3.91

1.72

33

3.97

1.62

31

Weak

3.50

1.70

30

4.53

1.78

30

Strong

4.23

1.72

30

3.87

1.96

30

Weak

4.03

1.59

30

4.23

1.59

31

American

83

Table 27
Mean Ratings of Trial Fairness Item by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and
Evidence Strength
Judge's Bent
Pro-plaintiff
_________ Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.21

1.43

33

5.10

1.89

31

Weak

4.90

1.60

30

4.33

1.73

30

Strong

4.83

1.60

30

5.03

1.47

30

Weak

4.50

1.76

30

4.68

1.11

31

American

84

Table 28
Mean Ratings of Trial Civility Item by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and
Evidence Strength
Judge’s Bent
_______ _
Pro-plaintiff
___________ Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.85

1.28

33

6.06

1.31

31

Weak

5.60

1.40

30

5.63

1.59

30

Strong

5.03

1.16

30

5.43

1.22

30

Weak

5.17

1.26

30

5.26

1.15

31

American
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Table 29
Mean Ratings of Perceived Distraction Level Item by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s
Bent, and Evidence Strength
__________
Pro-plaintiff

Judge’sBent________ ______
_________ Pro-defense

Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

2 27

1.42

33

2.13

1.20

31

Weak

2.67

1.35

30

<2 3 ”7

JL » AmtAmé

1 22

30

Strong

5.30

1.39

30

4.53

,JL * / And

1 72

30

Weak

4.77

1.65

30

4.84

1.63

31

American
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Table 30
Mean Free Recall of Trial Facts by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and Evidence

Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff
________
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

5.48

3.15

33

6.84

3.39

31

Weak

7.67

4.79

30

7.13

4.51

30

Strong

3.90

2.16

30

5.70

3.71

30

Weak

4.67

4.17

30

4.81

2.85

31

American
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Table 31
Mean Correct for Memory Test by Courtroom Procedure, Judge’s Bent, and Evidence
Strength

Judge’s Bent
Pro-plaintiff_________
Pro-defense
Courtroom
Procedure

Evidence
Strength

M

SD

N

M

SD

N

British

Strong

16.30

1.93

33

16.03

1.99

31

Weak

15.10

4.03

30

16.10

2.14

30

Strong

15.13

2.18

30

15.17

3.46

30

Weak

15.27

2.66

30

15.03

2.11

31

American
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B ritish C o u rtro o m Procedures
P laintiff’s Evidence Strong

M a rk A. Stevens v. K een Co., 1999
Judge: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for coming. Today you will be participating in a
summary jury trial in the case of Stevens vs. Keen Co. Now, although a summary jury trial is considerably
shorter than a jury trial, this does not make the case any less important or deserving of any less
consideration. I will ask you to give the evidence your complete attention and come to a reasonable
decision, as is your duty.
Now, before we begin today, let me give you very brief background information. This information has
been stipulated to by both plaintiff and defense counsel. Mark A. Stevens, who claims that Keen Co.
negligence resulted in his illness, filed this suit in 1999 against Keen Co. Mark Stevens was diagnosed as
suffering from metastatic colon cancer at the age of 28, slightly less than ten years after beginning his
employment at Keen Co. Although his cancer is in remission, he claims the danger of recurrence, in
addition to permanent decrease in his quality of his life, is present.
The cancer is alleged to have been caused by work place exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
in heat transfer fluids and through soil contamination at the Keen Company Plant. It is uncontested that
the plaintiff was indeed exposed to PCBs at Keen and that his exposure was significantly higher than
normal. W hat is contested is whether exposure to PCBs was the cause of Mr. Stevens’ cancer. Thomas
Fallon, Ph.D., a biochemist, will be offered as plaintiffs expert on causation. William R. Campbell, Ph.D.,
an epidemiologist, will testify for the defense. Ready to proceed, counsel?
P lain tiffs atto rn e y (Jean H ow ard): Thank you, your honor. Counsel, ladies and gentlemen, good
morning. My name is lean Howard. I am the attorney representing Mark Stevens. I'm here today to
present scientific evidence about how chemicals called PCBs, which were used at Keen Company, caused
Mark Stevens to contract colon cancer that metastasized; colon cancer that nearly ended his life. The
scientist who is going to present this evidence, Dr. Thomas Fallon, will explain to you that PCBs are
chemicals that are used in several industrial processes, and he'll tell you about the qualities that make them
useful in industry.
But what Dr. Fallon will also explain to you is that although PCBs have these qualities that make them
useful in industry, they also have qualities that can make them terribly dangerous to human health. When
human beings are exposed to PCBs it can place them at risk for a wide variety o f diseases including cancer
of the colon; the kind o f cancer Mark Stevens has.
The reason we are here today, as the evidence will show, is that the Keen Company violated its duty to
protect M ark Stevens against these hazardous chemicals. It did not warn him of the dangers. It did not
take the proper precautions to protect him from the dangers. We can show this to you quite clearly because
we know that M ark’s exposure was much, much higher than that of the average American. Too high. And
even the defendant will agree to this. This is not in dispute.
Now, M ark's body was full o f PCBs and as the scientific proofs will show, PCBs cause different forms
of cancer. One o f the cancers that PCBs have been associated with is cancer of the colon, and Mark has
that disease. It is a disease he was diagnosed with, had surgery for, and has suffered from for years. He is
now in remission and it looks good, but it took a long time and a lot of suffering, and Mark will never
really be the same.
Unfortunately, M ark won't be here to testify today to tell you the story himself because he is still in the
hospital undergoing treatment for an infection caused by the colostomy he had to get at age 29, when his
doctors removed his colon in order to save his life. A 29 year old with a colostomy. You don't see that
very often, do you? That's because 29 year olds don't get colon cancer. That is, they don't get it unless
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they've been exposed to something. Like a substance that causes it. And this is only one of the many
reasons why we believe that PCBs caused Mark Stevens' colon cancer.
We're here today because we're going to argue and we're going to prove that this should never have
happened. W e’re going to prove to you that if the defendant had protected M ark Stevens against the PCB
exposure, as they should have done, Mark never would have contracted this terrible disease.
What are the tools o f our trade? The tools of our trade are evidence and testimony. Dr. Thomas Fallon,
who will describe for you the basic scientific information, will offer these. He will also explain to you how
he came to the conclusion that PCBs caused Mark Stevens’ cancer and the research he has used to support
this conclusion. After you have heard all the evidence, I think you will have to agree that Mark Stevens'
cancer was caused by Keen Company negligence in exposing him to PCBs. PCBs they knew were there.
PCBs they knew were dangerous.
Now, when all is said and done, what is the point o f it? The academics and the issues are interesting, if
tough to understand. I think you'll find them interesting and also very difficult, but in the legal system,
we're not here merely for academic argument. My client has brought this case to be compensated and is
here seeking, as our law permits, reasonable compensation, adequate compensation from those who are
responsible for the decision that caused all of his pain and all his suffering. It is our contention and we're
going to argue and to present evidence to support the claim that he is entitled to compensatory, monetary
damages for the pain and suffering caused by his disease.
When we present our evidence I promise you, you will see he is entitled to this compensation. You will
hear the term burden o f proof - and the plaintiff does have the burden of proof. We must persuade you that
what I have said here today is true and I am going to make that commitment to you. It is an important case.
It is important to Mr. Stevens. It is important to the defendant and that's why you're here. Because in
disputes o f this magnitude, that concern our citizens this much, it is only you who can make a decision.
This is Mark's case. I will do the best I can to prove it. And thee I think you'll agree. We are not
Hollywood showmen. It doesn't always go smoothly as we'd like it to, but we'll do our best and we're
happy to have this opportunity to present this case to the jury system. Thank you.
Judge: Thank you, Ms. Howard. Are you ready to examine the witness?
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): Ready to proceed, your honor.
Judge: O.K. Dr. Fallon, please approach the witness stand. Dr. Fallon you have already been sworn in. I
remind you that you are still under oath.
Dr. Fallon: Yes, your honor.
Judge: Please be seated.
Plaintiff’s attorneyCJean Howard): Doctor would you state your name and address for the record?
Dr. Fallon; My name is Dr. Thomas Fallon and I reside at 1400 Longwood Ave., Brookline,
Massachusetts.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): And what is you profession?
Dr. Fallon: I run a research laboratory at Princeton University Medical School. My laboratory undertakes
investigations on studies o f carcinogens on animals. That is to say, I do cancer research.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): Doctor can you tell us about your educational background?
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Dr. Fallon: I graduated from Stanford University in 1980 with a dual major in biology and chemistry. In
1984 I received my Ph.D. in biochemistry from Johns Hopkins University.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And what positions have you held in your field?
Dr. Fallon: From 1984 to 1 9861 was an associate professor at Princeton University Medical School.
During this time I headed a laboratory in which we studied the effects of PCBs and other carcinogens on
animals. In addition, I taught introductory toxicology, which is the study of adverse effects of chemicals on
living organisms to students in the medical school. Periodically, I also taught a course in cancer cell
biology to graduate students. From 1986 to 1988 I was an associate professor at Princeton and served on
committees at the National Cancer Institute and the Food and Drag Administration. In 1988 I became a full
tenure professor and was elected to the board of directors of the American Association of Cancer Research.
I continue to teach toxicology and cancer cell biology courses and gave seminars at different universities
around the country.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And Dr. Fallon, can you tell us what the focus of your research
activities is?
Dr. Fallon: Laboratories interested in the mechanisms of how chemicals cause cancer. We do this by
maintaining a large stock o f the experimental animals and carefully standardizing the conditions and
feeding them certain chemicals. After a period of observation we can tell what effects the chemicals have
had on the animals.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And what have you published during this time?
Dr. Fallon: In the nine years I have been a professor, my laboratories published 45 articles on cancer in
peer review journals.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Do you hold any other scientific related positions?
Dr. Fallon: Yes I do. In addition to my other duties I am editor-in-chief of the Journal of Biochemistry
Review.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): At this time your honor, the plaintiff wishes to qualify Dr. Thomas
Fallon as an expert in the field of biochemistry.
Judge: I hear no objections. You may proceed Ms. Howard
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): So, Dr. Fallon, you do research on substances that cause cancer?
Dr. Fallon: Yes. These substances are called carcinogens. My laboratory studies several carcinogens
including PCBs.
P la in tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): So, PCBs are carcinogens?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I do believe that PCBs cause cancer.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): In your opinion, did Mark Stevens contract his cancer from exposure
to PCBs?
P la in tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Please continue, Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: I believe for several reasons that there is a very high possibility that Mark Stevens contracted
cancer as a result o f his exposure to PCBs.

96

Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, you've done a lot of research on PCBs. Are you familiar
with their uses outside of the laboratory?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I am. Because PCBs are fluids that are non-flammable and dielectric, they’re used as heat
exchange fluids. The extent of the heating does not cause these fluids to explode or to catch fire. They can
increase gas transmission in pipelines, capacitors and transformers. So, because of the unique physical
properties o f these compounds, they've found extensive use in a variety of products in electrical industry
and a number o f other industries.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): So PCBs are used in capacitors and transformers and various
electrical industries?
Dr. Fallon: Yes that’s right.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): Just like the capacitors and transformers that Mark Stevens worked
with at the Keen Company?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, but even if Mr. Stevens had not touched those capacitors and transformers he still would
have been exposed to high levels o f PCBs. I have here reports from the Environmental Protection Office,
Department o f Cancer and Toxic Substances Research and from the National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health dated 1994.
Judge: Please excuse me, Dr. Fallon Ms. Howard, have these reports been received as an exhibit?
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): No, your honor, but they are public documents.
Judge: Very well, I will allow Dr. Fallon to continue, but just so there can be no objections, I will have my
clerk make a copy o f these reports and make them available to the defense. Please, Dr. Fallon, continue.
Dr. Fallon: As I was saying, these reports state that the analytical data show extremely high amounts of
PCB contamination on the site. According to the reports, PCBs were used in heat exchangers, capacitors
and transformers as the heat transfer medium in polyester resin production from 1972 to 1991. Although
the PCBs were removed from these devices in 1991, soil containing PCB level above 50 PPMwas not
removed until early 1994. Both reports concluded that substantial health hazards existed at the Keen
Corporation.
P lain tiffs attorneyCJean Howard): Were there any differences between the PCBs used in the machinery
and PCBs found as contamination in the soil?
Dr. Fallon: Well, by the time Mark Stevens had begun working at the Keen plant in 1988, pressure from
the government and the public had already forced them to switch from heavily chlorinated PCBs to the
lesser-chlorinated PCBs. However, nothing was done to clean up the contaminated soil, which still
contained the old mixtures o f heavily chlorinated PCBs.
Judge: I must apologize for interrupting you Dr. Fallon, but I must ask if this is testimony based on first
hand reports?
Dr. Fallon: No, your honor, I was not on Keen Co. property at that time.
Judge: Then I must ask that you please refrain from making statements about the activities of the Keen Co.
The jury will need to disregard that last statement from Dr. Fallon. Please, Dr. Fallon continue.
P la in tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Dr., can you explain to me in the most basic terms you can, what the
significance is o f the different levels o f chlorine in different PCBs?
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Dr. Fallon: Sure. As the chlorination increases so does the apparent toxicity of the PCB congeners. For
example, aerochlores that have increased chlorination, like aerochlores 1254 and 1260; that is to say 6020
chlorinated aerochlores have caused hepatocarcinoma in rats, neoplastic changes in the liver and other
severe effects like necrosis and other degeneration. The effects of the lesser-chlorinated aerochlores like
1242 and 1248 appear to be less severe, although these less chlorinated PCBs have been less extensively
studied than their more heavily chlorinated counterparts. Thus, we attribute the increased carcinogenic and
toxic potential effects to the increased chlorination.
Plain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): O.K. So, if I understand you correctly, the more heavily chlorinated
PCBs, although they might have been easier for Keen to use, were still more toxic than the lesserchlorinated PCBs.
Dr. Fallon: Yes. That's correct.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): All right then, why did Keen switch to the lesser-chlorinated PCBs?
Judge; Excuse me Ms. Howard, but I must interject. I am sorry Dr. Fallon but your answer could be
considered speculative. Ms. Howard, could you please rephrase the question? Again, I am sorry for
interrupting.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Of course your honor. Dr. Fallon, why would a company switch to
the lesser chlorinated PCBs?
Dr. Fallon: Well, the first indications that PCBs might pose an environmental and health hazard began
emerging in the mid 1950's. By the 1970's evidence was strong enough that the federal government passed
regulations prohibiting the use o f the more heavily chlorinated PCBs. Of course, by then they became
nearly ubiquitous pollutants.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): All right, and why was it that the government forbade the use of
PCBs?
Dr. Fallon: Well, most o f the studies of the effects of PCBs on living organisms that the government used
were conducted on animals. These studies showed that PCBs were causing cancer in animals, and when
you see a substance causing cancer in animals you immediately begin to worry that the same substance may
cause cancer in humans.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Can you explain to us the value of animal studies? Why did you use
animals?
Dr. Fallon: Because for this type of research you can't use people due to the toxicity of the substance under
consideration. Laboratory animals are inexpensive to grow and maintain, and they grow up quickly which
makes them ideal subjects. We can keep the conditions controlled very closely when you use animals:
altering only a single variable between the experimental group and the control group. In addition, with
animal research you can control the dosage very carefully- so you can make sure an exact dose has an exact
effect.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Can you please describe for us some of the animal studies you did?
Dr. Fallon: Of course. In general we would dose the animals with a certain amount of PCBs for 2 weeks,
wait an appropriate latency period and then observe the effects. At the same time we would have a control
group o f animals that was treated in exactly the same way except that they would receive no such exposure
to PCBs. We would then compare any differences between the two groups and feel confident that any
differences were the result o f the PCB exposure. For example, a specific test we did was as follows: 100
rats were allowed to ingest 100 mgs. per kg. per diem of the aerochlore 1254 congener of PCBs. The
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control rats were fed saline. After two weeks of exposure we observed the rats for a follow up period of
one year; noting especially hepatic neoplasia in the experimental group.
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): And what else did you observe?
Dr. Fallon: After one year, 58% o f the experimental animals had liver tumors and another 10% of the
experimental animals had tumors of another type. Compare this to a control percentage of only 4% of the
animals receiving tumors o f any type during that year.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, so far all of the research we have discussed about the
effects o f PCBs has been on animals. What can you tell us about the effects o f PCBs on humans?
Dr. Fallon: Well, I don't think that there is any scientist out there who could seriously pose a challenge to
the idea that animal studies could tell a lot about the effects of chemicals on humans. The FDA, for
example, relies exclusively on animal studies for the purpose of determining which foods and drags are
appropriate for dispensation to humans. In fact, just about every substance that has been shown to be
carcinogenic in human beings was first shown to be carcinogenic in animals. O f course, animals aren't
humans, but since we don’t want to use humans to test potentially toxic substances; animals are an
appropriate substitute.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): So we can use animal studies to help us understand and to predict the
effects of PCBs in humans, as for instance in Mr. Stevens?
Dr. Fallon: Absolutely.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, do you recall my discussing with you and my giving you
information about Mr. Stevens family medical history?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I do.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And specifically do you recall asking me to find out all information
concerning any incidences of cancer in Mr. Stevens’s family? Is that correct?
Dr. Fallon: That’s correct.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Why would this be an important factor for you to know?
Dr. Fallon: Mark Stevens was diagnosed with colon cancer at age 28. You usually don't see colon cancer
till at least age 45. You only see colon cancer in people much younger than that, in 20 year olds, when they
belong to a cancer family.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Can you tell the court exactly what a cancer family is?
Dr. Fallon: Yes. Members o f a cancer family have a genetic predisposition to certain forms of cancer. For
example, families with Lymphedema syndrome inherit a gene, which makes it more likely they'll get many
kinds o f tumors. What turns out to happen is that their inherited mutant P53 gene is functionally haploid
insufficient. This means that the lymphedema syndrome families get tumors of all forms at a much greater
rate than that o f the general populace. In fact, in cancer families such as these 75 to 80 percent of inflicted
individuals eventually get cancer.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Are their cancer families explicitly for colon cancer?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, there are. In familial adenomatous polyposis or FAP, for short, virtually every member of
the family gets colon cancer. Another notable trait of FAP is that it causes colon cancer to strike young
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people. People as young as in their twenties. As a matter of fact, one theory posits that all men who have
colon cancer at a young age, say in their 30's or early 40's, are related in some way to these cancer families.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard); All right, now, when are most colon cancer victims diagnosed?
Dr. Fallon; Colon cancer is usually diagnosed around 65 years of age. As you look at younger and
younger populations, colon cancer becomes progressively, relatively more rare; until by the time you look
at people in their 2 0 ’s you never see colon cancer. Except of course in cancer families.
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard); So it was important for you to know whether Mark Stevens’ family
was a cancer family. Is that right?
Dr. Fallon: Oh that’s correct.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, based upon the medical evidence and research and
conversations with the family were you able to reach any conclusions about the Stevens being a cancer
family?
The defense attorney leans toward the plaintiff’s attorney. They quietly discuss things to one another fo r
30-45seconds. Then they fa ce the judge and the p la in tiffs attorney nods to the judge.
Plaintiff’s attorney(Jean Howard); Dr. Fallon, please continue.
Dr. Fallon: The Stevens definitely are not a cancer family. No one in Mr. Stevens’ family has ever
contracted any form o f cancer.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon do you recall inquiring whether Mr. Stevens had a personal
history o f intestinal polyps or chronic inflammatory bowel disease?
Dr. Fallon: Yes.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): And why might that be important?
Dr. Fallon; Well, both can increase the risk of colon cancer. In terms of the intestinal polyps they increase
the risk o f colon cancer when they are adenomatous polyps and those polyps are large and there are several
of them. Other types o f polyps, hyperplastic and inflammatory do not increase the risk of colon cancer. As
for the chronic bowel disease, well this is a condition in which the colon is inflamed over a long period of
time and may have ulcers in its lining. This increases the risk of colon cancer.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard); Based on Mr. Stevens’ medical history, would you say that Mr.
Stevens had a personal history o f intestinal polyps or chronic inflammatory bowel disease?
Dr. Fallon: Mr. Stevens does not have and never has had any polyps whatsoever in his colorectal area. As
for the chronic inflammatory bowel disease, Mr. Stevens has never had this disease nor is there evidence of
ulcers in his colon.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, do you recall inquiring whether Mr. Stevens is a smoker
or non-smoker?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, he is a non-smoker.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And why might that be important?
Dr. Fallon: There are several lines of evidence indicating that smokers face an increased incidence of
certain types o f cancer -that includes colon cancer.
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P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): That fact that Mr. Stevens is a non-smoker helpful to you in
formulating your opinion?
Dr. Fallon: It was a minor factor, but it was still a factor.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Do you recall asking for information about M ark Stevens eating
habits and. lifestyle?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I do. Mr. Stevens lived quite a healthy lifestyle outside of his work. He engaged in both
aerobic and anaerobic exercise at least four times a week. He also ate foods that were high in fiber and low
in fat and cholesterol. He never ate fast foods, which are high in fat and cholesterol and low in fiber.
Recent research has uncovered that diets which consist mainly of fast foods and foods that are low in fiber
and high in fat and cholesterol have been associated with colon cancer. I would consider Mr. Stevens a bit
of a health fanatic.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): So, was the fact that Mr. Stevens had a healthy lifestyle also
important in formulating your opinion?
Dr. Fallon; Yes, very much so, because it eliminated yet another factor as to the source of Mr. Stevens
colon cancer.
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, did you ask for a report on the recent medical histories of
the individuals who worked with M ark Stevens at Keen Company?
Dr. Fallon: Yes I did.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Why did you ask for this?
Dr. Fallon: I requested information on those individuals who could reasonably be expected to have been
exposed to high levels o f PCBs as was Mr. Stevens. According to the report, Mr. Stevens was employed at
the Keen Corporation Plant from 1988 to 1998, at which time he was diagnosed with this colon cancer.
Keen had stopped using PCBs in its capacitors in 1992 and did some significant cleanup on the site later in
1995. Therefore, I was primarily interested in those individuals who worked with Mr. Stevens prior to
1995. I was able to locate 46 other such individuals.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard); All right. Dr. Fallon, have you read the report written by the Keen
Company physician?
Dr. Fallon: Yes I have.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And what does it say? Could you summarize the contents for the
court please?
Dr. Fallon: The report said that 47 people, including Mark Stevens, had been exposed to high levels of
PCBs at the Keen Company Plant. In this small group of 47 people, 20 people over a five-year period
contracted cancer.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard); And what is so unusual about this?
Dr. Fallon: In a normal group of American males you would expect only one, or at most two cancers over
a five-year period. To get 20 is really statistically rare and unusual. It really shocked me to see that
number. Nearly half the men we found had contracted cancer of some form! In fact, a statistical chi square
test o f the difference o f finding two cancers in this group to finding 20 cancers is enormous. The
probability is only 1 in 1800 that this is due to chance alone.
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P lain tiff’s atto rn ey (Jean H ow ard): So, Dr., if it's not chance alone, what do you think the cause of their
cancer is?
D r. Fallon: Well, when we see numbers like this, we immediately start looking for where the common
cause may lie. In a case such as this, the most immediate and possible explanation is that they were all
exposed to a carcinogen. In this case all the men were exposed to PCBs.
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): And if PCBs are the real cause why didn't all 47 of these men get
cancer? W ouldn’t you expect that?
Dr. Fallon: Oh no, not at all. As I said, to find 20 cancers in this group, at this time was really
remarkable: a 1 in 1800 chance. There are also other reasons why you would see 20 cancers and not more.
First, there is latency. It takes time for these tumors to develop to the point where they can be physically
diagnosed. Second, there is a difference between being exposed to and getting a disease. For example,
even if you were exposed to a proven causative agent like chicken pox that doesn't mean you automatically
come down with the disease. And it's the same with carcinogens. Cigarette smoke is a known carcinogen.
It's known that not everybody who smokes cigarettes gets lung cancer.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard); And Dr., what was the dosage level on Mark Stevens?
Dr. Fallon: Well, the average background level in American males of PCBs is 4.2 to 6.4 parts per billion
in the blood. W hen we measured Mark Stevens blood levels of PCBs he came out to 300 parts per billion.
That's over 60 times the normal level.
Plaintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Of these 20 men at the Keen plant who did get cancer, what kinds of
cancer did they get?
Dr. Fallon: There were: six cases of colon cancer, three young and three old; four cases of lung cancer,
non-Hodgkin's lymphoma; three each of liposarcoma, epithelioma, hepatocarcinoma.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And is there any reason to suspect that more cancers might come out
of the Keen plant even if it were closed down for business today?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, because o f the latency of most tumors.
Judge: Dr. Fallon, could you explain latency to the jury?
Dr. Fallon: Latency is the period o f time between the exposure to the disease and the onset of the disease.
For instance, in colon cancer the period o f latency is usually quite long, up to 10 years. Ten years between
the first pre-malignant defense and the expression of frank diagnosable disease.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): All right, so, what you're saying is that given more time the incidence
o f PCB induced cancer in Mark Stevens' co-workers could actually increase?
Dr. Fallon: That is a strong possibility, yes.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): And if this were to come to pass, this would make Mark’s case even
stronger wouldn't it?
Dr. Fallon: Well yes, o f course it would. But we would have to wait at least 10 years after the cessation of
exposure in order to insure that we would be able to observe all the PCB induced tumors.
P la in tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): I see. Dr. Fallon, everything you told us here today suggests very
strongly that colon cancer can result from exposure to PCBs.
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Dr. Fallon: Yes, I would agree with that.
P lain tiffs attorney (Jean Howard): So, there's no reason to believe that Mark would have contracted
cancer had he not been exposed to PCBs. Is that correct?
Dr. Fallon: That is correct, especially since I could eliminate such factors as: Mr. Stevens being from a
cancer family; having had adenomatous polyps or chronic inflammatory bowel disease; having any sort of
smoking habit; and also, the fact that Mr. Stevens was a bit of a health fanatic and ate foods high in fiber
and low in fat and cholesterol.
Plaintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon can you give us your expert opinion as to the cause of
Mark's colon cancer?
Dr. Fallon: In my expert opinion there can be no other cause for Mr. Stevens’s early onset of colon cancer
except for his exposure to high levels o f PCBs at the Keen Company plant.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard); Thank you, Dr. Fallon.
Judge.* Yes, thank you Dr. Fallon. You may step down. Ms. Howard, are you ready to proceed with your
closing statement at this time?
Plaintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Yes, your honor we are ready to proceed with the plaintiff’s closing
arguments.
Judge: Ladies and gentlemen o f the jury, before Ms. Howard proceeds with her closing statement, I have
one caution for you: what the attorneys say to you is not evidence. The evidence came from the witness
stand in the form o f testimony.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): Thank you, your honor. Now is my opportunity to come before you
and examine in a comprehensive way the evidence that's been presented in this case. And the theme that I
want to set for you is responsibility. Responsibility. Lets talk about my client and realize you can't
examine what's happened to Mark Stevens without looking at the evidence hard from beginning to end.
As you heard in this case PCBs are dangerous chemicals and when they get into your body they can
cause serious diseases. And there's no dispute about this in this particular case and there's no doubt that for
many years Mr. Stevens was exposed to PCBs. We know that Mr. Stevens was exposed and he had PCBs
in his liver. You know that he got sick, very sick and one of the best scientists in the world showed you
that his sickness was quite probably caused by PCBs in his body. There was no other reason for him to get
colon cancer. People argue that people like Mark Stevens don’t get this disease. But Mr. Stevens was full
of PCBs and he got it.
Now, not all chemicals are the same, not all o f them cause disease or symptoms. But some do and
there's really only one way to determine that. You've got to look at this the way Dr. Fallon did. You've got
to do an experiment on them and study them. Dr. Fallon was able to experimentally control his variables,
thus enabling him to eliminate alternative explanations and confounding variables. This is very important
in understanding the effects o f different chemicals on humans.
W hen you resolve some o f these issues you will come to conclusions. What can you now do? Well, the
only thing we can do in a civil justice system is award damages. You can't take away Mark Stevens cancer,
you can’t take away his years of pain and suffering. That's not in your power. All you can do is make it
right by awarding Mr. Stevens with a settlement, by returning your verdict sheet with an amount. That
power is yours and that choice is your, ladies and gentlemen, to decide if Mr. Stevens deserves a
settlement.
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Now, how do you make that decision? Well, you have to use your own judgm ent as to what adequately
will compensate him. You're going to have a few tools but not many. You can measure his pain and
suffering. But I won't dwell on that because this trial is not about sympathy, it's about causation and it’s
about responsibility.
This trial has not been easy. We all understand and appreciate it. But the fact of the matter is that in the
wisdom o f all this concern, the decision is left up to you. It's not left up to Judge Montgomery, it's not left
up to the lawyers, it's left up to you and that's because the intrinsic value of this system is that when
someone has a dispute or has been harmed in your community they can come to the courthouse and get
relief. That's what Mr. Stevens has done. His judgm ent is in your hands and we have no doubt that when it
is over, justice will be done. Thank you.
Judge: Thank you, Ms. Howard. We will now proceed with the defendant’s case. Ms. Moore, are you
ready to proceed?
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Diane Moore and I represent the
Keen Company. This case like any other case started with a complaint and like any other case the
complaint has an allegation. The allegation in this case is that the plaintiff has PCB caused injuries and that
my client the Keen Company provided the exposure that resulted in those injuries. These are the
allegations against my client, the Keen Company.
Now, we're all here today because this trial is a search for the facts. Fortunately, in this country it is not
enough to simply make allegations. We have to carefully examine the facts and weigh the evidence before
we decide the truth o f any allegation. Now I know that a lot of you have heard stuff about PCBs. I'm going
to ask you to try, if it is in any way possible, to set that aside and listen to what happens in court. Listen to
the testimony and see if the plaintiff has proven to you that his injuries were proven by PCBs. I'm going to
ask you to listen closely.
Now, the judge asked you during voir dire if you could treat a corporation the same as you could treat
any individual in this case. All o f you said that you could and I hope you can, but I also think that will be
difficult to do. I think that's going to be difficult because pure and simple; a corporation is not flesh and
blood. It is not flesh and blood unless, of course, you think of the people who make up the corporation. It
is many people who make up a corporation, the various jobs that they do. And that's what the Keen
Company is; a corporation made up o f people. The people who make up the Keen Company are just one of
the issues that I'll ask you to keep in mind throughout this case.
And in this case there is one issue that stands out as being most important. This is the issue of whether
or not Mr. Stevens’s colon cancer was caused by PCBs. Every witness who speaks from this witness stand
and every piece o f evidence that comes into this trial will have some bearing on this issue. The attorney for
the plaintiff is going to tell you that his client's cancer was caused by the PCBs he was exposed to while
working at Keen Corporation. He and his expert are going to tell you that if Mark Stevens hadn't been
exposed to PCBs he would not have gotten cancer. I don’t think the testimony you will hear will support
that. Instead, the evidence will show that he doesn't have any PCB caused cancer in his body.
But this is neither for me to decide nor for the experts to decide. This most important issue is for you to
decide. You're the jury and it is your job to decide the case. My job, on the other hand, is to present the
evidence to you; bring in an expert witness who can explain the evidence to you better than I ever could.
Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not here to defend PCBs. It’s very clear that PCBs cause some serious
health problems. They do, and we're not trying to try and hide from the truth. But neither are we going to
sit still for exaggerations and distortions of the scientific evidence about PCBs. PCBs do cause some
serious health problems. They cause some kinds of liver disease and also skin ailments, but they do not
cause colon cancer.
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Today, I'm going to invite Dr. William Campbell, and eminent epidemiologist to speak with you about
the plaintiffs cancer and explain to you why it was not caused by PCBs. Dr. Campbell will tell you how he
looked at all o f the relevant epidemiological studies. Studies that have taken place in Japan, in China and
in America. All of these studies, people were exposed to PCBs. In each of these countries people got liver
damage and they also got skin cancer but they did not, in any of these studies, get colon cancer. Indeed, it
will be undisputed in this case that the majority, the majority of the studies showed no statistically
significant increase in colon cancer and there will be no question about that issue. These studies do not
show any connection between colon cancer and PCBs. But, what they did show was that colon cancer, an
extremely rare form, o f cancer, occurs more frequently in some groups than in others. For instance, in New
York and New Jersey we have some o f the highest colon cancer rates in this country and this has absolutely
nothing to do with PCBs. These studies also show there are different risk factors such as diets high in fatlow in fiber; and these are associated with high rates of colon cancer. And when you look at all the studies
and you take into account the inherent variability in people and that people are not numbers, not statistics you will conclude, ladies and gentlemen, on the evidence in this case, that PCBs simply do not cause colon
cancer.
Now, as Ms. Howard said earlier, "A trial is nothing less than a search for the truth." - "A search
for the facts, “ I think she said, and I believe Ms. Howard would join me in saying that we want you to do
justice in this case. And justice in this case, ladies and gentlemen, on all the evidence, all the scientific
evidence o f the relevant epidemiological studies. All the most credible interpretations of the evidence will
show the defendants are entitled to your verdict at the end of this case. And I will have a chance to speak
to you again at the end o f this case and I just want to ask you for a few things before I go. I'm going to ask
you to pay close attention to the case. I'm going to ask you for your common sense. I'm going to ask you
for your oath, your sense o f fairness even though we are a corporation. I'm going to ask you for a
reasonable, intelligent verdict at the end of this case. Thank you.
Judge: Thank you. Are you ready with your witness?
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Yes, your honor.
Judge: Dr. Campbell, please approach the bench. Dr. Campbell you've already been sworn in. I remind
you, you're still under oath. You may be seated. Ms. Moore, you may proceed.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Thank you, your honor. Dr., will you please state your name and
address for the record.
Dr. Campbell: My name is Dr. William Campbell and I live at 2230 Huntington Court, New Haven,
Connecticut.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): And Dr. Campbell, what is your current occupation?
Dr. Campbell: I'm a professor of epidemiology at Yale University.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): And what exactly is epidemiology?
Dr. Campbell: Epidemiology is the study o f the distribution and effects of disease on human populations.
An epidemiologist is someone who like myself gathers information about a large population and then uses
statistics to process this information and reach conclusions about effects of disease. We can gather this
information from a variety o f sources including medical records, clinical examinations, surveys and even
death certificates.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Thank you. And where did you receive your training in this science?
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D r. C am pbell; 1 received my bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth University in 1977 with concentrations in
mathematics and biology. And then I proceeded to earn a Ph.D. in epidemiology from Columbia
University in New York.
Defense atto rn e y (D iane M oore); What professional appointments have you held?
D r. C am pbell; In 1982 when I finished my Ph.D., I proceeded to work for the Center of Disease Control
in Atlanta, Georgia; studying the effects of diet on heart attacks. After three years, in 1985 I was appointed
associate professor at Yale University and in 1989 appointed full professor.
Defense atto rn e y (D iane M oore): Well, what do you do at Yale, Dr. Campbell?
D r. C am pbell; I teach a seminar in epidemiology to graduate students in public health and also a class on
environmental disease to medical students. Most importantly, I do research. I study gastrointestinal
cancer; how the diet and environment affect gastrointestinal cancer. And this is epidemiology of
gastrointestinal cancer.
Defense atto rn ey (D iane M ore); And where does you work take you besides Yale, Doctor?
D r. C am pbell: I'm on the committee for population studies in the National Institute of Health in
Washington, D.C. and I still maintain my contacts at the Center for Disease Control and fly to Atlanta at
least once a month.
Defense atto rn e y (D iane M oore): With what professional journals are you involved?
D r. C am pbell: I've published over 30 articles in such journals as Cancer Research, Environmental Health
and Public Safety and the European. Journal of Cancer Research. In addition, I sit on the board of review
for several journals. I'm most proud, however, o f my recent book The Environment and Cancer Danger ;
What Governments Can Do About It.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): Dr., have any of your articles or chapters covered epidemiological
studies of PCBs?
D r. C am pbell: Yes, several o f my articles have covered epidemiology of PCB exposure.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore); So would you consider PCB epidemiology to be one of the major
thrusts o f your research?
D r. C am pbell: Yes, I would.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): W ould you consider yourself to be an expert on that subject, the
epidemiology o f PCBs?
D r. C am pbell: Yes, I would consider myself to be an expert in that area.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): At this time, your honor, the defense wishes to qualify Dr. William
Campbell as an expert in the field of epidemiology.
Ju d g e : I hear no objections. Ms. Moore, you may proceed.
D efense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): Thank you, your honor. Dr., you've conducted and reviewed many
studies on the effects of PCBs on populations. What have these studies indicated with respect to the
association between PCBs and colon cancer?
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Dr. Campbell: Well, there are no studies that specifically address the question o f PCBs and colon cancer.
In none o f these studies was there a linkage shown between PCB exposure and colon cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): So people who were exposed to PCBs were no more likely to contract
colon cancer than anybody else.
Dr. Campbell: That's right. Populations exposed to PCBs did not have a different rate of colon cancer
than populations that are unexposed.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): What does that mean for the plaintiff?
Dr. Campbell: That means it is unlikely the plaintiffs colon cancer was caused by PCB exposure.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore); So in your expert opinion PCBs did not cause Mark Stevens colon
cancer.
The p lain tiffs attorney leans toward the defense attorney and the defense attorney notices and
leans down and they begin whispering to one another. Then the plaintiffs attorney crouches down and
they continue whispering to one another. Allow thirty seconds to go by, then the defense attorney stands
up.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell, please answer the question.
Dr. Campbell: I see no evidence that the plaintiffs colon cancer was caused by PCB exposure.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Do you believe that epidemiology is an appropriate way to answer such
a question?
Dr. Campbell: There is really no better way to answer that question. Epidemiology is the study of people
in real life. It measures how various environmental effects influence a large population of people. It has
direct implications for making causal interpretations and even for designing preventive strategies. There is
one limitation, however, in that since you're working with real people it's not possible to randomize. But in
a properly conducted study, with a large population, this is a minor limitation that can be worked around to
lead to very conclusive results.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): O.K. Dr. Campbell, are you aware of any medical text or literature that
identify PCBs as being causally related to colon cancer?
Dr. Campbell: No, I'm not.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): If there were an epidemiological association with colon cancer and
PCBs, would you know about it?
Dr. Campbell: Yes I would. I'm actively involved in epidemiology of cancer and PCBs. I’m on the
boards o f a variety o f journals. If there were such evidence, such information out there, I would certainly
hear o f it.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): So PCBs have not been shown to cause colon cancer but they have not
been ruled out.
Dr. Campbell: Well, I think it's actually stronger than that. There's just no evidence that PCBs are
involved in the cancer problem. High doses of PCBs have serious toxic effects, but their risk of causing
cancer is minimal.
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Defense attorney (Diane Moore): I see. I’d like to talk about your research for a minute. Am I correct in
my belief that an epidemiologist has both the research or data collecting function and then an analytical
function?
Dr. C am pbell: Yes. First we must identify a population, collect data on it and then we use statistics, work
with the data to a coherent whole and interpret it.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): So you yourself perform the experiment?
Dr. Campbell: Not in the same way that a laboratory scientist would perform an in vivo or in vitro
experiment. No, we have less ability to control since we are working with real people, especially in the
case o f epidemiology with PCBs. We're talking about toxic substances. We can't control for exposure, we
can only look for exposed populations and look for its effects on them.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): So you must be extremely knowledgeable about the other research in
the field?
Dr. Campbell: Well definitely, in order to reach legitimate conclusions you must be even more conversant
in the literature than scientists in other fields.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): The scientific literature that is associated with epidemiology of PCBs
and humans sufficient for you to draw any scientific conclusions either from an individual piece of
literature or looking at the body o f literature as a whole?
Dr. Campbell: You're asking whether I can draw a conclusion from literature in aggregate?
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Yes.
Dr. Campbell: Well, very few o f these Individual studies are persuasive on their own. They may have
some flaws, they may not be a large enough sample, and they may not follow the population long enough.
But, as an aggregate, you can take all o f these studies and look at all of the conclusions and reach a fairly
strong conclusion that PCBs are not linked to cancer problems.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): So I take it you would agree that there is no substantial minority of
epidemiologists who find that the literature supports a causal connection between exposure to PCBs and
colon cancer?
Dr. Campbell: W ell, obviously, I can't know that. I haven't asked every epidemiologist his or her opinion
on this question. But, I'm not aware of any epidemiologist who thinks there is a strong causal between
PCB exposure and cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): What about the animal studies that say that PCBs are carcinogens? Are
they wrong or is it scientifically improper to extrapolate from animals to humans?
Dr. Campbell: It's scientifically improper to extrapolate from one kind of tumor type in animals to another
kind o f tumor type in humans.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Why is that, Doctor?
Dr. C am pbell: W ell, there are many reasons you can't say that one tumor type in an animal can be directly
related to another tumor type in humans. Animals and humans interact with their environments differently.
Different chemicals can have different effects on different animals for a variety of reasons.
Judge: Excuse me, Dr. Campbell, but I just wanted to make one thing clear. You are an epidemiologist
and your research does not involve experiments with animals. Is that correct?
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D r. C am pbell: Yes.
Judg e: Thank you Dr. Campbell. I just wanted to get that clear for the jury and myself. Please continue.
D r. Campbell: As I was saying, most experimental animals are quite small. Just looking at humans a
thousand times larger than a rat or a mouse. You have to be very careful about dosages. Likewise, the
human life expectancy is much longer than that of a rat or a mouse. A human can live for 80 years. Cancer
can take ten years to develop. A rat lives two years. Cancers happen in a matter of months. It's hard to
extrapolate between organisms in that way, especially with the different types of tumors, is the question.
Defense a tto rn e y (Diane M oore): I see. Is it possible to extrapolate at all from any animal tumors to
human tumors?
D r. C am pbell: Well, as I said it is perfectly legitimate to extrapolate from hepatocarcinoma elicited by a
chemical in a mouse to a hepatocarcinoma being perhaps elicited by the same chemical in humans. But, it
would not be legitimate to extrapolate to a different type of tumor.
Defense a tto rn ey (D iane M oore); Can you tell us more about the specificity of carcinogens and tumors?
D r. C am pbell: Well, I would if I could. This is an on going area of research. Site specificity is a very
important question in science today. Toxins and carcinogens affect very specific organs and it's not all that
very well understood. As a non-obvious example, take Aflo-Toxin B, which is a biological toxin found on
contaminated beans and rice in Africa. Now, Aflo-Toxin B causes liver cancer. This kind of toxin is found
throughout the body o f an affected person but only the liver develops tumors. It’s not understood why. A
more obvious example is cigarette smoking. Cigarette smoke is known to cause lung cancer and cancers of
the esophagus and larynx, and that's about it. It does not cause colon cancer even though smokers are
ingesting the same toxins that cause lung cancer into the gastrointestinal tracts. The colon is exposed to the
same toxins,- nicotine, tar, etc.,- but no colon cancer arises. The same thing is true of PCBs. They have
very specific targets in the skin and the liver, not affecting the colon.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore); O.K. Since cancer-causing substances are tissue specific, can you
extrapolate from animal studies to humans?
D r. C am pbell: You can extrapolate if the dosages are comparable and organs are identical. If you saw a
rodent that was exposed to PCBs and developed a hepatocarcinoma, a liver tumor, you could extrapolate
that PCBs could be linked to hepatocarcinoma, or liver cancer in humans, but not to a different type of
cancer.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): I see. But if the tumor type is different then an extrapolation is not
appropriate.
D r. C am pbell; Exactly.
Defense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): O.K. So if for example we found that PCBs cause liver cancer in rats it
would be improper based only that evidence to say that PCBs cause colon cancer in humans.
Judge: Ms. Moore, please rephrase that last question.
D efense a tto rn e y (D iane M oore): If, for example we found that PCBs cause liver cancer in rats would it
be improper based only that evidence to say that PCBs cause colon cancer in humans?
D r. C am pbell: O f course.
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Defense attorney (Diane Moore): How would epidemiological evidence be brought to bear on such an
extrapolation?
D r. C am pbell: Well, if epidemiological evidence failed to show a correlation between exposure and a
tumor type then the assumptions that the same chemicals causing cancer in humans just like the animals
would be inappropriate. Only if the epidemiological evidence led to the same conclusions, this chemical
leads to this type of cancer would extrapolations from animals to humans be considered appropriate.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Could you please tell us more about, the sort of conclusions that have
arisen in those 50 years o f experience? Maybe you can start by telling us something about your own
research.
Dr. Campbell: I'd be happy to. My most recent study concerned 30 railroad workers that were exposed to
PCBs on the job. Either through PCB as dielectric fluid in railroad transformers, PCBs that leaked out onto
the tracks or were breathed in as dust through respirative function. Now these workers had been exposed
for an average o f 5 years, over a range o f 1 to 15 years. We follow them, for 4 years after they have been
identified. At the beginning o f the work their blood PCB rs levels range from 17 to 200 parts per billion.
That has since dropped.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): And so far what have you found?
Dr. Campbell: Well, we found some normal liver functions, elevated numbers for SGOT, SGBT and OCT
and serum cholinesterase, but no cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): I see. Dr. Campbell, have you done other similar studies?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, until this most recent one, my 1985 study of electrical workers was the critical study.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): And what did you find there?
Dr. Campbell: We found that PCBs induced hepatic drug metabolism, and high levels induced frank
toxicity.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Anything else?
Dr. Campbell: Well, yes, dermal conditions such as digital and ocular keratinitis, edema of the skin and
eyes and some core acne.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): How interesting. What about other studies?
Dr. Campbell: Well, there have been about 17 epidemiological studies related to PCB exposure and
cancer. One o f the most important was a morbidity and mortality study in 1985 by Brown and Jones from
the National Institute o f Health. They had evaluated the incidence of cancer individuals who were exposed
occupationally to PCBs.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Did they concentrate on groups believed to have increased risks of
exposure to PCBs?
Dr. Campbell: The actual PCB exposure levels were known.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): What is the most reliable way to measure PCB levels?
Dr. Campbell: The most reliable way to measure PCB levels in the blood is through mastocapony.
Certainly, with maspec, as we call it, you take a sample you want to study- like a drop of someone's blood,
in this case and you burn it. The burning separates and ionizes it in the samples into its individual
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components. And the machine exposes the separated components into an electrical field. They separate
from each other in direct relation to their mass, their size in this electrical field. The mass to charge ratio of
each compound is unique, like a fingerprint, and this allows you to identify every compound found in the
sample in question.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): O.K. Dr. Campbell, in the Brown and Jones study they were able to
measure very accurately the blood levels o f PCBs.
Judge: Ms. Moore, please ask your witness a question.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Could you tell us what the study showed?
Dr, Campbell: Well, one health defect that they found was liver damage. Forty percent of heavily
exposed workers had a normal liver function test. There were anomalous readings and GGT and OCT and
again cholinesterase and in addition, instances o f hepatomegaly and hypetosplenomegaly and venal
hypertrophy.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): But no cancer?
Dr. Campbell: But no cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Is there a substantial body o f scientific opinion that claims that human
exposure to PCBs will give rise to any form of human cancer?
Dr. Campbell: Not substantial, epidemiological literature on PCBs and cancer risk is scant.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Is it fair to say that there is a small minority position of qualified
investigators who will adopt that position?
Dr. Campbell: Well, there are a very limited number of published studies, which do suggest some
relationship between PCB and cancer. But again, these studies each have their own individual flaw, maybe
not large enough, not long enough follow-up time or flaws like that. There are some studies that suggest
PCBs are related to cancer in animals but not in humans.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Doctor, do you have other studies, which support your claim?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, one o f the most conclusive and powerful studies was just published in 1993 by
Harvinsons group from the University o f Florida. They summarized the major chemical findings about
exposure to PCBs. Those people that had the greatest exposure were involved in the manufacture and
maintenance o f electrical transformers and capacitors. The potential target areas they looked at include the
skin, lungs, liver, circulatory system, endocrine system, some aspects of the immune system as well as the
colon and gastrointestinal and urinary tracts, in general. After careful analysis the weight of the evidence
suggests that the effects of PCBs are limited to the skin and the liver.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): There was no evidence linking PCBs to cancer of any type at all?
Dr. Campbell: Well, this is only one study, but no it did not show linkage between PCB exposure and
cancer. I would consider this to be a very well done study.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): O.K. So, that's only one study. But let me get this clear, what you've
told us here today was that if you look at all the studies that have been done and you put all the studies and
all the data together; all you can really say is, the evidence to date suggests although PCBs may have some
adverse effects, colon cancer is not among them.
Dr. Campbell: That is what the epidemiological data would suggest, yes.

Ill

Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Meaning that, there is no evidence linking colon cancer to PCB
exposure.
The plaintiffs attorney leans toward the defense attorney and the defense attorney notices and
leans down and they begin whispering to one another. Then the plaintiffs attorney crouches down and
they continue whispering to one another. Allow thirty seconds to go by, then the defense attorney stands
up.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Please, continue Dr. Cambell.
Dr. Campbell: There is no epidemiological evidence that links PCB exposure to cancer, yes.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Then in you expert opinion, would you day that PCBs were not the
cause of the plaintiffs illness?
Dr. Campbell: I would say that it is highly improbable the plaintiffs colon cancer was the result of
exposure to PCBs.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Thank you very much Dr. Campbell.
Judge: Good afternoon members o f the jury. As I cautioned before, what the attorneys say to you is not
evidence. The evidence came from the witness stand in the form of testimony. All right, Ms. Moore, are
you ready to proceed?
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Yes, thank you your honor. Counsel, Ms. Plaintiff and members of the
jury, this is my last chance to talk to you before you go and deliberate. You've been asked to sit as a juror in
a case and decide a dispute between parties in an impartial manner. An impartial manner means that you
decide this matter fairly to all parties concerned.
Ladies and gentlemen, when you look at the deficiencies in Dr. Fallon's opinion, his failure to interpret
the evidence correctly, Ms failure to consider all the relevant information when formulating his opinion,
you will realize he did not have all the evidence to make a considered medical opinion. For that reason you
should disregard his opinion. It is your right to disregard his opinion.
I told you in my opening statement that just because a scientist hired by a lawyer comes to a conclusion
that doesn't mean we are going to sit still and accept that conclusion. Not all the truth comes from
opinions. Some o f the studies he used are a little old. Some have even been disproved. W e don't have to
accept them.
Now on the other hand our scientist, Dr. Campbell, has carefully considered all the important facts. He
is familiar with all the medical literature and all the latest scientific literature and he has based his opinion
on this information. He says that his opinion reflects the opinion of the majority of the scientific
community. He has seen the deficiencies in the other point of view and he has chosen a view that he
believes to be right and to be supported by the majority of scientists who study colon cancer.
Ladies and gentlemen, if you think that Keen has caused Mr. Stevens’ pain and suffering you should
give him money. There is nothing wrong with compensating people with money. That's the only way our
system has for addressing a wrong. But remember you're not here to throw money into the wind. That's
not going to help the situation. All the plaintiff is entitled to is plain and fair compensation and if his injury
was not caused by Keen, then making Keen pay for this unfortunate accident would be grossly unfair,
wouldn’t it?
I've made my position clear, I hope. I don't go into the jury room with you, I have no place there. I
know some other things, which have no place there. One is sympathy. W e've heard some sympathetic
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testimony in this case, things that have nothing to do with this case, anymore. I ask you to try to put that
aside. I hope you can. I ask you for your common sense especially in regards to the testimony of Dr.
Fallon. He might be a scientist, he might have all those degrees, but you have your common sense. I ask
you for a fair and reasonable and intelligent verdict. I'm confident we will get one. Thank you.
Judge: Thank you Ms. Moore.
Judge: Members of the jury, we have reached the final phase of this case. I will first summarize the facts
of the case and instruct you, as is my duty, to the principles of law that apply to this case.
The plaintiff, Mark A. Stevens, alleges that his metastatic colon cancer is the result of negligence
on the part o f the Keen Co., and as such has filed this suit against the Keen Co. because of this alleged
negligence. The plaintiff claims that he was exposed during his employment at the Keen Co. from 1988 to
1998, to PCBs, or Polychlorinated Biphenyls. The Keen Co. does not contest that Mr. Stevens was
exposed to higher than normal levels of PCBs. The Keen Co. is contesting whether Mr. Steven’s exposure
to PCBs was the proximal cause o f his cancer.
The plaintiff had called Dr. Thomas Fallon, an expert in biochemistry and biochemistry research,
to testify as to the effects o f PCBs on animals. His research focus is on how chemicals cause cancer in
animals. It is Dr. Fallon’s opinion that PCBs are carcinogens, i.e. they cause cancer. Dr. Fallon noted in
his testimony that the Keen Co. used PCBs in their heat exchangers, capacitors and transformers as the heat
transfer medium in polyester resin production from 1972 to 1991. PCBs were removed from these devices
in 1992, but soil containing high levels of PCBs was not removed until early 1995. Dr. Fallon also pointed
out that by the time M ark Stevens started at the Keen Co. in 1988, they had already switched to lesser
chlorinated PCBs, however nothing was done to clean up the soil which contained a mixture of both the
heavily and lesser chlorinated PCBs. The more heavily chlorinated PCBs are more toxic than the lesser
chlorinated PCBs.
Dr. Fallon’s research and research by his colleagues in biochemistry has demonstrated that PCBs
can cause cancer in animals. He believes that these animal studies can help us to understand and to predict
the effects o f PCBs in humans.
Dr. Fallon went on to note that M ark Stevens did not come from a cancer family, which means
there are no incidences of cancer in his family, Mark Stevens did not have adenomatous polyps or chronic
inflammatory bowel disease, Mark Stevens did not smoke, and he also maintained a diet which was high in
fiber and low in fat. As Dr. Fallon noted, all of these things have been associated with an increase risk in
colon cancer. He said that diagnosing colon cancer at age 28 is rare because symptoms are not usually
diagnosed until around age 65. Dr. Fallon also found that another 20 out of 47 other people, who were
exposed to the same levels o f PCBs as Mr. Stevens, had contracted cancer as well.
The defense called Dr. William Campbell, an epidemiologist, which, to refresh your memory, is
the study o f the distribution and effects o f disease on human populations. Dr. Campbell noted that several
of his articles covered the epidemiology o f PCB exposure. Dr. Campbell notes that his research, along with
that of his colleagues, found that populations exposed to PCBs did not have a different rate of colon cancer
than populations that are unexposed. Dr. Cam pbell’s research and research by his colleagues in
epidemiology has intimated that PCBs may have serious toxic effects, but their risk in causing cancer has
not been found. It is his opinion that PCBs were not the proximal cause of the p lain tiffs colon cancer.
Dr. Campbell feels it is scientifically improper to extrapolate from one type of tumor in animals to
another type o f tumor in humans. Since life expectancy and body size o f animals is different than that of
humans it is very difficult just on this basis to compare the two. Dr. Campbell believes that toxins and
carcinogens affect very specific organs and that PCBs have not been shown to affect the colon. Dr.
Campbell described his research and that of other colleagues in epidemiology and noted that the research
has demonstrated that PCBs have been found to affect the skin and the liver. Based on both of these
findings in epidemiology, Dr. Campbell concludes that it is improper to say that a substance that causes
cancer in a specific organ site in animals would cause cancer in a different organ site in humans.
Your first duty is to determine whether or not the defendant is legally liable and whether the defendant
proximally caused the injuries complained of. If you find the defendant is legally liable and that this
liability was the proximate cause of these injuries, then it becomes you duty to determine the total amount
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of damages the plaintiff is entitled to. To compensate him reasonably for his injuries in this case, you the
jury, have to weigh and sift contradictory testimony.
You have to determine the credibility o f the witnesses who took the stand. You have to determine the
extent to which each witness is to be believed or disbelieved. You're required to give the witnesses such
weight; such worth such credibility as you believe they are entitled to. Now if you believe any testimony to
be inherently improbable or impossible you may reject such testimony. You may believe only that part of
the witness testimony that you think is accurate and true and disregard that part you think is false or
inaccurate.
Now you must divide you decision into two parts. First, was the defendant legally liable, that is to say
legally responsible. Second if the defendant is responsible, what damages is the plaintiff entitled to. That
is to say, how much money should be awarded. Note that many useful products are dangerous but since
they come with warnings the companies that manufacture them are not negligent.
There is conflicting testimony here as to whether or not PCBs cause injury. To be fair, take a
preponderance of the credible evidence that PCBs are or are not a proximate cause of Mr. Stevens. In order
to be a proximate cause, PCBs need not be the only cause but just one of the causes. You may find that
PCBs are not a substantial contributing factor.
Next, you should consider damages. Well, how will you determine the damages, if any? A plaintiff
who sustains an injury or illness or a disease as the result of the legal responsibility of another is entitled to
recover reasonable monetary damages for the full extent of the harm caused. The law recognizes as proper
items of recovery: pain, suffering, discomfort, distress and disability, which apparently may endure as a
natural consequence o f such injury. The measure o f damages is what a reasonable person would consider
to be fair and just under all the circumstances o f the case, to compensate the plaintiff, no more and no less.
Now, with all that said, I want to thank you ladies and gentlemen, for your presence in this courtroom here
today. You will now retire to deliberate the facts and return a decision. Bailiff, please escort the jury into
the deliberation room. Court is adjourned.

114

APPENDIX B

115

American Courtroom Procedures
Plaintiff’s Evidence Weak

M a rk A. Stevens v. K een Co., 1999
Judge: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for coming. Today you will be participating in a
summary jury trial in a case of Stevens vs. Keen Co. Now, although a summary jury trial is considerably
shorter than a jury trial this does not make the case any less important or deserving of any less
consideration. I will ask you to give the evidence your complete attention and come to a reasonable
decision, as is your duty.
Now, before we begin today, let me give you very brief background information. This information has
been stipulated to by both plaintiff and defense counsel, Mark A, Stevens, who claimed that Keen Co.
negligence resulted in his illness, filed this suit in 1991 against Keen Co. Mark Stevens was diagnosed as
suffering from metastatic colon cancer at the age of 28, slightly less than 10 years after beginning his
employment at Keen Co. Although his cancer is remission, he claims the danger of recurrence, in addition
to a permanent decrease in his quality of his life, are present.
The cancer is alleged to have been caused by work place exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
in heat transfer fluids and through soil contamination at the Keen Company Plant. It is uncontested that
the plaintiff was indeed exposed to PCBs at Keen and that his exposure was significantly higher than
normal. W hat is contested is whether exposure to PCBs was the cause of Mr. Stevens’s cancer. Thomas
Fallon, Ph.D., a biochemist, will be offered as plaintiffs expert on causation. W illiam R. Campbell, Ph.D.,
an epidemiologist, will testify for the defense. Ready to proceed counsel?
Plaintiff’s atty . (Jean H ow ard); Thank you, your honor. Counsel, ladies and gentlemen, good morning.
My name is Jean Howard. I am the attorney representing Mark Stevens. I'm here today to present
scientific evidence about how chemicals called PCBs, which are used at Keen Company, caused Mark
Stevens to contract colon cancer, which had metastasized; colon cancer that nearly ended his life. The
scientist who is going to present this evidence, Dr. Thomas Fallon, will explain to you that PCBs are
chemicals that are used in several industrial processes, and he’ll tell you about the qualities that make them
useful in industry.
But what Dr. Fallon will also explain to you is that although PCBs have these qualities that make them
useful in industry, they also have qualities that can make them terribly dangerous to human health. When
human beings are exposed to PCBs it can place them at risk for a wide variety o f diseases including cancer
of the colon; the kind o f cancer Mark Stevens has.
The reason we are here today, as the evidence will show, is that the Keen Company violated its duty to
protect Mark Stevens against these hazardous chemicals. It did not warn him o f the dangers. It did not
take the proper precautions to protect him from, the dangers. W e can show this to you quite clearly because
we know that M ark’s exposure was much, much higher than that of the average American. Too high. And
even the defendant will agree to this. This is not in dispute.
Now, M ark's body was full o f PCBs and as the scientific proofs will show, PCBs cause different forms
of cancer. One o f the cancers they have been associated with is cancer of the colon, and Mark has that
disease. It is a disease he was diagnosed with; had surgery for; and has suffered from for years. He is now
in remission and it looks good, but it took a long time and a lot o f suffering, and M ark will never really be
the same.
Unfortunately, Mark won't be here to testify today to tell you the story him self because he is still in the
hospital undergoing treatment for an infection caused by the colostomy he had to get at age 29, when his
doctors removed his colon in order to save his life. A 29 year old with a colostomy. You don’t see that
very often, do you? That's because 29 year olds don't get colon cancer. That is, they don't get it unless
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they’ve been exposed to something. Like a substance that causes it. And this is only one of the many
reasons why we believe that PCBs caused Mark Stevens' colon cancer.
W e're here today because we're going to argue and we're going to prove that this should never have
happened. We're going to prove to you that if the defendant had protected Mark Stevens against the PCB
exposure, as they should have done, Mark never would have contracted this terrible disease.
W hat are the tools of our trade? The tools of our trade are evidence and testimony. Dr. Thomas Fallon,
who will describe for you the basic scientific information, will offer these. He will also explain to you how
he came to the conclusion that PCBs caused Mark Stevens’ cancer and the research he has used to support
this conclusion. After you have heard all the evidence, I think you will have to agree that Mark Stevens*
cancer was caused by Keen Company negligence in exposing him to PCBs. PCBs they knew were there.
PCBs they knew were dangerous.
Now, when all is said and done, what is the point of it? The academics and the issues are interesting, if
tough to understand. I think you'll find them interesting and also very difficult, but in the legal system,
we're not here merely for academic argument. My client has brought this case to be compensated and is
here seeking, as our law permits, reasonable compensation, adequate compensation from those who are
responsible for the decision that caused all of his pain and all his suffering. It is our contention and we're
going to argue and to present evidence to support the claim that he is entitled to compensatory, monitory
damages for the pain and suffering caused by his disease.
When we present our evidence I promise you, you will see he is entitled to this compensation. You will
hear the term burden o f proof - and the plaintiff does have the burden of proof. We must persuade you that
what I have said here today is true and I am going to make that commitment to you. It is an important case.
It is important to Mr. Stevens. It is important to the defendants and that's why you’re here. Because in
disputes o f this magnitude, that concerns our citizens this much, it is only you who can make a decision.
This is M ark’s case. I will do the best I can to prove it. And then I think you'll agree. We are not
Hollywood showmen. It doesn't always go smoothly as we'd like it to, but we'll do our best and we're
happy to have this opportunity to present this case to the jury system. Thank you.
Judge: Thank you, Ms. Howard. Ms. Moore you may proceed.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Ladies and gentlemen, my name is Diane Moore and I represent the Keen
Company. This case like any other case started with a complaint and like any other case the complaint is
an allegation. The allegation in this case is that the plaintiff has PCB caused injuries and that my client the
Keen Company provided the exposure that resulted in those injuries. These are the allegations against my
client, the Keen Company.
Now, we're all here today because this trial is a search for the facts. Fortunately, in this country it is not
enough to simply make allegations. We have to carefully examine the facts and weigh the evidence before
we decide the truth o f any allegation. Now I know that a lot of you have heard stuff about PCBs. I'm going
to ask you to try, if it is in any way possible, to set that aside listen to what happens in court. Listen to the
testimony and see if the plaintiff has proven to you that his injuries were proven by PCBs. I’m going to ask
you to listen closely.
Now, the judge asked you during voir dire if you could treat a corporation the same as you could treat
any individual in this case. All o f you said that you could and I hope you can, but I also think that will be
difficult to do. I think that's going to be difficult because pure and simple; a corporation is not flesh and
blood. It is not flesh and blood unless, o f course, you think of the people who make up the corporation. It
is many people who make up a corporation, the various jobs that they do. And that's what the Keen
Company is; a corporation made up of people. The people who make up the Keen Company are just one of
the issues that I'll ask you to keep in mind throughout this case.
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And in this case there is one issue that stands out as being most important. This is the issue of whether
or not Mr. Stevens’s colon cancer was caused by PCBs. Every witness who speaks from this witness stand
and every piece of evidence that comes into this trial will have some bearing on this issue. The attorney for
the plaintiff is going to tell you that his client's cancer was caused by the PCBs he was exposed to while
working at Keen Corporation. He and his expert are going to tell you that if Mark Stevens hadn't been
exposed to PCBs he would not have gotten cancer. I don't think the testimony you will hear will support
that. Instead, the evidence will show that he doesn't have PCB caused cancer in his body.
But this is neither for me nor for the experts to decide. This most important issue is for you to decide.
You're the jury and it is your job to decide the case. My job, on the other hand, is to present the evidence to
you; bring in an expert witness who can explain the evidence to you better than I ever could.
Now, don't get me wrong, I’m not here to defend PCBs. It’s very clear that PCBs cause some serious
health problems. They do, and we're not trying to hide from the truth. But neither are we going to sit still
for exaggerations and distortions of the scientific evidence about PCBs. PCBs do cause some serious
health problems. They cause some kinds o f liver disease and also skin ailments, but they do not cause
colon cancer.
Today, I'm going to invite Dr. W illiam Campbell, and eminent epidemiologist to speak with you about
the plaintiffs cancer and explain to you why it was not caused by PCBs. Dr. Campbell will tell you how he
looked at all of the relevant epidemiological studies. Studies that have taken place in Japan, in China and
in America. All of these studies, people were exposed to PCBs. In each of these countries people got liver
damage and they also got skin cancer but they did not, in any of these studies, get colon cancer. Indeed, it
will be undisputed in this case that the majority, the majority of the studies showed no statistically
significant increase in colon cancer and there will be no question about that issue. These studies do not
show any connection between colon cancer and PCBs. But, what they did show was that colon cancer, an
extremely rare form, o f cancer, occurs more frequently in some groups than in others. For instance, in New
York and New Jersey we have some o f the highest colon cancer rates in this country and this has absolutely
nothing to do with PCBs. These studies also show there are different risk factors such as diets high in fatlow in fiber; and these are associated with high rates of colon cancer. And when you look at all the studies
and you take into account the inherent variability in people and that people are not numbers, not statistics you will conclude, ladies and gentlemen, on the evidence in this case, that PCBs simply do not cause colon
cancer.
Now, as Ms. Howard said earlier, "A trial is nothing less than a search for the truth" - "A search
for the facts, “ I think he said, and I believe Ms. Howard would join me in saying that we want you to do
justice in this case. And justice in this case, ladies and gentlemen, on all the evidence, all the scientific
evidence o f the relevant epidemiological studies. All the most credible interpretations of the evidence will
show the defendants are entitled to your verdict at the end of this case. And I will have a chance to speak
to you again at the end o f this case and I just want to ask you for a few things before I go. I'm going to ask
you to pay close attention to the case. I'm going to ask you for your common sense. I'm going to ask you
for your oath, your sense o f fairness even though we are a corporation. I'm going to ask you for a
reasonable, intelligent verdict at the end o f this case. Thank you.
Jud g e: Thank you.
Jud g e: Plaintiffs counsel ready to examine the witness?
P lain tiff's a tty . (Jean H ow ard): Ready to proceed, your honor.
Ju d g e; O.K. Dr. Fallon please approach the witness stand. Dr. Fallon you have already been sworn in. I
remind you that you are still under oath.
D r. F allon: Yes, your honor.
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Judge; Please be seated.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard); Dr., would you state your name and address for the record?
Dr. Fallon: My name is Dr. Thomas Fallon and I reside at 1400 Longwood Ave., Brookline,
Massachusetts.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): And what is you profession?
Dr. Fallon: I run a research laboratory at Princeton University Medical School. My laboratory undertakes
investigations on studies o f carcinogens on animals. That is to say, I do cancer research.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Doctor can you tell us about your educational background?
Dr. Fallon: I graduated summa cum laude from Stanford University in 1980 with a dual major in biology and
chemistry. In 1984 I received my Ph.D. in biochemistry from Johns Hopkins University.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): And what positions have you held in your field?
Dr. Fallon: From 1984 to 1986 I was an associate professor at Princeton University Medical School.
During this time I headed a laboratory in which we studied the effects of PCBs and other carcinogens on
animals. In addition, I taught an introductory toxicology, which is the study of adverse effects of chemicals
on living organisms to students in the medical school. Periodically I also taught a course in cancer cell
biology to graduate students. From 1986 to 1988 I was an associate professor at Princeton and served on
committees at the National Cancer Institute and the Food and Drug Administration. In 1988 I became a full
tenure professor and I continued to teach the toxicology and cancer cell biology courses and give seminars
at different universities around the country.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): And Dr. Fallon, can you tell us what the focus of your research activities
is?
Dr. Fallon: Laboratories interested in the mechanisms of how chemicals cause cancer. We do this by
maintaining a large stock o f the experimental animals and carefully standardizing the conditions and
feeding them certain chemicals. After a period of observation we can tell what effects the chemicals had on
the animals.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): And what have you published during this time?
Dr. Fallon: In the nine years I have been a professor, my laboratories published 45 articles on cancer in
peer review journals.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Do you hold any other scientific related positions?
Dr. Fallon: Yes I do. In addition to my other duties I am editor-in-chief of the Journal of Biochemistry
Review.
P lain tiffs atty. (Jean Howard): At this time your honor, the plaintiff wishes to qualify Dr. Thomas Fallon
as an expert in the field o f biochemistry.
Judge; I hear no objections. You may proceed Ms. Howard.
P lain tiffs atty. (Jean Howard): So, Dr. Fallon, you do research on substances that cause cancer?
Dr, Fallon: Yes. These substances are called carcinogens. My laboratory studies several carcinogens
including PCBs.
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P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): So, PCBs are carcinogens?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; leading!
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Your honor this man has been qualified as an expert.
Judge: Overruled, You may answer the question Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I do believe that PCBs cause cancer.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): And in your opinion, did Mark Stevens contract his cancer form exposure
to PCBs?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; this is what the jury has to decide!
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Your honor, as I said before, this man has been qualified as an expert.
Judge: Overruled. Please answer the question Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: I believe for several reasons that there is a very high possibility that Mark Stevens contracted
cancer as a result o f his exposure to PCBs.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, you've done a lot of research on PCBs. Are you familiar with
their uses outside of the laboratory?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I am. Because PCBs are fluids that are non-flammable and dielectric, they're used as heat
exchange fluids. The extent o f the heating does not cause these fluids to explode of to catch fire. They can
increase gas transmission in pipelines, capacitors and transformers. So, because of the unique physical
properties o f these compounds, they've found extensive use in a variety of products in electrical industry
and a number of other industries.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): So PCBs are used in capacitors and transformers and various electrical
industries.
Dr. Fallon: Yes, that’s right.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Just like the capacitors and transformers that Mark Stevens worked with
at the Keen Company?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, but even if Mr. Stevens had not touched those capacitors and transformers he still would
have been exposed to high levels of PCBs. I have here reports from the department of Environmental
Protection Office, of Cancer and Toxic Substances Research and from the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health dated 1994.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor. These reports have not been received as an exhibit.
This is hearsay your honor based on Rules 703 and 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence!
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Your honor, these are reports that can be accessed by the public!
Judge: I will allow Dr. Fallon to continue, but I will have my clerk make a copy of these reports and make
them available to you Ms. Moore. Please continue Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: As I was saying, these reports state that the analytical data show extremely high amounts of
PCB contamination on the site. According to the reports, PCBs were used in heat exchangers, capacitors
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and transformers as the heat transfer medium in polyester resin production from 1972 to 1991. Although
the PCBs were removed from these devices in 1991, soil containing PCB level above 50 PPM was not
removed until early 1994. Both reports concluded that substantial health hazards existed at the Keen
Corporation.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): W ere there any differences between the PCBs used in the machinery and
PCBs found as contamination in the soil?
Dr. Fallon: Well, by the time Mark Stevens had begun working at the Keen plant in 1990, pressure from
the government and the public had already forced them to switch from heavily chlorinated PCBs to the
lesser-chlorinated PCBs. However, nothing was done to clean up the contaminated soil, which still
contained the old mixtures o f heavily chlorinated PCBs.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor, hearsay. Dr. Fallon was not present at the Keen Co.
during that time.
Judge: Sustained. The jury will disregard that last sentence from the record.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Dr., can you explain to me in the most basic terms you can, what the
significance is o f the different levels of chlorine in different PCBs?
Dr. Fallon: Sure. As the chlorination increases so does the apparent toxicity of the PCB congeners. For
example, aerochlores that have increased chlorination, like aerochlores 1254 and 1260; that is to say 6020
chlorinated aerochlores have caused hepatocarcinoma in rats, neoplastic changes in the liver and other
sever effects like necrosis and other degeneration.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor. Ms. Howard has not established the relevance of this
question, Rules 401 and 402 o f the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Your honor, I am. simply addressing the issue of PCBs.
Judge: Overruled. Please continue Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: The effects o f the lesser-chlorinated aerochlores like 1242 and 1248 appear to be less severe.
Although these less chlorinated PCBs have been less extensively studied than their more heavily
chlorinated counterparts. Thus, we attribute the increased carcinogenic and toxic potential effects to the
increased chlorination.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): O.K. So, if I understand you correctly, the more heavily chlorinated
PCBs, although they might have been easier for Keen to use, were still more toxic than the lesserchlorinated PCBs?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; leading!
Judge: Overruled. Dr. Fallon you may answer.
Dr. Fallon; Yes. That's correct.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): All right then, why did Keen switch to the lesser-chlorinated PCBs?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor. Hearsay, your honor. Unless Dr. Fallon was on the
board o f directors he has no idea why they switched!
Judge: Sustained. Ms. Howard, please refrain the question.
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Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, why would a company switch to the lesser-chlorinated
PC B ’s?
Dr. Fallon: Well, the first indications that PCBs might pose an environmental and health hazard began
emerging in the mid 1950's. By the 1970's evidence was strong enough that the federal government passed
regulations prohibiting the use of the more heavily chlorinated PCBs. O f course, by then they became
nearly ubiquitous pollutants.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): All right, and why was it that the government forbids the use of PCBs?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; sufficient qualifications have not been established for
the witness to give opinion testimony on this subject, Rule 702 in the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Fallon: Well, most o f the studies o f the effects of PCBs on living organisms that the government used
were conducted on animals. These studies showed that PCBs were causing cancer in animals, and when
you see a substance causing cancer in animals you immediately begin to worry that the same substance may
cause cancer in humans.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Can you explain to us the value of animal studies? Why did you use
animals?
Dr. Fallon: Because for this type of research you can't use people due to the toxicity of the substance under
consideration. Laboratory animals are inexpensive to grow and maintain, and they grow up quickly which
makes them ideal subjects. W e can keep the conditions controlled very closely when you use animals:
altering only a single variable between the experimental group and the control group. In addition, with
animal research you can control the dosage very carefully- so you can make sure an exact dose has an exact
effect.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Can you please describe for us some of the animal studies you did?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; overly narrative under Rule 6 1 1(a)!
Judge: Overruled. Please continue Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: O f course. In general we would dose the animals with a certain amount of PCBs for 2 weeks,
wait an appropriate latency period and then observe the effects. At the same time we would have a control
group of animals that was treated in exactly the same way except that they would receive no such exposure
to PCBs. W e would then compare any differences between the two groups and feel confident that any
differences were the result of the PCB exposure.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; relevance!
Judge: Overruled. Please continue Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: For example, a specific test we did was as follows: 100 rats were allowed to ingest 100 mgs.
per kg. per diem of the aerochlore 1254 congener of PCBs. The control rats were fed saline. After two
weeks o f exposure we observed the rats for a follow up period of one year; noting especially hepatic
neoplasia in the experimental group.
P lain tiffs atty. (Jean Howard): And what else did you observe?
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Dr. Fallon: After one year* 58% of the experimental animals had liver tumors and another 10% of the
experimental animals had tumors of another type. Compare this to a control percentage of only 4% of the
animals receiving tumors o f any type during that year.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, so far all of the research we have discussed about the effects
of PCBs has been on animals. What can you tell us about the effects of PCBs on humans?
Dr. Fallon: Well, I don't think that there is any scientist out there who could seriously pose a challenge to
the idea that animal studies could tell a lot about the effects of chemicals on humans. The FDA, for
example, relies exclusively on animal studies for the purpose of determining which foods and drags are
appropriate for dispensation to humans. In fact, just about every substance that has been shown to be
carcinogenic in human beings was first shown to be carcinogenic in animals.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection your honor; inflammatory!
Judge: Overruled, Ms. Moore. Please continue Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: O f course, animals aren't humans, but since we don't want to use humans to test potentially
toxic substances; animals are an appropriate substitute.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): So we can use animal studies to help us understand and to predict the
effects of PCBs in humans, as for instance in Mr. Stevens?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, leading!
Judge: Sustained. Please rephrase the question Ms. Howard.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Then, in essence, animal studies can help us to understand and maybe to
predict the effects o f PCBs in humans. Is that correct Dr. Fallon?
Dr. Fallon: Absolutely.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, do you recall my discussing with you and my giving you
information about Mr. Stevens family medical history?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I do.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): And specifically do you recall asking me to find out all information
concerning any incidences o f cancer in Mr. Stevens’s family? This is correct?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, leading!
Judge: Sustained, Please rephrase the question Ms. Howard.
P lain tiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Do you recall asking me to find out all information concerning any
incidences of cancer in Mr. Stevens’s family?
Dr. Fallon: Yes.
P lain tiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Why would this be an important factor for you to know?
Dr. Fallon: M ark Stevens was diagnosed with colon cancer at age 28. You usually don't see colon cancer
till at least age 45. You only see colon cancer in people much younger than that, in 20 year olds, when they
belong to a cancer family.
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Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard); Can you tell the court exactly what a cancer family is?
Dr, Fallon; Yes. Members of a cancer family have a genetic predisposition to certain forms of cancer. For
example, families with Lymphedema syndrome inherit a gene, which makes it more likely they'll get many
kinds of tumors. W hat turns out to happen is that their inherited mutant P53 gene is functionally haploid
insufficient. Which means that the lymphedema syndrome families get tumors of all forms at a much
greater rate that the general populace. In fact, cancer families such as these 75 to 80 percent of inflicted
individuals eventually get cancer.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Are there cancer families explicitly for colon cancer?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, there are. In familial adenomatous polyposis or FAP, for short, virtually every member of
the family gets colon cancer. Another notable trait of FAP is that it causes colon cancer to strike young
people. People as young as in their twenties. As a matter of fact, one theory posits that all men who have
colon cancer at a young age, say in their 30’s or early 40's are related in some way to these cancer families.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): All right, now, when are most colon cancer victims diagnosed?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore); Objection, calls for speculation!
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Fallon: Colon cancer is usually diagnosed around 65 years of age. As you look at younger and
younger populations, colon cancer becomes progressively, relatively more rare; until by the time you look
at people in their 2 0 ’s you never see colon cancer. Except of course in cancer families.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): So it was important for you to know whether M ark Stevens’s family was
a cancer family. Is that right?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection. Ms. Howard is leading the witness your honor!
Judge: Overruled. Please answer the question Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: Oh, that's correct.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, based upon the medical evidence and research and
conversations with the family were you able to reach any conclusions about the Stevens being a cancer
family?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, leading! Your honor may I request a side-bar?
Judge: Ms. Moore, Ms. Howard, please approach the bench.
(Simply show the judge and lawyers conversing for approximately 45 seconds to a minute)
Judge: Dr. Fallon, please continue.
Dr. Fallon: W here were we? Only Mr. Stevens’ great uncle, uncle and two male first cousins have
contracted colon cancer.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon do you recall inquiring whether Mr. Stevens had a
personal history o f intestinal polyps or chronic inflammatory bowel disease?
Dr. Fallon: Yes.
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Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): And why might that be important?
Dr. Fallon: Well, both can increase the risk of colon cancer. In terms of the intestinal polyps they increase
the risk o f colon cancer when they are adenomatous polyps and those polyps are large and there are several
of them. Other types of polyps, hyperplastic and inflammatory do not increase the risk of colon cancer. As
for the chronic bowel disease, well this is a condition in which the colon is inflamed over a long period of
time and may have ulcers in its lining. This increases the risk of colon cancer.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): Based on Mr. Stevens’ medical history, would you say that Mr.
Stevens had a personal history of intestinal polyps or chronic inflammatory bowel disease?
Dr. Fallon: Mr. Stevens had a few adenomatous polyps but again, they were not large and there were only
a few o f them. As for the chronic inflammatory bowel disease, Mr. Stevens was never tested for it, but
there is evidence o f ulcers in his colon.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, you concluded that Mr. Stevens is a non-smoker.....
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, leading!
Judge: Ms. Howard, please rephrase the question.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, do you recall inquiring whether Mr. Stevens is a smoker or
non-smoker?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, and Mr. Stevens only smoked for seven years of his life and quit when he was 25.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection. Habit must be established over time, your honor. Rule 406!
Judge: Overruled.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): And why might that be important?
Dr. Fallon: There are several lines o f evidence indicating that smokers face an increased incidence of
certain types o f cancer -that includes colon cancer. Mr. Stevens (pause slightly) didn’t smoke for that long
so he probably wasn’t as affected as other smokers.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): That fact that Mr. Stevens is not really a smoker helpful to you in
formulating your opinion?
Dr. Fallon: It was a minor factor, but it was still a factor.
Plaintiff’s attorney (Jean Howard): Do recall asking for information about Mark Stevens eating habits
and lifestyle?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I do. Mr. Stevens lived a relatively average lifestyle in terms o f health outside of his
work. He didn’t really exercise much. He also had a pretty typical diet for an American, which consisted
mostly o f fast foods and maybe little bit of healthier high fiber/low fat and cholesterol foods. Recent
research has uncovered that diets consisting mainly of fast foods and foods that are low in fiber and high in
fat and cholesterol have been associated with colon cancer. But Mr. Stevens’ diet wasn’t out of the
ordinary for the typical American.
Plaintiff's attorney (Jean Howard): So, was the fact that Mr. Stevens had a typical lifestyle also
important in formulating your opinion?
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Dr. Fallon: Well, his diet wasn’t that good but it also wasn’t atypical of the average American. So, like
the smoking it was a minor factor that I used in formulating my opinion.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon, did you ask for a report on the recent medical histories of the
individuals who worked with Mark Stevens at Keen Company?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I did.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Why did you ask for this?
Dr. Fallon: I requested information on those individuals who could reasonably be expected to have been
exposed to high levels of PCBs as was Mr. Stevens. According to the report, Mr, Stevens was employed at
the Keen Corporation Plant from 1988 to 1998, at which time he was diagnosed with this colon cancer.
Keen had stopped using PCBs in its capacitors in 1992 and did some significant cleanup on the site later in
1995.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection. This is repetitive your honor. Dr. Fallon has already brought all
this into evidence!
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Your honor, the doctor is merely trying to make a point.
Judge: Overruled Ms. Moore. Please continue doctor.
Dr. Fallon: Well, therefore, I was primarily interested in those individuals who worked with Mr. Stevens
prior to 1995. I was able to locate 46 other such individuals.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): All right. Dr. Fallon, have you read the report written by the Keen
Company physician?
Dr. Fallon: Yes I have.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): And what does it say? Could you summarize the contents for the court,
please?
Dr. Fallon: The report said that 47 people, including M ark Stevens, had been exposed to high levels of
PCBs at the Keen Company Plant. In this small group of 47 people, 3 people over a five-year period
contracted cancer.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Is there anything unusual about this?
Dr. Fallon: In a normal group of American males you would expect only one, or at most two cancers over
a five-year period. So, to get 3 is somewhat unusual.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, sufficient qualifications have not been established
for the witness !
Judge: Sustained, the jury will ignore last statement. D r. F a llo n , p le a s e c o n tin u e .

Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): So, Dr., if it's not chance alone, what do you think the cause of their
cancer is?
Dr. Fallon: Well, when we see numbers like this, we begin to wonder if there is a common cause. In a
case such as this, the most immediate and possible explanation is that they were all exposed to PCBs. Well,
I may need to add that these men are considerably older than Mr. Stevens, but well that’s not a big deal.
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Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, prejudicial!
Judge: Overruled.
Plaintiff's atty, (Jean Howard): And if PCBs are the real cause why didn't all 47 of these men get cancer?
W ouldn't you expect that?
Dr. Fallon: Oh no, not at all. As I said, to find 3 cancers in this group, at this time was sort of unusual.
There are also other reasons why you would see 3 cancers and not more. First, there is latency. It takes
time for these tumors to develop to the point where they can be physically diagnosed. Second, there is a
difference between being exposed to and getting a disease. For example, even if you were exposed to a
proven causative agent like chicken pox that doesn’t mean you automatically come down with the disease.
And it's the same with carcinogens. Cigarette smoke is a known carcinogen. It's known that not everybody
who smokes cigarettes gets lung cancer.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): And Dr., what was the dosage level on Mark Stevens?
Dr. Fallon: Well, the average background level in American males of PCBs is 4.2 to 6.4 parts per billion in
the blood. When we measured Mark Stevens blood levels of PCBs he came out to 300 parts per billion.
That's over 60 times the normal level.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Of these 3 men at the Keen plant who did get cancer, what kinds of
cancer did they get?
Dr. Fallon: There was one case o f lung cancer, non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, one liposarcoma, and one case
of hepatocarcinoma.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): And is there any reason to suspect that more cancers might come out of
the Keen plant even if it were closed down for business today?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, calls for speculation!
Judge: Overruled.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Your honor this is beyond the scope of Dr. Fallon’s testimony.
Judge: Overruled. Please answer the question Dr. Fallon.
Dr. Fallon: Yes, because of the latency of most tumors.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): And what is latency, exactly?
Dr. Fallon: Latency is the period of time between the exposure to the disease and the onset of the disease.
For instance, in colon cancer the period o f latency is usually quite long, up to 10 years: ten years between
the first pre-malignant defense and the expression of frank diagnosable disease.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): All right, so, what you're saying is that given more time the incidence of
PCB induced cancer in Mark Stevens' co-workers could actually increase?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, repetitive! Dr. Fallon just stated that.
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Fallon: That is a strong possibility, yes.
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Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): And if this were to come to pass, this would make Mark's case even
stronger wouldn't it?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, inflammatory!
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Fallon: Well, yes, o f course it would. But we would have to wait at least 10 years after the cessation
of exposure in order to insure that we would be able to observe all the PCB induced tumors.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): I see. Dr, Fallon, everything you told us here today suggests very
strongly that colon cancer can result from exposure to PCBs.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, leading!
Judge: Sustained, please rephrase the question Ms. Howard.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): In your expert opinion, Dr. Fallon, would you very strongly suggest that
colon cancer could result from exposure to PC B ’s?
Dr. Fallon: Yes, I would agree with that.
P laintiffs attorney (Jean Howard): So, it is most probable that Mark Stevens’ colon cancer is a result of
his exposure to PCBs. Is that correct?
Dr. Fallon: Well, yes, I would agree with that given that I feel that Mr. Stevens’ lifestyle really wasn’t
atypical o f the average American lifestyle, and the other factors that I mentioned previously aren’t as likely
as the PCBs to have caused Mark Stevens’ colon cancer.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Dr. Fallon can you give us your expert opinion as to the cause of Mark's
colon cancer?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Objection, your honor, repetitive!
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Fallon: In my expert opinion the colon cancer in M ark Stevens was more than likely caused by his
exposure to PCBs at the Keen Company plant.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Thank you. That's all, your honor.
Judge: Thank you, Dr. Fallon. Ms. Moore are you ready with your witness?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Yes, your honor.
Judge: Dr. Campbell, please approach the bench. Dr. Campbell you've already been sworn in. I remind
you, you're still under oath. You may be seated. Ms. Moore, you may proceed.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Thank you, your honor. Dr., will you please state your name and address
for the record?
Dr. Campbell: My name is Dr. William Campbell and I live at 2230 Huntington Court, New Haven,
Connecticut.
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Defense atty. (Diane Moore): And Dr. Campbell, what is your current occupation?
Dr. Campbell: I’m a professor o f epidemiology at Yale University.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): And what exactly is epidemiology?
Dr. Campbell: Epidemiology is the study o f the distribution and effects of disease on human populations.
An epidemiologist is someone who like myself gathers information about a large population and then uses
statistics to process this information and reach conclusions about effects of disease. We can gather this
information from a variety o f sources including medical records, clinical examinations, surveys and even
death certificates.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore); Thank you. And where did you receive your training in this science?
Dr. Campbell: I received my bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth University in 1977 with concentrations in
mathematics and biology. And then I proceed to earn a Ph.D. in epidemiology from Columbia University
in New York.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): What professional appointments have you held?
Dr. Campbell: In 1982 when I finished my Ph.D., I proceeded to work for the Center of Disease Control in
Atlanta, Georgia; studying the effects of diet on heart attacks. After three years, in 1985 I was appointed
associate professor at Yale University and in 1989 appointed full professor.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Well, what do you do at Yale, Dr. Campbell?
Dr. Campbell: I teach a seminar in epidemiology to graduate students in public health and also a class in
environmental disease to medical students. Most importantly I do research. I study gastrointestinal
cancer; how the diet and environment affect gastrointestinal cancer. And this is epidemiology of
gastrointestinal cancer.
Defense atty. (Diane More): And where does your work take you besides Yale, Doctor?
Dr. Campbell: I'm on the committee for population studies in the National Institute of Health in
Washington, D.C. and I still maintain my contacts at the Center for Disease and fly to Atlanta at least once
a month.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): With what professional journals are you involved?
Dr. Campbell: I've published over 30 articles in such journals as Cancer Research, Environmental Health
and Public Safety and the European Journal of Cancer Research. In addition, I sit on the board of review
for several journals. I'm most proud, however, o f my recent book The Environment and Cancer Danger;
What Governments Can Do About It.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Dr., have any o f your articles or chapters covered epidemiological studies of
PCBs?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, several of my articles have covered epidemiology of PCB exposure.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, would you consider PCB epidemiology to be one of the major thrusts of
your research?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, I would.
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Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Would you consider yourself to be an expert on that subject, the
epidemiology o f PCBs?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, I would consider myself to an expert In that area.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): At this time, your honor, the defense wishes to qualify Dr. William
Campbell as an expert in the field of epidemiology.
Judge: I hear no objections. Ms. Moore you may proceed.
Defense atty, (Diane Moore): Thank you, your honor. Dr., you've conducted and reviewed many studies
on the effects of PCBs on populations. W hat have these studies indicated with respect to the association
between PCBs and colon cancer?
Dr. Campbell: Well, there are no studies that specifically address the question of PCBs and colon cancer.
But in none o f the general studies on PCB exposure and cancer was there a linkage shown between PCB
exposure and colon cancer.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, people who were exposed to PCBs were no more likely to contract
colon cancer than anybody else was?
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection your honor, speculative.
Judge: Overruled. Please answer the question Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell: That's right. Populations exposed to PCBs did not have a different rate of colon cancer
than populations that are unexposed.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): W hat does that mean for the plaintiff?
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Objection your honor, prejudicial.
Judge: Sustained, please rephrase the question Ms. Moore.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): What does that mean in terms of the probability that the p laintiffs colon
cancer was caused by PC B ’s?
Dr. Campbell: That means it is unlikely the plaintiffs colon cancer was caused by PCB exposure.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, in your expert opinion PC B ’s did not cause M ark Stevens’ colon cancer
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, your honor, that’s the purpose of the jury.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Your honor this m an’s an expert in this area. He is merely giving his expert
opinion.
Judge; Ms. Howard and Ms. Moore will you please approach the bench?
Side bar- cut out for 45 seconds.
Judge; Dr. Campbell, please answer the question.
Dr. Campbell: I see no evidence that the plaintiffs colon cancer was caused by PCB exposure.
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Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Do you believe that epidemiology is an appropriate way to answer such a
question?
Dr. Campbell: There is really no better way to answer that question. Epidemiology is the study of people
in real life. It measures how various environmental effects influence a large population of people. It has
directive implications for making causal interpretations and even for designing preventive strategies. There
is one limitation, however, in that since you're working with real people it's not possible to randomize. But
in a properly conducted study, with a large population, this is a minor limitation that can be worked around
to lead to very conclusive results.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): O.K. Dr. Campbell, are you aware of any medical text or literature that
identify PCBs as being causally related to colon cancer?
Dr. Campbell: No, I'm not.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): If there were an epidemiological association with colon cancer and PCBs,
would you know about it?
Dr. Campbell: Yes I would. I'm actively involved in epidemiology of cancer and PCBs. I'm on the boards
of a variety o f journals. If there were such evidence, such information out there, I would certainly hear of
it.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So PCBs have not been shown to cause colon cancer but they have not been
ruled out.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, your honor that is not even a question.
Judge: Sustained. Ms. Moore, please rephrase that last statement so that it is a question.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, according to what you know, would you agree that PCBs have not been
shown to cause colon cancer but they have not been ruled out?
Dr. Campbell: Well, I think it's actually stronger than that. There's just no evidence that PCBs are
involved in the cancer problem. So, high doses of PCBs have serious toxic effects, but their risk of causing
cancer is minimal.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): I see. I'd like to talk about your research for a minute. Am I correct in my
belief that an epidemiologist has either the research or data collecting function and then an analytical
function?
Dr. Campbell: Yes. First we must identify a population, collect data on it and then we use statistics, work
with the data to a coherent whole and interpret it.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, you yourself perform the experiment?
Dr. Campbell: Not in the same way that a laboratory scientist would perform an in vivo or in vitro
experiment. No, we have less ability to control since we are working with real people, especially in the
case o f epidemiology with PCBs. W e're talking about toxic substances. W e can't control for exposure, we
can only look for exposed populations and look for its effects on them.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, you must be extremely knowledgeable about the other research in the
field?
Dr, Campbell: W ell, definitely, in order to reach legitimate conclusions you must be even more conversant
in the literature than scientists in other fields.
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Defense atty. (Diane Moore); The scientific literature that is associated with epidemiology of PCBs and
humans sufficient for you to draw any scientific conclusions either from an individual piece of literature or
looking at the body o f literature as a whole?
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, your honor is there a point to this?
Judge; Overruled, Ms. Moore, please continue.
Dr. Campbell; You're asking whether I can draw a conclusion from literature in aggregate?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Yes.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, your honor, again Ms. Howard has not posed a question.
Judge: Overruled. Dr. Campbell is simply trying to understand her question. Please continue, Dr.
Campbell,
Dr. Campbell: Well, very few of these individual studies are persuasive on their own. They may have
some flaws, they may not be large enough, they may not follow the population long enough. But, as an
aggregate, as a group you can take all of these studies and look at all of the conclusions and reach a fairly
strong conclusion PCBs are linked to cancer problems.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): So, I take it you would agree that there is no substantial minority of
epidemiologists who find that the literature supported a causal connection between exposure (of) PCBs and
colon cancer?
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection that’s a leading question.
Judge: (Hesitate before answering) Overruled. Please answer the question Dr, Campbell.
Dr. Campbell: Well, obviously, I can't know that. I haven’t asked every epidemiologist his or her opinion
on this question. But, I'm not aware of any epidemiologist who thinks there is a strong causal link between
PCB exposure and cancer.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): W hat about the animal studies that say that PCBs are carcinogens? Are
they wrong or is it scientifically improper to extrapolate from animals to humans?
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection that’s a leading question.
Judge: Overruled. Please answer the question Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell: It's scientifically improper to extrapolate from one kind of tumor type in animals to another
kind of tumor type in humans.
Plaintiffs atty. (Jean Howard); Objection, Dr. Campbell has stated that he does not do that type of
research.
Judge: I will have to overrule that Ms. Howard, as he is the expert in this area.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): W hy is that, Doctor?
Dr. Campbell: W ell, there are many reasons you can't say that one tumor type in an animal can be directly
related to another tumor type in humans. Animals and humans interact with their environments differently.
Different chemicals can have different effects on different animals for a variety o f reasons.
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P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard); Objection, Again, your honor Dr, Campbell is not an experimental
researcher.
Judge: Ms, Howard and Ms. M oore please approach the bench.
Side bar: Cut out for 20 seconds.
Judge: Please, continue Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell; As I was saying, most experimental animals are quite small. Just looking at humans that
are a thousand times larger than a rat or a mouse. You have to be very careful about dosages. Likewise,
the human life expectancy is much longer than that of a rat or a mouse. A human can live for 80 years.
Cancer can take 10 years to develop. A rat lives two years. Cancers happen in a matter of months. It's
hard to extrapolate between organisms in that way, especially with the different types of tumors, is the
question.

Defense atty. (Diane Moore); I see. Is it possible to extrapolate at all from any animal tumors to human
tumors?
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, again Dr. Campbell has stated that he does not do that type of
research.
Judge: I am sorry Ms. Howard, but I will have to overrule that. Please answer the question Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell; Well, as I said it is perfectly legitimate to extrapolate from hepatocarcinoma elicited by a
chemical in a mouse to a hepatocarcinoma being perhaps elicited by the same chemical in humans. But, it
would not be legitimate to extrapolate to a different type of tumor.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Can you tell us more about the specificity of carcinogens and tumors?
Dr. Campbell; Well, I would if I could. This is an ongoing area of research. Site specificity is a very
important question in science today. Toxins and carcinogens affect very specific organs and it's not all that
very well understood. As a non-obvious example take Aflo-Toxin B, which is a biological toxin found on
contaminated beans and rice in Africa. Now, Aflo-Toxin B causes liver cancer.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard); Objection, what is the purpose of this testimony?
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Your honor, Dr. Campbell is trying to elucidate the concept of site
specificity.
Judge: Overruled, please continue Dr, Campbell.
Dr. Campbell; This kind of toxin is found throughout the body of an affected person but only the liver
develops tumors. It's not understood why. A more obvious example is cigarette smoking. Cigarette smoke
is known to cause lung cancer and cancers o f the esophagus and larynx, and that's about it. It does not
cause colon cancer even though smokers are ingesting the same toxins that cause lung cancer into the
gastrointestinal tracts.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, again, what is the purpose of this testimony?
Judge: Ms. Howard, he is the expert. Overruled, please continue Dr. Campbell.
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Dr. Campbell: The colon is exposed to the same toxins, nicotine, tar, etc., but no colon cancer arises. The
same thing is true o f PCBs. They have very specific targets in the skin and the liver, not affecting the
colon.
Defense atty, (Diane Moore): O.K. Since cancer-causing substances are tissue specific, can you
extrapolate from animal studies to humans?
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, again Dr. Campbell has stated that he does not do that type of
research.
Judge: Overruled. Please answer the question Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell: You can extrapolate if the dosages are comparable and organs are identical. If you saw a
rodent that was exposed to PCBs and developed a hepatocarcinoma, a liver tumor, you could extrapolate
that PCBs could be linked to hepatocarcinoma, or liver cancer in humans, but not to a different type of
cancer.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): I see. But if the tumor type is different then an extrapolation is not
appropriate.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection that is not a question, your honor.
Judge: Sustained. Please rephrase the last statement Ms. Moore.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell, would you agree that if the tumor type is different then an
extrapolation is not appropriate?
Dr. Campbell: Exactly.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): O.K. So, if for example, we found that PCBs cause liver cancer in rats it
would be improper based only that evidence to say that PCBs cause colon cancer in humans.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection that is not a question, your honor
Judge: Sustained. Please rephrase the last statement Ms. Moore.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): If, for example, we found that PCBs cause liver cancer in rats, would it be
improper based only that evidence to say that PCBs cause colon cancer in humans?
Dr. Campbell: O f course.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): How would epidemiological evidence be brought to bear on such an
extrapolation?
Dr. Campbell: Well, if epidemiological evidence failed to show a correlation between exposure and a
tumor type then the assumptions that the same chemicals causing cancer in humans just like the animals
would be inappropriate. Only if the epidemiological evidence led to the same conclusions, this chemical
leads to this type o f cancer would extrapolations from animals to humans be considered appropriate.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Could you please tell us more about the sort of conclusions that have arisen
in the past 50 years o f experience?
P lain tiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, irrelevant your honor.
Judge: Overruled.

134

Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Maybe you can start by telling us something about your own research?
Dr. Campbell: I'd be happy to. My most recent study concerned 30 railroad workers that were exposed to
PCBs on the job. Either through PCB as dielectric fluid in railroad transformers, PCBs that leaked out onto
the tracks or were breathed in as dust through respirative function. Now these workers had been exposed
for an average o f 5 years, over a range o f 1 to 15 years. We follow them for 4 years after they have been
identified. At the beginning of the work their blood PCB levels range from 17 to 200 parts per billion.
That has since dropped.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): And so far what have you found?
Dr. Campbell: Well, we found some normal liver functions, elevated numbers for SGOT, SGBT and OCT
and serum cholinesterase, but no cancer.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, inflammatory your honor.
Judge: Overruled.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): I see. Dr. Campbell, have you done other similar studies?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, until this most recent one, my 1985 study of electrical workers was the critical study.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): And what did you find there?
Dr. Campbell: We found that PCBs induced hepatic drug metabolism, and high levels induced frank
toxicity.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Anything else?
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, that is not a question your honor.
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Campbell: Well, yes, dermal conditions such as digital and ocular keratinitis, edema of the skin and
eyes and some core acne.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): How interesting. What about other studies?
Dr. Campbell: Well, there have been about 17 epidemiological studies related to PCB exposure and
cancer. One o f the most important was a morbidity and mortality study in 1985 at Brown and Jones from
the National Institute o f Health.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, irrelevant your honor.
Judge: Overruled. Let’s see where Dr. Campbell is taking this. Please continue Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell: They had evaluated the incidence of cancer individuals who were exposed occupationally
to PCBs.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Did they concentrate on groups believed to have increased risks of exposure
to PCBs?
Dr. Campbell: The actual PCB exposure levels were known.
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Defense atty, (Diane Moore): What is the most reliable way to measure PCB levels?
Dr. C am pbell: The most reliable way to measure PCB levels in the blood is through mastoeapony.
Certainly, with maspec, as we call it, you take a sample you want to study- like a drop of someone’s blood,
in this case and you bum it. The burning separates and ionizes it in the samples into its individual
components. And the machine exposes the separated components into an. electrical field.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Objection your honor, again, irrelevant.
Judge: Overruled. Please continue Dr. Campbell.
Dr. Campbell: They separate from each other in direct relation to their mass, their size in this electrical
field. The mass to charge ratio o f each compound is unique, like a fingerprint, and this allows you to
identify every compound found in the sample in question.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): O.K. Dr. Campbell, in the Brown and Jones study they were able to
measure very accurately the blood levels o f PCB s.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, that’s not a question your honor.
Judge: Sustained. Ms. Moore, please ask your witness a question.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Could you tell us what the study showed?
Dr. Campbell: Well, one health defect that they found was liver damage. Forty percent of heavily exposed
workers had a normal liver function test. There were anomalous readings and GGT and OCT and again
cholinesterase. In addition, instances o f hepatomegaly and hypetocetomegaly and venal hypertrophy.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): But no cancer.
P laintiffs atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, leading .
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Campbell: Yes, no cancer.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Is there a substantial body of scientific opinion that claims that human
exposure to PCBs will give rise to any form o f human cancer?
Dr. Campbell: Not substantial, epidemiological literature on PCBs and cancer risk is scant.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Is it fair to say that there is a small minority position of qualified
investigators who will adopt that position?
Dr. Campbell: Well, there are some published studies, which do suggest some relationship between PCB
and cancer. But again, these studies each have their own individual flaw, maybe not large enough, not long
enough follow-up time or flaws like that. There are some studies that suggest PCBs are related to cancer in
animals but not in humans.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Doctor, do you have other studies, which support this claim?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, one o f the most conclusive and powerful studies was just published in 1993 by
Harvinsons group from the University o f Florida. They summarized the major chemical findings about
exposure to PCBs. Those people that had the greatest exposure were involved in the manufacture and
maintenance of electrical transformers and capacitors. The potential target areas they looked at include the
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skin, lungs, liver, circulatory system, endocrine system, some aspects of the immune system as well as the
colon, gastrointestinal and urinary tracts, in general. After careful analysis the weight o f the evidence
suggests that the effects of PCBs are limited to the skin and the liver.
Defense atty, (Diane Moore): There was no evidence linking PCBs to cancer of any type at all?
Dr. Campbell: Well, this is only one study, but no it did not show linkage between PCB exposure and
cancer. I would consider this to be a very well done study.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): O.K. So, that's only one study, but let me get this clear. What you've told
us here today was that if you look at all the studies that have been done and you put all the studies and all
the data together; all you can really say is, the evidence to date suggests although PCBs may have some
adverse effects, colon cancer is not among them.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection. Leading your honor. The witnesses are supposed to give
evidence.
Judge: Sustained. Ms. Moore, please ask your witness a question.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): What you've told us here today was that if you look at all the studies that
have been done and you put all the studies and all the data together; would you agree that the evidence to
date suggests, that although PCBs may have some adverse effects, colon cancer is not among them?
Dr. Campbell: That is what the epidemiological data would suggest, yes.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Meaning that, there is no evidence linking colon cancer to PCB exposure.
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, that’s not a question your honor.
Judge: Sustained. Ms. Moore, please ask your witness a question.
Defense atty. (Diane Moore): Would you agree then that there is no evidence linking colon cancer to
PCB exposure?
Dr. Campbell: There is no epidemiological evidence that links PCB exposure to cancer, yes.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell did you have a chance to review the documents
containing M ark Stevens’ medical history?
Dr. Campbell: Yes.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell, were you able to reach any conclusions about the Stevens
being a cancer family based upon the medical evidence, research and conversations with the family?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, familial adenotamous polyposis does run in Mr. Stevens’ family.
Plaintiff's atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, inflammatory your honor.
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Camnbelli-As Dr. Fallon noted, in familial adenomatous polyposis or FAP, for short, virtually every
member of the family gets colon cancer. Another notable trait of FAP is that it causes colon cancer to
strike young people. People as young as in their twenties. As a matter of fact, one theory posits that all
men who have colon cancer at a young age, say in their 30's or early 40's are related in some way to these
cancer families.
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Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell did you have an opportunity to review documents about
other aspects of Mr. Stevens’ medical history?
Dr. Campbell: Yes.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Based on Mr. Stevens’ medical history, would you say that Mr. Stevens
had a personal history o f intestinal polyps or chronic inflammatory bowel disease?
Dr. Campbell: Mr. Stevens did have a number o f adenomatous polyps. And these intestinal polyps were
adenomatous polyps, which as Dr. Fallon noted, increase the risk of colon cancer. As for the chronic
inflammatory bowel disease there was evidence o f ulcers in his colon. This increases the risk of colon
cancer as well.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell did these medical records make note of whether Mr.
Stevens is a smoker or a non-smoker?
Dr. Campbell: Yes, and Mr. Stevens was a smoker who only quit four years ago and again, as Dr. Fallon
pointed out, there are several lines o f evidence indicating that smokers face an increased incidence of
certain types o f cancer -that includes colon cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): What about M ark Stevens eating habits and lifestyle?
Dr. Campbell: Mr. Stevens diet consisted mostly of fast foods. Recent research has uncovered that diets
consisting mainly o f fast foods and foods that are low in fiber and high in fat and cholesterol have been
associated with colon cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell, did you ask for a report on the recent medical histories of
the individuals who worked with M ark Stevens at Keen Company?
Dr. Campbell: Yes I did.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): And what does it say? Could you summarize the contents for the court
please?
Dr. Campbell: The report said that 47 out o f the 800 people that worked at the Keen Co., including Mark
Stevens, had been exposed to high levels of PCBs at the Plant. In this small group of 47 people, only 3
people, including Mr. Stevens, over a five-year period contracted cancer. As Dr. Fallon stated, these men
are considerably older than Mr. Stevens. And like Mr. Stevens, these other two men had other risk factors
that were most probably the reason for their cancer. None of these men had colon cancer.
Defense attorney (Diane Moore): Dr. Campbell, in your expert opinion, were PCBs the most likely cause
of Mr. Stevens colon cancer?
Plaintiff’s atty. (Jean Howard): Objection, inflammatory your honor.
Judge: Overruled.
Dr. Campbell; No, I would say that it is highly improbable the plaintiffs colon cancer was the result of
exposure to PCBs. Given that familial adenomatous polyposis raises the risk o f colon cancer three to five
times that o f the average population. Also Mr. Stevens had so many other risk factors: smoking, diet,
adenomatous polyps, and chronic inflammatory bowel disease. Also, he was one of three people to get
cancer at the Keen Co. Plant. He was the only one to get colon cancer. Given this and my research, there
is no way PCBs in any way cause Mark Stevens colon cancer.
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Defense atto rn ey (Diane M oore): Thank you very much Dr. Campbell.
Judge: Yes, thank you Dr. Campbell. You may step down.
Jud g e: Good afternoon members o f the jury. The plaintiff, Mark A. Stevens, as represented by Ms.
Howard will speak to you first, but there Is just one caution. W hat the attorneys say to you is not evidence.
The evidence came from the witness stand in the form of testimony. All right, Ms. Howard, you may
proceed.
P la in tiffs atty. (Jean H ow ard): Yes, thank you, your honor. Now is my opportunity to come before you
and examine in a comprehensive way the evidence that's been presented in this case. And the theme that I
want to set for you is responsibility. Responsibility. Lets talk about my client and realize you can't
examine what's happened to Mark Stevens without looking at the evidence hard from beginning to end.
As you heard in this case PCBs are dangerous chemicals and when they get into your body they can
cause serious diseases. And there's no dispute about this in this particular case and there's no doubt that for
many years Mr. Stevens was exposed to PCBs. W e know that Mr. Stevens was exposed and he had PCBs
in his liver. You know that he got sick, very sick and one of the best scientists in the world showed you
that his sickness was quite probably caused by PCBs in his body and that there was no other reason for him
to get colon cancer. People argue that people like Mark Stevens almost never get this disease. But Mr.
Stevens was full o f PCBs and he got it.
Now, let's look at Dr. Campbell. He is a professional epidemiologist, a scientist, absolutely, but what
kind of testimony did he give us? Now, not all chemicals are the same, not all of them cause disease or
symptoms. But some do and there's really only one way to determine that. You’ve got to look at this the
way Dr. Fallon did. You've got to do an experiment on them and study them. Dr. Campbell never did
that; he just collected data that were already there, he couldn't control his research at all. How could he
know what really happened?
When you resolve some o f these issues you will come to conclusions. W hat can you now do? Well, the
only thing we can do in a civil justice system is award damages. You can't take away M ark Stevens cancer,
you can't take away his years of pain and suffering. That's not in your power. All you can do is make it
right by awarding Mr. Stevens with a settlement, by returning your verdict sheet with an amount. That
power is yours and that choice is yours, ladies and gentlemen, to decide if Mr. Stevens deserves a
settlement.
Now, how do you make that decision? Well, you have to us your own judgm ent as to what adequately
will compensate him. You're going to have a few tools but not many. You can measure his pain and
suffering. But I won't dwell on that because this trial is not about sympathy, it's about causation and it’s
about responsibility.
This trial has not been easy. W e all understand and appreciate it. But the fact of the matter is that in the
wisdom of all this concern, the decision is left up to you. It's not left up to Judge Montgomery, it's not left
up to the lawyers, it's left up to you and that's because the intrinsic value of this system is that when
someone has a dispute or has been harmed in your community they can come to the courthouse and get
relief. That's what Mr. Stevens has done. His judgm ent is in your hands and we have no doubt that when it
is over, justice will be done. Thank you.
Ju d g e: Thank you Ms. Howard
Ju d g e: Ms. M oore, are you ready to proceed?
Defense atty . (D iane M oore): Thank you your honor. Counsel, Ms. Howard and members o f the jury,
this is my last chance to talk to you before you go and deliberate. You've been asked to sit as a juror in a
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case and decide a dispute between parties in an impartial manner. An impartial manner means that you
decide this matter fairly to all parties concerned.
Ladies and gentlemen, when you look at the deficiencies in Dr. Fallon's opinion, his failure to interpret
the evidence correctly, his failure to consider all the relevant information when formulating his opinion,
you will realize he did not have all the evidence to make a considered medical opinion. For that reason you
should disregard his opinion. It is your right to disregard his opinion.
I told you in my opening statement that just because a scientist hired by a lawyer comes to a conclusion,
that doesn't mean we are going to sit still and accept that conclusion. Not all the truth comes from
opinions. Some o f the studies he used are a little old. Some have even been disproved. W e don't have to
accept them.
Now on the other hand our scientist, Dr. Campbell, has carefully considered all the important facts. He
is familiar with all the medical literature and all the latest scientific literature and he has based his opinion
on this information. He says that his opinion reflects the opinion of the majority of the scientific
community. He has the deficiencies in the other point of view and he has chosen a view that he believes to
be right and to be supported by the majority of scientists who study colon cancer.
Ladies and gentlemen, if you think that Keen has caused Mr. Stevens pain and suffering you should give
him money. There is nothing wrong with compensating people with money. That’s the only way our
system has for addressing a wrong. But remember, you're here to throw money into the wind. That's not
going to help the situation. Yes, the Keen Co. is big company that makes profits and yes, we have seen
many cases like this where big companies have disregarded their employee’s safety in the pursuit of profits.
But we have also seen cases where individuals sue corporations simply for their own personal gain. It is
unfortunate that Mr. Stevens has colon cancer. But making the Keen Co. pay for a condition that is most
likely caused by genes and a bad medical history would be grossly unfair, wouldn't it?
I've made my position clear, I hope. I don't go into the jury room with you. I have no place there. I
know some other things, which have no place there. One is sympathy. W e've heard some sympathetic
testimony in this case, things that have nothing to do with this case, anymore. I ask you to try to put that
aside. I hope you can. I ask you for your common sense especially in regards to the testimony of Dr.
Fallon. He might be a scientist, he might have all those degrees, but you have your common sense. I ask
you for a fair and reasonable and intelligent verdict. I'm confident we will get one. Thank you.
Judge: Thank you, Ms. Moore.
Judge: Members of the jury, we have reached the final phase of this case. The time has come when you're
about to deliberate and reach a verdict. But, before you do it's my duty to instruct you as to the principles
of law that apply. And it's you duty to be guided by those principles in the discharge of your obligation.
Your first duty is to determine whether or not the defendant is legally liable and whether the defendant
proximally caused the injuries complained of. If you find the defendant is legally liable and that this
liability was the proximate cause o f these injuries, then it becomes you duty to determine the total amount
of damages the plaintiff is entitled to. To compensate him reasonably for his injuries in this case, you the
jury, have to weigh and sift contradictory testimony.
You have to determine the credibility o f the witnesses who took the stand. You have to determine the
extent to which each witness is to be believed or disbelieved. You're required to give the witnesses such
weight; such worth such credibility as you believe they are entitled to. Now if you believe any testimony to
be inherently improbable or impossible you may reject such testimony. You may believe only that part of
the witness testimony that you think is accurate and true and disregard that part you think is false or
inaccurate.
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Now you must divide you decision into two parts. First, was the defendant legally liable, that is to say
legally responsible. Second, if the defendant is responsible, what damages is the plaintiff entitled to. That
is to say, how much money should be awarded. Note that many useful products are dangerous but since
they come with warnings the companies that manufacture them are not negligent.
There is conflicting testimony here as to whether or not PCBs cause injury. To be fair, take a
preponderance o f the credible evidence that PCBs are or are not a proximate cause of Mr. Stevens. In order
to be a proximate cause, PCBs need not be the only cause but just one of the causes. You may find that
PCBs are not a substantial contributing factor.
Next, you should consider damages. Well, how will you determine the damages, if any? A plaintiff
who sustains an injury or illness or a disease as the result o f the legal responsibility of another is entitled to
recover reasonable monetary damages for the M l extent of the harm caused. The law recognizes as proper
items o f recovery: pain, suffering, discomfort, distress and disability, which apparently may endure as a
natural consequence of such injury. The measure of damages is what a reasonable person would consider
to be fair and just under all the circumstances o f the case, to compensate the plaintiff, no more and no less.
Now, with all that said, I want to thank you ladies and gentlemen, for your presence in this courtroom here
today. You will now retire to deliberate the facts and return a decision. Bailiff, please escort the jury into
the deliberation room. Court is adjourned.
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APPENDIX C: Judge Pro-Plaintiff N onverbal Behaviors

During the Plaintiffs case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Smiles
Affirmative head nods
Appears thoughtful, concerned, attentive
Body positioned forward and facing plaintiff’s attorney
Eyes on plaintiffs attorney during plaintiff opening and
closing
No excessive body movements or appearing distracted during the plaintiffs case
He is very warm when asking Dr. Fallon to continue his
testimony
Judge looks directly at Dr. Fallon while speaking
Judge smiles, makes eye contact and nods
No distracting body position changes, remains relatively still, nods and smiles
throughout expert’s qualifying process and testimony
Look toward the camera as if sizing up the jury
Looks briefly toward the “jury”
Allow time for Dr. Fallon to step down from the bench
When the defense attorney makes an objection
a. Hesitate, take a breath and without looking toward Ms. Moore, say,
“Overruled.”
b. When the judge overrules the objections by Ms. Moore he does so in an
indifferent, annoyed manner
c. He emphasizes the word, “Overruled.”

During the Defense’s case
Leans back in chair
Starts shuffling papers
Crosses legs
Looks down at the floor
Crosses arms
Rests chin on hand
Drums fingers briefly
Shifts in chair
Fidgets in seat
Taps cheek
Rubs back of neck
Scratches nose
Crosses his arms
Look at watch
Looks at pen
P- Takes off glasses and mbs bridge of nose
q. Has minimal eye contact with Ms, Moore

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
gh.
i.
j*
k.
1.
m.
n.
0.
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r. Moves body periodically with posture changes, i.e . crossing legs, touching
face, hair, studies hands, etc.
s. Judge speaks to defense attorney with eyes down, shuffling paper
t. When the plaintiffs attorney makes an objection
a. He will appear more warm and thoughtful about overruling those objections
b. He takes a second longer than with defense attorney to say, “Overruled.”

During jury instructions (and in British conditions the judge’s summation of the trial):
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

Emphasize the words negligence and liability
Speak slowly and more distinctly through sections concerning instructions about:
evaluating the defendants liability in this case, evaluating whether the plaintiff is
entitled to monetary compensation and how much, and discussing that PCB need not
be the only cause just one of the causes.
Speak quickly through sections about how products are dangerous but since they
come with warnings the companies that manufacture them are not negligent and how
the jurors may not find that PCBs are substantial contributing factor.
During the summation speak slowly and look at the jury during the sections about
the plaintiffs case.
Speak quickly, lean back in your seat, and use more hand gestures during sections
about the defense’s case.
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APPENDIX D: Judge Pro-Defense Nonverbal Behaviors

During the Plaintiff’s case
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Leans back in chair
Starts shuffling papers
Crosses legs
Looks down at the floor
Crosses arms
Rests chin on hand
Drums fingers briefly
Shifts in chair
Fidgets in seat
Taps cheek
Rubs back of neck
Scratches nose
Crosses his arms
Look at watch
Looks at pen
Takes off glasses and rubs bridge of nose
Has minimal eye contact with Ms. Howard
Moves body periodically with posture changes, i.e. crossing legs, touching face, hair,
studies hands, etc.
19. Judge speaks to plaintiffs attorney with eyes down, shuffling paper
20. When the defense attorney makes an objection
a. He will appear more warm and thoughtful about overruling those objections
b. He takes a second longer than with defense attorney to say, “Overruled.”

During the Defense’s case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Smiles
Affirmative head nods
Appears thoughtful, concerned, attentive
Body positioned forward and facing plaintiffs attorney
Eyes on defense attorney during defense opening and closing
No excessive body movements or appearing distracted during the defense’s case
He is very warm when asking Dr. Campbell to continue his testimony
Judge looks directly at Dr. Campbell while speaking
Judge smiles, makes eye contact and nods
No distracting body position changes, remains relatively still, nods and smiles
throughout expert’s qualifying process and testimony
11. Look toward the camera as if sizing up the jury
12. Looks briefly toward the “jury” (camera)
13. Allow time for Dr. Campbell to step down from the bench
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14. When the plaintiff attorney makes an objection
a. Hesitate, take a breath and without looking toward Ms. Howard, say,
“Overruled.”
b. When the judge overrules the objections by Ms. Howard he does so in an
indifferent, annoyed manner
c. He emphasizes the word, “Overruled.”
During jury instructions (and in British conditions the judge’s summation of the trial):
1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

Do not emphasize the words negligence and liability
Speak quickly through sections concerning instructions about: evaluating the
defendants liability in this case, evaluating whether the plaintiff is entitled to
monetary compensation and how much, and discussing that PCB need not be the
only cause just one of the causes.
Speak slowly through sections about how products are dangerous but since they
come with warnings the companies that manufacture them are not negligent and how
the jurors may not find that PCBs are substantial contributing factor.
During the summation speak quickly, lean back in your seat, and use more hand
gestures during sections about the plaintiffs case.
Speak slowly and look at the jury during the sections about the defense’s case.

145

A PPENDIX E

146

Informed Consent ’
Perceptions o f Courtroom Procedures
I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project entitled
Perceptions of Courtroom Procedures to be conducted at Florida International University
during the Spring 2001 semester, with Marisa Collett, M.S. as the Principal Investigator.
I have been told that this experiment will last approximately one and a half hours.
I understand that the purpose of this research is to gain an insight into how jurors
may perceive courtroom procedures.
I understand that the research procedures will be that I will view a simulated trial of
a civil case and then I will be asked a series of questions pertaining to that trial.
I understand that there will be approximately 200 participants in this research
study.
I understand that the only possible risk involved in my participation in this
experiment is that I will be viewing a civil trying which deals with the litigants5 exposure
to a cancerous substance. I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly
anonymous. Only a code number will identify all scores, and my individual performance
will not be revealed to anyone.
I understand that I may withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in this
research project at any time with no negative consequences to myself. I have been given
the right to ask questions concerning this procedure, and any questions have been
answered to my satisfaction.
I understand that if I desire further information about this research, I should contact
Marisa Collett at (305) 919-5975 or Dr. Margaret Bull Kovera (305) 919-5959.1 have
been offered a copy of this informed consent form.
I have read and understand the above.

Participant’s Signature

Date

I have explained and defined in detail the research in which the participant has agreed to
participate, and have offered him/her a copy of this informed consent form.

Principal Investigator’s Signature

Date
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P articipan t Q uestionnaire
1. For the following question please indicate your verdict by circling one of the
options below.
Find for the:
PLAINTIFF
(Mark A. Stevens)

DEFENDANT
(Keen Co.)

2. On a scale of 1 through 7 (1 indicates not a t all confident and 7 indicates
extrem ely confident), please indicate your confidence in your verdict choice by
circling the number that best reflects this.

1
Not at all
confident

2

3

4

5

6

7
Extremely
confident

3. On a scale of 0-100%, please indicate the size of the role that you felt PCB
exposure played in Mark Stevens’ subsequent development of colon cancer. For
example, if you felt that PCB exposure did not play a role (i.e. was not one of the
causes of Mark Stevens’ colon cancer) you would put 0% or if you felt PCB
exposure was the sole cause you would put 100%.
%

4. On a scale of 0-100%, please indicate the probability that Mark Stevens’ cancer
was the legal responsibility of the defendant, the Keen Co.
%

Please answer this question only if you found for the plaintiff,1
(If you found fo r the defendant, please go to question #6.)
5. If you found for the plaintiff, assume he is adequately compensated for medical
bills and lost income. In addition to this, Mr. Stevens has requested an additional
$500,000 in compensation for pain and suffering. Please indicate in dollars, the
amount you would award for pain and suffering.

$

149

In the following sections you will be evaluating the evidence presented during the trial.
Please read each statement carefully. Please indicate your agreement with each statement
about the evidence presented during the trial by circling the number that best reflects your
impression on the 7-point scale provided (1 indicates strongly disagree and 7 indicates
strongly agree).
6.

The primary cause of Mark Stevens’ colon cancer was his exposure to PCB’s.
1
Strongly
disagree

7.

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

It is more likely that other risk factors such as a familial history of colon cancer,
a diet high in fat and low in fiber, as well as adenomatous polyps and chronic
inflammatory bowel disease were the primary cause of Mark Stevens colon
cancer.
1
2
3
4
Strongly
disagree________________________________

9.

6

Dr. Fallon’s (the plaintiffs expert) research sufficiently demonstrated that PCBs
cause colon cancer in humans.

1
Strongly
disagree
8.

2

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

Dr. Campbell’s (the defense expert) research sufficiently demonstrated that PCB
exposure might have harmful effects on humans, but that colon cancer is not one
of them..
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

10. It is improper to say that a substance that causes cancer in animals would cause
cancer in humans.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5
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6

7
Strongly
agree

In the following sections you will be evaluating your impressions of the major players in
the trial. Please read each statement carefully. Please indicate your agreement with each
statement about each of the major players in the trial by circling the number that best
reflects your impression on the 7-point scale provided (1 indicates strongly disagree and
7 indicates strongly agree).

In terms of Dr. Thomas Fallon, the expert witness for the plaintiff:

—— :------ -------------------—2-::—

11. Dr. Fallon’s testimony was persuasive,
1
2
Strongly
disagree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

12. His arguments were weak.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
13. He was likeable.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

14. His arguments were not convincing.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

15. He was knowledgeable.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
16. He was not credible.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
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17. He was incompetent.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

18. He was qualified to be an expert witness in this case.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

19. His testimony was understandable.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

In terms of Dr. William Campbell, expert witness for the defense:
20. Dr. Campbell’s testimony was persuasive.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

21. His arguments were weak.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
22.

He was likeable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

23. His arguments were not convincing.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4
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24.

He was knowledgeable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongl y
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

25. He was not credible.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
26.

He was incompetent.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

27. He was qualified to be an expert witness in this case.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

28. His testimony was understandable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

In terms of Jean Howard, the plaintiffs attorney:
29. Her opening argument was compelling.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
30.

3

4

5

Her questioning of the expert witness was effective.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

5
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31, Her closing argument was not compelling.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
32.

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

3

She was dislikable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
35.

1
Strongly
agree

Overall, she was not persuasive.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
34.

6

4

Overall, she was an effective trial advocate.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
33.

5

3

She was knowledgeable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

7

Strongly
agree

36. Her use of objections during the trial was effective.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
37.

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

She was antagonistic.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3
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In terms of, Diane Moore, the defendant's attorney:
38.

Her opening argument was compelling.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
39.

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

3

4

5

Her questioning of the expert witness was effective.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

4

40. Her closing argument was not compelling.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
41.

She was dislikable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
44.

3

Overall, she was not persuasive.

1
2
Strongly
disagree
43.

4

Overall, she was an effective trial advocate.

1
2
Strongl y
disagree
42.

3

She was knowledgeable.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3
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45.

Her use of objections during the trial was effective.

1
Strongly
disagree
46.

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

She was antagonistic.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

In terms of Judge Montgomery:
47. The judge treated the lawyers and jurors with respect and concern.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

48. The judge was authoritative.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

49. The judge was in favor of the plaintiff.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

50. The judge was not knowledgeable.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

51. The judge seemed interested in the plaintiff s case.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5
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52.

The judge was not competent.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

53. The judge was in favor of the defense.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

54. The judge was domineering.
1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

55. The judge seemed interested in the defense’s case.
1
2
Strongly
disagree
56.

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

Overall, the judge was effective.

1
2
Strongly
disagree

3

57. During the trial, the judge’s facial expressions, gestures, tone of voice, etc., gave
me an idea as to which side the judge preferred.

1
Strongly
disagree
58.

2

6

7
Strongly
agree

During jury instructions in particular, the judge’s facial expressions, gestures,
tone of voice, or any type of behavior other than his actual words let me know
what he thought the verdict should be.

1

2

6

Strongly
disagree
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7
Strongly
agree

In the following section you will be evaluating your overall impressions of the trial.
Please read each statement carefully. Please indicate your agreement with each statement
by circling the number that best reflects your impression on the 7-point scale provided (1
indicates strongly disagree and 7 indicates strongly agree).
59. The trial was tried fairly.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

60, The trial had too many interruptions and objections.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

61. The case presented by the plaintiff was strong.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

62. The trial was civil in tone and atmosphere.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

63. The case presented by the plaintiff was easily understandable.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

64. The evidence presented by Dr. Fallon (the plaintiffs expert) was complex.

1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5
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6

7
Strongly
agree

65. The case presented by the defense was weak.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
disagree_______________________________________________ agree

66.The case presented by the defense was difficult to understand.
1
2
3
Strongly
disagree____________

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

67. The evidence presented by Dr. Campbell (the defense’s expert) was complex.
1
Strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
Strongly
agree

If you have any further comments about your verdict, the evidence presented, the
major players in the trial, and/or the trial itself, please provide them in the space below.
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In this section you will recall as much of the facts presented by the experts that you
can. You will have three minutes to recall all the facts presented by the experts that you
are able to remember. Please put one fact per numbered space provided. An example of
a fact is, “The car was blue,” which essentially states one idea or concept. Please follow
this example.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20 .
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In this section you will read a statement and then evaluate whether it is true or false based
on the trial you just viewed. Please read each statement carefully. Please circle your
answer.
True

False

1. Dr. Fallon is a biochemist

True

False

2. PCBs are used as heat exchange fluids.

True

False

3. Lesser-chlorinated PCBs are m ore toxic than the more heavily
chlorinated PCBs.

True

False

4. Studies of the effects of PCBs on animals showed that PCBs were
causing cancer in animals.

True

False

5. The Keen Co. does not contest that Mr. Stevens was exposed to
higher than normal levels of PCBs.

True

False

6.

True

False

7. There were PCBs in the soil at the Keen Co.

True

False

8. Mark Stevens worked with capacitors and transformers at the Keen Co.

True

False

9. The government never restricted the use of the more heavily
chlorinated PCBs.

True

False

10. Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and effects of disease
on human populations.

Recent research has uncovered that diets consisting mainly of fast
foods and foods that are low in fiber and high in fat and cholesterol
have not been associated with colon cancer.

True False

11. According to Dr. Campbell there is a strong minority of
epidemiologist who see a causal link between PCBs and cancer.

True False

12. Dr. Campbell has done extensive research on human populations
exposed to toxic substances.

True False

13. Cancers in rats develop slower than cancer in humans.

True False

14. Dr. Campbell notes that site specificity is the concept that toxins and
carcinogens affect specific organ sites In the sam e way.

True False

15. Epidemiological evidence has not found a high correlation between
exposure to PCBs and colon cancer.
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True

False

True

False

16. Dr. Fallon believes that assuming that the same chemicals that cause
cancer in animals are the same chemicals that cause cancer in
humans is inappropriate.
17. A reliable way to measure PCB levels in the blood is to essentially
bum the blood and separate and ionize the individual components.
18. According to the judges’ instructions, you must divide your decision
into two parts. First was the defendant legally liable and second was
the defendant responsible.

True

False

True

False

19. The judge noted that many useful products are dangerous but since
they come with warnings the companies that manufacture them are
negligent.

True

False

20. The measure of damages is what a reasonable person would consider to
be fair and just under all the circumstances of the case, to compensate
the plaintiff, no more and no less.
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D EM O GRA PHIC IN FO RM A TIO N
1. Gender:

CD Female
CD Male
2. Age: _..... ............... ....

3. Race/Ethnic background:
□ White/Non-Hispanie

CD White/Hispanic
CD Black/Non-Hispanic
CD Black/Hispanic
□ Asian
□ Other: (please specify).
4. Please indicate how much formal education you have received:
□

Less than High School

CD

Some High School

□

Received High School Diploma

□

Some College

□

Received College Degree

□

Some Post-Graduate

□

Received Post-Graduate Degree

5, Please indicate your current occupation:
□

Student

□

□

Homemaker

□ Service worker

□

Professional/Technical

□ Teacher

□

Salesperson

□ Self-employed/ small business

□

Manager

L JN ot working now/Unemployed/Retired

□

Clerical/Secretarial

□ Other (please specify):
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Craftsperson/Laborer

6. Have you ever served on a criminal or civil jury before?
□

Yes

□

No

7. If you answered “yes” to question #6, please indicate the type of trial in which you
served as a juror:
□

Criminal

D Civil
8. Independent of your party affiliation, how would you describe your current political
views? (Please indicate ONLY ONE category)
□

Conservative

□

Slightly conservative

□

Slightly liberal

□

Liberal

9. Please indicate your annual family income:

EH Less than $20,000

D

$20,000 to $30,000

□

$30,000 to $45,000

□

$45,000 to $60,000

□

$60,000 to $75,000

□

$75,000 +

Thank you fo r your participation in this study.
Please hand this questionnaire to the experimenter now.
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